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ABSTRACT 
Democratization, Civil Society and NGOs: the case of Brcko District, 
BosniaaHerzegovina 
Alexander Sam Jeffrey, December 2004 
This thesis explores the impact of the process of democratization on the development of 
civil society organisations in Brcko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina. This study aims to 
advance existing debates concerning democratization within contemporary political 
geography by reflecting on the plural and conflicting nature of civil society organisations. 
In the shadow of the fall of Communism across east and central Europe, analysts have 
focussed on the role of civil society in legitimising democratic transitions. This has led to 
the notion of 'civil society building' entering the 'tool kit' of intergovernmental 
organisations and multilateral donors, as the term has become part of a global discourse of 
development and democratization. Increasingly, the constitution of civil society has been 
questioned, as the globalisation of development discourse has coincided with a narrowing 
of the term to focus almost exclusively on non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This 
thesis critically examines these processes within Brcko District, an area of north-east 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that suffered brutal ethnic cleansing during the conflict of the 
1990s. As a result of its strategic significance to all warring parties it did not comprise part 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Instead, it was decided to establish the area as a 'special 
district', with a unique commitment to multiethnic institutions such as schools, judiciary 
and the police. This decision led to a significant increase in international funding, coupled 
with the escalation of the executive and legislative powers of the internationally-led Office 
of the High Representative (OHR). This thesis assesses the influence of this supervision 
and intervention on the ability ofNGOs to set the agenda and represent the concerns of the 
local citizenry. As such, it forms part of a wider effort to provide ethnographic 
perspectives on the relationship between civil society and democratization. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Research questions 
and thesis overview 
1.1 Introduction 
As l approached the Office of the High Representative (OHR)' it stmck me that the building 
lived up to its local nickname 'Alcatraz' [see figure 1.1 overleaf]. Located near the centre of 
Brcko, the building had previously been a secondary school: the only external sign of its 
change in use was the ten-foot perimeter wall. As l approached the intercom system l 
rummaged in my bag for my identification card: a library card from a UK university, its 
legitimacy granted by its metal chain and plastic holder. I pressed a button by a small 
window and waited. A surly looking security guard asked what I wanted. I said l was there 
for the non-governmental organisation (NGO) meeting. He went away without a word. A 
door six feet away made a buzzing noise-! took this as an indication to walk through. In a 
small entrance lobby l was greeted with a stare ji-om the security guard and asked to walk 
through an airport-style security gate and place my bag on a conveyor belt. Unlike in an 
airport, the screen was turned towards me-! could see the silhouette of my voice recorder, 
1 The internationally-led organisation responsible for implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Figure 1.1 Office of the High Representative (OHR), Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
camera, phone, electronic diary and notebooks. I explained that I was in Brcko conducting 
research about NGOs - this provoked a familiar smile somewhere between amusement and 
confusion. He said I could go through to the main reception. I walked across the courtyard 
and through the mirrored glass of the front doors. There I was asked to hand over my 
identification, it was replaced for a large 'OHR Visitor' badge. As I waited to be escorted 
through to the conference room I noticed that the area surrounding the reception was 
exhibiting drawings by school children depicting the Supervisor [head of OHR Brcko] 
alongside messages of 'Happy Easter '. It seemed ironic that in this former school building 
the walls were still covered by children 's drawings. I was eventually escorted through to a 
large conference room, where representatives from many of Brcko 's NGOs sat in silence 
looking bored. In one corner sat a group of six 'civilian affairs ' soldiers in uniform and at 
the head of the table three OHR representatives with translators. As the representatives 
introduced themselves and provided an outline of their activities I started to think: what has 
brought us all here? Why have the NGO representatives gone through the humiliation of 
entering this building to sit and listen to the details of the activities of other organisations? 
2 
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Why is the OHR in Brcko? Why has no one ji-om the Local Government come to the 
meeting? Why have I come to the meeting? 
(Extract from fieldjournal20111 April2003) 
My fieldwork in Brcko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina2, was a continual 
process of questioning the practices and representations that often are subsumed 
under the rubric of 'democratization'. In this thesis, I explore the impact of 
processes of democratization on the development of civil society organisations in 
Brcko District. My study aims to advance existing debates concerning 
democratization within contemporary political geography by reflecting on the plural 
and conflicting nature of civil society organisations and their normative placement 
within democratization discourses. 
The past two decades have seen an increasing focus within the social sciences 
on the content of democracy and, specifically, how fledgling democracies can 
"consolidate" (Hall, 1996). In the shadow of the fall of Communism across Eastern 
and Central Europe, analysts have focussed on the role of civil society in legitimising 
democratic transitions (Arato and Cohen, 1995; Isaac, 1996; Padgett, 1999). This 
renewed interest has led to the notion of 'civil society building' entering the 'tool kit' 
of intergovernmental organisations and multilateral donors, as the term has become 
part of a global discourse of development and democratization. Increasingly, the 
constitution of civil society has come to be questioned, as the globalisation of 
development discourse has coincided with a narrowing of the term to focus almost 
exclusively on NGOs. 
This thesis critically examines these processes within Brcko District, an area 
of north-east Bosnia that suffered brutal 'ethnic cleansing' during the conflict of the 
1990s. As a result of its strategic significance to all warring parties Brcko was left 
out of the Dayton Peace Agreement, its fate decided by an International Arbitration 
Tribunal four years later. The tribunal decided to establish the Brcko area as a 
2 In line with accepted abbreviations, I will refer to 'Bosnia and Herzegovina' as 'Bosnia' for the 
remainder of the thesis. 
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'special district' of Bosnia, with a unique commitment to multiethnic institutions 
such as government, schools, judiciary and the police. This decision led to a 
significant increase in intemational funding, coupled with the escalation of the 
executive and legislative powers of the intemationally-led OHR. This thesis assesses 
the influence of this supervision and intervention on the ability of NGOs to set the 
agenda and represent the concems of the local citizenry. In doing so, this work 
contributes to wider efforts to provide ethnographic perspectives on the relationship 
between civil society and democratization. 
The ethnographic focus of this thesis has allowed critical reflection on the 
methodologies employed by political geographers in understanding democratization. 
This approach has involved a 'multi-scalar' mode of inquiry, looking at the interplay 
between different scales, drawing on Cox (1998) in "challenging the notion that 
issues are clearly definable in scale-exclusive terms, as local, national or regional" 
(Cox, 1998: 3). The interaction between NGOs, intemational organisations and the 
Brcko District Govemment is assessed through Amin, Massey and Thrift's (2000) 
notion of 'politics in place' examining participation in "multiple causes and networks 
of affiliation, resulting in people bearing multiple political identities" (Amin, 2002: 
397). The ethnographic methodology employed in this thesis focuses on these hybrid 
or multiple political identities, vital in a context such as Bosnia where notions of 
identity have too often been predetermined by essential characteristics. 
This methodological approach allows the thesis to focus on the improvised 
and often contradictory processes through which labels such as 'civil society' are 
produced in post-conflict Bosnia. Recent scholarship conceming civil society m 
Bosnia has rightly pointed to the lack of involvement of civil society groups m 
negotiating the peace settlement following the conflict in 1992-1995, or in shaping 
the terms of intemational intervention (Oberg, 2000). But this work has often 
reproduced a binary between NGOs, imaged as virtuous organisations offering 
spaces of democratic participation, and intemational organisations which are 
perceived as repressive, or even neo-colonial (Chandler, 2000; Evans-Kent, 2002). In 
4 
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a similar vein, several studies conflate NGOs with civil society, a representative 
strategy that suggests NGOs are autonomous spaces distinct from the state (Tvedt, 
2002). This binary between state and NGOs has been reproduced at the global scale 
in accounts of a "global civil society", where networks ofNGOs and pressure groups 
are holding to account the 'global state' (represented through intergovernmental 
organisations and multinational companies) (Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003). This thesis 
wishes to challenge this binary. By examining the state in Bosnia as 'improvised', it 
complicates the division between NGOs and organisations of authority. The 
ethnographic material points instead to complex and plural relationships which draw 
NGOs into the gaze of this improvised state in Brcko, and legitimises their existence. 
Such a reconceptualisation invigorates understandings of democratization and 
civil society by drawing on two bodies of theoretical work. The first is the recent 
critical and ethnographic work re-theorising the state. Authors such as Trouillot 
(2002) and Painter (2002) have looked to Foucault's (1991) conception of 
'govemmentality' to focus on the techniques and technologies through which 
modem state power is reproduced. This is a theme addressed by Navaro-Yashin 
(2002) in her ethnographic study of the Turkish state, where she examines the 
mundane or 'everyday' practices through which the state revitalises its power. This 
literature helps illuminate the practices of the improvised state in Brcko, as it shapes 
the post-conflict political and social fields through a range of governmental 
techniques. The thesis also engages with Bourdieu's conceptual vocabulary of 
capital, habitus andfield (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1989, 1990). Bourdieu's concepts 
provide a framework for understanding the interplay between structure and agency in 
determining the social practices of NGOs. This vocabulary helps highlight the 
stmggles between NGOs as they strive to maximise their social and cultural 
resources to ensure institutional survival. Rather than rehearsing these literatures and 
their relationship to more standard narratives of civil society formation outside 'the 
West' in an all encompassing literature review, these arguments will be introduced as 
they become pertinent to the discussion in the thesis. 
1.2 Research Questions and Thesis Aims 
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The central research question of this thesis is: 
e What is the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
'democratization schemes' in Brcko District, Bosnia? 
This question provokes four subsidiary research questions: 
• How is 'democracy' conceived in post-conflict Brcko? 
8 What constitutes an NGO in the context of Brcko? 
8 Which organisations are instrumental in influencing the role of 
NGOs in Brcko? 
• Through what mechanisms is this influence manifest? 
In addressing these questions, the thesis seeks to advance contemporary 
understandings of civil society, intervene in regional debates over the direction and 
nature of democratization, and contribute to research reflecting critically on the 
practice of ethnographic fieldwork. 
1.3 Thesis Overview 
This thesis addresses these research questions over the course of six chapters. 
Chapter 2 'Approaches' reflects on the methodologies employed during the 
research in Brcko and the subsequent dissemination of findings. Examining the 
'everyday practices' of NGOs and international agencies has required an 
ethnographic approach, encompassing both listening to what people say they do, and 
6 
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observing how they do it. This chapter addresses, in particular, the political and 
ethical challenges provoked by this qualitative research process. 
Chapter 3 'Producing Bosnia' continues the discussion of the politics of 
research, this time through an examination of the role of the historian in promoting 
pat1icular representations of the past. This discussion is developed in the context of 
the Balkans, where notions of the past have been characterised by reductive images 
of ancient ethnic hatred or nationalist myth making. Drawing on these insights, this 
thesis examines the history of Bosnia and, in particular, how the small northern town 
of Brcko became strategically important to all three warring sides in the conflict 
from 1992-1995. The strategic importance of Brcko was 'resolved' in March 1999 
through an internationally-brokered agreement known as 'The Final Award'. 
The implications of this decision are discussed in Chapter 4 'Improvising 
the State'. The Final Award created Brcko as a 'special district' of Bosnia, with 
'multi-ethnic' government, judiciary, schools and police. In a parallel process, the 
award led to an intensification of the power of international agencies operating in the 
town. Drawing on analysis of literature produced by Bosnian NGOs and interviews 
with government officials and NGO representatives, this chapter argues that rather 
than thinking of the state as a distinct set of organisations in Brcko, it is more useful 
to think of it as an improvised network of local and international agencies 
performing the practices of the state. In the absence of elections in Brcko, the 
agencies of the improvised state have measured democracy in terms of the 
transparency of the activities of the Brcko District Government. Such a measure of 
democracy has placed a premium on an active civil society, capable of holding the 
'state' to account. In the case of Brcko, NGOs have been perceived as such civil 
society actors. 
Chapter 5 'Local Geopolitics' examines the emergence of NGOs in Brcko 
District. In particular, the chapter examines academic literature, policy scripts and 
interview material to highlight how the geopolitical framing of the Bosnian conflict 
as a 'humanitarian disaster' led to the involvement ofNGOs as the main institutional 
form of international intervention. In the post-conflict period the focus of 
7 
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international agencies m Bosnia has shifted from humanitarian relief to 
'democratization', leaving NGOs filling a new role as organisations of 'civil 
society'. This has created a paradox: while NGOs are embraced by the agencies of 
the improvised state as representatives of civil society, their role in delivering 
internationally-funded humanitarian relief ensures that they continue to be perceived 
as 'wealthy' and 'international' by members of the Brcko public. 
This paradox is explored in greater detail in Chapter 6 'Gentrifying Civil 
Society'. This chapter suggests that the NGOs in Brcko represent gentrified civil 
society: certain organisations have used their accumulated social and cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1984) to secure funding, while others have struggled to adapt to shifting 
donor discourses. These varied experiences have led to competition and suspicion 
amongst the NGOs themselves, with some turning to nationalist political parties to 
fund their activities. By drawing on the interview data with members of community 
associations and 'failed' NGOs, the thesis examines moments of crisis and reversal 
within civil society. In particular, this chapter explores how intervention has worked 
to marginalise potential civil society groups that do not 'fit' the prevailing 
democratization discourse and therefore have not gentrified. An example is made of 
the Mjesne Zajednice (former Yugoslav 'Local Communities'), a network of 
territorially bound community associations which had links to the former Socialist 
State. While they have gained scarce funding from international donors and remain 
marginalised within formal networks of international/ local NGO collaboration, the 
Mjesne Zajednice have now emerged as key outlets of citizen participation and 
representation. This detailed investigation provides insights into the premium placed 
by citizens on familiarity and continuity in this post-conflict environment. 
Chapter 7 'Conclusions: Examining spaces of democracy' rethinks the 
role of NGOs in scenarios of international intervention. Rather than representing an 
autonomous group of civil society actors, the gentrified NGOs in Brcko were bound 
in intricate and changing ways to the agencies of the improvised state. This situation 
is not reflected in current policy literature, keen to represent NGOs as independent 
from the state, as sites of potential resistance and dissent. This chapter suggests 
8 
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engaging with spaces of alternative politics in Brcko. This includes spaces such as 
the Mjesne Zajednice which challenge dominant nanatives. These associations, 
difficult to label and define, do not fit the rhetoric and practices of democratization 
in post-conflict Brcko: they have not been handed an OHR visitors badge, they have 
not been granted security clearance, and they have not attended OHR meetings. 
9 
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Chapt r 2 
Approaches: 
Researching and 
representing Brcko 
District 
The violent and protracted disintegration of Yugoslavia stimulated 
fascination amongst the world's politicians, media and academics in the plight of 
'Bosnia'. The creation of the Dayton Bosnian state in 1995 occmTed in parallel with 
the emergence of Bosnia as an object of political campaigns, aid appeals and 
academic analysis. Bosnia became more than a fledgling European country; it was a 
problem in need of a solution. Politicians and academics attempted to find 'causes' 
of the conflict, setting Bosnia apart as a site of difference, some pointing to the past, 
suggesting 'ancient ethnic enmity' and 'primordial hatreds', others to international 
intervention, branding 'Bosnia' as a neo-colonial enterprise. These processes set 
Bosnia apart as a place whose difference could be understood and solved through 
careful observation and analysis. 
10 
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My first visit to Brcko in autumn 1999 was part of an attempted solution to 
the 'Bosnia problem'. I was UK Coordinator of Firefly Youth Project, a small 
Scottish NGO carrying out inter-ethnic reconciliation activities in the fields of art, 
music and theatre in Brcko. My time was divided between fundraising in Edinburgh 
and implementing a grant from the Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Trust Fund in 
Brcko. This dual role drew my attention to the polarised images of Bosnia. During 
my visits to Brcko I witnessed an impoverished town struggling in an uncertain 
economic climate, with an ever-present backdrop of nationalist politics. The most 
common topics of conversation with friends in Brcko were everyday concerns of job 
security, poverty or David Beckham, not nationalism or historical hatreds. But these 
everyday struggles did not seem appropriate to the public in Edinburgh as I 
attempted to raise money for Firefly's activities. On fundraising trips round 
Scotland, Bosnia was described to me as a crazed place where friends killed each 
other in cold blood because they were of different ethnicities, not somewhere where 
children needed music lessons. When I contacted newspapers to ask them to print a 
feature on Firefly to generate publicity, the article would often appear with an 
archive photograph of starved men behind barbed wire or an old lady shuffling past 
a burnt out building. 'Bosnia' had become a collection of images suggesting a land 
beyond 'everyday' concerns. 
By subjecting Bosnia to academic research there is potential to exacerbate 
this distancing. The terminology of 'fieldwork' and 'ethnography' are suggestive a 
latent power relation, presenting the researcher as an agent of enlightenment and 
Bosnia as a site of inquiry. Recent theorisations of methodological practice have 
begun to illuminate these power relations and question how they shape the conduct 
and outcomes of empirical research (McDowell, 1998; Skelton, 2001 ). Drawing on 
such studies, this chapter will reflect on the ethical and political challenges that I 
have faced researching and representing Brcko District. Rather than attempting to 
divide the research into distinct phases of 'data collection', 'analysis' and 'writing 
up', this approach allows a discussion of the cyclical, improvised, eclectic and 
collaborative nature of research and dissemination. Consequently, the first 
'international intervention' I will examine in this thesis is my own. 
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2.2 Research Position 
Positionality has become a key concern of theorists of research methodology. 
This concept challenges the portrayal of the researcher as a neutral observer, 
external to the object of observation before subjecting their data to interpretation and 
finally presenting impartial findings. These theoretical developments encourage 
researchers to place themselves back in the frame of their research to acknowledge 
how their role shapes the processes they seek to interpret and describe (Rose, 1997; 
McDowell, 1998). These methodological insights are visible in the work of graphic 
journalist Joe Sacco (2000, 2001). His work examining the conflicts in Bosnia and 
Israel/Palestine provides striking examples of acknowledging the researcher, or in 
this case the journalist, as an active agent in shaping the outcomes of their research. 
In Safe Area Goraide (2000), Sacco compiles an account of his experiences living in 
the Eastern Bosnian town of Gorazde during the Bosnian conflict. Sacco writes 
himself into almost every frame, distinctive with round glasses, his often nai"ve 
questions are written in full and text boxes are used to vocalise his inner-monologue. 
Figure 2.1 (overleaf) shows two interlinked aspects of Sacco's positionality as a 
resident in besieged Gorazde. Firstly, Sacco alludes to his privileged position as an 
international outsider, capable of a rapid exit and " ... back home to mommy if things 
really slipped back to unthinkable" (Sacco, 2000: 7). Secondly, the excerpt shows 
one example of a request for help, in this case from a local resident for original Levi 
Jeans from Sarajevo. Throughout the book Sacco struggles with ethical questions of 
who to help and how, and what impact this assistance may have. 
There are many parallels between these ethical dilemmas and those I 
experienced during the research process in Brcko. I was apprehensive at the outset 
about my change in role from NGO worker to NGO researcher. I was particularly 
concerned that I would still be perceived as a Firefly employee, a perception that 
could restrict access to certain organisations or limit the openness of NGO 
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Figure 2.1 Excerpt from Safe Area Goraide 
(Source: Sacco, 2000: 7) 
·· .. . 
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representatives to discuss the internal workings of their organisations. In the event 
this did not seem to be the case or, if it was, it was not manifest as reduced access or 
guarded responses. The effects of this shift in role seem to have been reduced by the 
rapid turnover of staff in the NGOs, coupled with the arrival of many new 
organisations since my time with Firefly. The greater ethical challenge was how to 
act in response to the many calls for assistance from all the NGOs. My privileged 
access to audiences with international organisations led to a number of NGOs 
requesting advocacy on their behalf. These experiences reminded me of Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes' (1992) study of violence amongst street communities of North 
East Brazil. Prior to her research she had worked in these communities establishing 
a creche and assisting with the immunization of young children. When she returned 
to Brazil to conduct fieldwork, she described how local people became resentful of 
her lack of action and help (Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 16). My research attracted 
similar criticism, and I was asked on a number of occasions 'why wasn't I doing 
anything useful?' In response I attempted to keep the organisations well informed of 
what I was doing and why, through research statements and repeated visits, 
culminating in a 'dissemination event' towards the end of my research in Brcko 
(discussed in the final section of this chapter). By drawing together the NGOs, 
international agencies and representatives of the local government, I attempted 
'group advocacy' by discussing the problems that NGOs faced in the presence of 
those who could perhaps institute change. 
While these ethical challenges formed a backdrop to the research in Brcko, 
over the course of the fieldwork my positionality was not static. I found myself 
assuming various personas in order to suit the particular research scenario. When 
interviewing members of international agencies I wore a collar, carried business 
cards and used my laptop bag as a briefcase. Partially unintentionally I was 
attempting to act like a member of an international agency, to be part of 'their 
group'. In these cases time was short so questions needed to be direct and relevant. 
My background knowledge of Brcko, accrued over my time with Firefly, proved 
valuable in this context. This research persona was not used for meetings with local 
community associations, where I 'dressed down' and carried my field equipment in 
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a cloth bag. I was aware of not wanting to look like a donor, a situation which could 
raise expectations or suspicion. When conducting interviews with these 
organisations often the first question I was asked with a hint of suspicion was 'which 
organisation was I from?' When I said a university in the UK, the representatives 
from the NGOs often seemed to relax. An affiliation to a Brcko NGO or 
international agency would have affected how open the interviewees felt, for many 
of the organisations had poor relations with these international organisations and 
they may have considered my research to be following a particular institutional line. 
In contrast to the international organisations, during these interviews with local 
associations and NGOs I employed naivety as a research strategy, in an attempt to 
uncover the assumed or the implicit. This approach was particularly important when 
interviewing nationalist organisations, where naivety was a useful tool for gaining 
insights into how these organisations viewed international interventions in Bosnia. 
There is not a neutral or disinterested position from which to gauge the effect 
of these research personas on the production of research findings. One of the key 
insights of theorisations of positionality is that the researcher is never in the 
possession of perfect self knowledge (Rose, 1997: 306). In the case of Brcko I 
cannot know how my deployed personas changed the informants' perceptions of me 
or the research process. Ultimately, I carried out these performances for my own 
benefit, like a chameleon changing my persona to ensure that I felt comfortable and 
accepted within different scenarios. Perhaps the only conclusion I can draw is that 
these personas played some role, that the research was not a case of uncovering pre-
existing findings, but rather a mutual performance of their social construction as a 
consequence of friction and collaboration between researcher and researched. In 
order to capture and represent this friction, I chose to employ an ethnographic 
methodology in my fieldwork in Brcko. 
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2.3 Ethnography 
As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a tendency within accounts 
of the Bosnian conflict and the post-conflict period to give privilege to the 
geopolitical or the historical: to understand everything that has happened in Bosnia 
as the outcome of wider global transformations or the re-emergence of hatreds from 
the past. These approaches have tended to shape the choice of methodology 
employed, with such studies often engaging with the discourses of 'key agencies' 
such as UN bodies or the OSCE, while 'local' opinion was frequently reduced to 
representatives of intransigent nationalist political parties. In contrast, this thesis has 
attempted to engage with the people of Brcko, to give primacy to the social 
processes that make up post-conflict Bosnia. This methodology has been an attempt 
to evoke Brcko through a description of the local, every-day struggles that are often 
lost within the distancing discourses of Bosnia. This process began five years ago, 
when I first arrived with Firefly. The time since can be best described as a 
protracted ethnography, consisting of structured methodologies examining the 
practices of individuals and organisations, coupled with a broader process of 
observation assessing the social contexts in which these practices were embedded 
(Herbert, 2000). As Cloke et al. (2004) suggest, ethnography examines both "what 
people say they do and why, and what they are seen to do and say to others" (Cloke 
et al., 2004: 169 emphasis in the original). The structured methodologies consisted 
of a survey of the NGOs which were operating in Brcko District coupled with 
follow-up interviews. By definition, the more unstructured methodologies are 
difficult to describe. They consisted of a series of practices rather than specific 
methodologies, grouped around a process of observation of the NGOs and 
international agencies in Brcko. The main outputs from these unstructured practices 
were a nine-volume field journal and 800 digital photographs. This coupling of 
structured and open-ended methodologies has allowed an examination of both the 
official discourses circulating in post-conflict Brcko but also of the ways in which 
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these discourses are reshaped, resisted and compromised as they are translated into 
practice. 
2.3.1 Structured Methodologies 
Following language training (see below) the first structured research activity 
conducted in Brcko was an NGO survey, a process which took place from 
September to November 2002 (see the Thesis Appendix for a copy of the survey). 
With a year stretching ahead in which to conduct research, the regimented nature of 
the survey was reassuring - I could print the surveys out, type them up and tick 
organisations off a spreadsheet. In addition to the survey I prepared and translated a 
'research overview' for the NGOs, which consisted of an A4 sheet briefly 
introducing the main themes of the research. The methods for finding organisations 
to survey were eclectic, shaped by past experience, secondary sources, word of 
mouth and attending NGO functions. This range of strategies pointed to the 
problematic definition of what it took for an NGO to 'exist'. The fuzzy boundary 
between NGO existence and non-existence is itself an important aspect of analysis 
of this thesis, discussed in Chapters 5 ands 6. For the purposes of the survey I drew 
on the work of Mercer (2002) and Desai (2002) to establish four selection criteria to 
limit the organisations surveyed: legal registration; social welfare objectives; non-
profit, and non-political (in the sense of non-party political) objectives. Following 
these criteria, eighteen NGOs were surveyed in Brcko. 
I had convinced myself prior to arriving in Brcko that the survey would have 
two main purposes: to act as an 'audit' of the NGO sector, and provide research 
themes which could be examined in greater detail through extended interviews. 
Though fulfilling these objectives, in practice the main benefit of the survey was that 
it acted as a useful tool to introduce myself to the NGO volunteers and workers. 
The NGOs had experienced a number of surveys in the year preceding my research, 
undertaken or funded by international organisations such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) or International Rescue Committee (IRC). In 
light of these surveys I risked being perceived by the organisations in Brcko as 'just 
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another international organisation counting the NGOs'. This made me more explicit 
in my 'research overview' of my independence from donor organisations or 
international agencies. Despite this potential risk, the surveys from the UNDP and 
IRC had the advantage of ensuring that my study was considered 'legitimate 
research' as the questions seemed familiar to the NGOs. This proved a sound 
strategy, as the open-ended nature of the interviews was a much less familiar 
medium of research. 
From September 2002 until June 2003 I attempted to interview all the 
surveyed NGOs, in addition to interviewing local and national government 
representatives, members of 'international organisations' such as the OSCE and 
United Nations agencies, and representatives from the OHR. I conducted forty-nine 
extended interviews over this period (see figure 2.2 overleaf), with two further 
interviews conducted on a one-week visit to Brcko in September 2004. As this 
interview schedule demonstrates, the interviews were not spread evenly over this 
time. The extreme cold of January, coupled with many public holidays for 
differently-timed Catholic and Orthodox New Years and Christmases, made 
arranging interviews or meetings extremely difficult. Following an improvement in 
the weather over March and April the interview-rate increased. The majority of the 
interviews were conducted in the foyer cafe area of the Hotel Posavina, as it 
provided a quiet space located in the centre of town (see figure 2.3). As some cafes 
exhibited ethno-national affiliations, the recently reconstructed hotel benefited from 
seeming 'neutral'; learning the ethnicised coffee landscape had been important to 
ensuring that interviewees did not feel uncomfortable. Each interview followed a 
checklist approach rather than structured questions: as themes were covered in the 
discussion they were ticked off a list (Alien, 1991; Warrington, 1997: 404). This 
flexible process was iterative: interview 'findings' could be easily incorporated into 
future themes for discussion. Brief notes were taken during the interviews, though 
they were all recorded with a digital voice recorder and the sound files stored on a 
laptop. The voice recorder's extremely small size, coupled with the fact that it did 
not require an external microphone, meant that it was an unobtrusive device and 
only on a two occasions was there objections to its use (and these were only for 
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Organisation 
N/A 
Office of the High Representative, Brcko 
Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 
Counterpart International , Brcko 
UNDP Brcko Local Action Programme 
CIMIC, Eagle Base Tuzla 
EKI Microcredit, Brcko 
OSCE, Brcko 
Serb Sisters' Association 
Bozur Women's Association, Brcko 
"Baza" Anti Terrorist Organisations, Brcko 
Graica Youth Association, Brcko 
Brcko Development Agency 
Paraplegics Association, Brcko 
Serb Youth Association, Brcko 
UNDP Brcko Local Action Programme 
Office of the High Representative, Brcko 
Bosnijak Women's Association, Brcko 
Vermont, Brcko 
Roma Association, Brcko District 
CRIC' Agricultural NGO, Dornja Skakava 
Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 
Party of Social Democrats (POP), Brcko 
Serb Democratic Party (SOS), Brcko 
UNDP Brcko Local Action Programme 
Party of Democratic Progress (SDP), Brcko 
Brcko District Assembly 
Proni Brcko 
N/A 
Office of the High Representative, Brcko 
Proni, Brcko 
Arizona Market, Brcko District 
N/A 
Proni Brcko 
Brcko District Government 
Office of the High Representative, Brcko 
Counterpart International, Brcko 
Bosnijak Cultural Association, Brcko 
Brcko District Government 
Counterpart International 
S-For, Camp McGovern Brcko 
Office of the High Representative, Brcko 
PADCO, Brcko 
Bosnian Central Government 
Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo 
UNDP, Sarajevo 
USAID, Sarajevo 
Office of the High Representative, Brcko 
National Democratic Institute, Brcko 
GTZ, Tuzla 
Mercy USA, Tuzla 
Counterpart International, Brcko 
Representative 
Saska Haramina 
Political Officer 
Representative 
Officiai'C' 
Project Officer 
Coordination Officer 
President 
Head of Mission 
President 
President 
President 
President 
Director 
President 
President 
Programme Manager 
Former Chief of Staff 
President 
President 
President 
Programme Manager 
Programme Manager 
Youth Representative 
Youth Representative 
Project Officer 
Youth Representative 
Councillor 
Project Officer 
Bosnijak Displaced Person 
District Supervisor 
Programme Manager 
Stallhoider 
Goran Mihailovic 
Regional Coordinator 
Mayor 
Head of Reconstruction and Return 
Officiai'A' 
President 
NGO Liaison Officer 
Official'S' 
Civil Affairs Officer 
Political Officer 
Economics Advisor 
NGO Liaison Officer 
Senior Officer, Sarajevo 
Programme Manager 
Project Officer 
Former Legal Department Official 
Director 
Funding Advisor 
Programme manger 
Officiai'A' 
Figure 2.2 Interview schedule 
Date 
22nd August 2002 
5th September, 2002 
15th September 2002 
4th October 2002 
9th October 2002 
13th October 2002 
15th October 2002 
17th October 2002 
23rd October 2002 
21st November 2002 
22nd November 2002 
22nd November 2002 
4th December 2002 
9th December 2002 
11th December 2002 
18th February 2003 
20th February 2003 
21st February 2003 
25th February 2003 
27th February 2003 
18th March 2003 
27th March 2003 
14th April 2003 
14th April 2003 
15th April 2003 
16th April 2003 
21st April 2003 
22nd April 2003 
22nd April 2003 
24th April 2003 
30th April 2003 
3rd May 2003 
4th May 2003 
7th May 2003 
8th May 2003 
14th May 2003 
15th May 2003 
19th May 2003 
22nd May 2003 
22nd May 2003 
22nd May 2003 
24th May 2003 
24th May 2003 
28th May 2003 
28th May 2003 
29th May 2003 
29th May 2003 
2nd June 2003 
3rd June 2003 
4th June 2003 
15th September 2004 
18th September 2004 
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Figure 2.3 The Hotel Posavina, Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
brief periods within interviews as the interviewee felt the topic was too sensitive to 
be 'on the record'). The majority of the interviews were transcribed in Brcko, and 
the transcripts were then coded and analysed on return to Durham using Atlas.ti 
discourse analysis software. 
Though a number of the NGOs asked 'why' I wanted to conduct this 
research, this did not seem a defensive statement or an attempt to hide the practices 
of their organisation, but came rather on account of the perceived banality of 
particular questions. In order to relax the interviewee (and interviewer) interviews 
were designed to open with seemingly mundane aspects of institutional practice. 
The more sensitive questions relating, for example, to aspects of funding or relations 
with the government, could be broached towards the end of the interview when trust 
and familiarity had been established. In practice, this chronology would often have 
to be disregarded as the interviewees were not keen to engage in 'small talk' and 
would rather discuss the many difficulties they faced in terms of funding and 
regulation. In these instances, the interviews seemed to function as a pressure 
release for the organisations, and I served as a suitable sounding board for their 
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complaints. On one occasion, I visited the Brcko Paraplegics Association just to 
pick up a completed survey and it took forty minutes for the president to finish 
describing the litany of difficulties and injustices that his organisation faced. "You 
must write a book" he said "of the problems in Brcko" 1• This 'sounding board' role 
was not restricted to NGOs; I seemed to switch from researcher to confidante on a 
number of occasions with members of international organisations. It seemed their 
everyday routine did not seem to offer such an opportunity to air grievances about 
the situation in Brcko. 
The role of the interviews as a therapeutic process was not one I had 
envisaged in the research design phase, however, and it raised particular ethical 
dilemmas. I often had to clarify whether comments made outside of the formal 
interviewing process were made 'on the record', and unsurprisingly these remarks 
were often taken back, or I was informed that entire conversations 'did not happen'. 
This would prompt a negotiation where certain comments were deemed passable for 
the research, particularly as I had reassured each research participant that their 
contribution would be anonymous. This negotiation seems to reflect Parr's (200 1) 
assertion that ethnographic findings are not realities extracted from the field, but are 
rather "intersubjective truths" emerging from "the warmth and friction of an 
unfolding iterative process" (Parr, 2001: 181 ). In addition to the interviews and 
surveys, this 'warmth and friction' was evident in the wider ethnographic process of 
participant observation. 
2.3.2 Observation 
The interviews and surveys provided rich qualitative material concerning the 
practices and beliefs of the representatives of NGOs and international organisations, 
often used throughout this thesis in large unedited quotations. This material is 
supported by the insights gained from visiting Brcko regularly over the past five 
years, and specifically from living in the town from August 2002 to July 2003. This 
fieldwork period was spent living with a family in the Srpska Varos area of Brcko 
1 Comment made by the President of the Paraplegics Association, Brcko 3'd October 2002. 
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town (see figure 2.4). My landlord was the foreman ofthe Tesla battery factory and 
had lived in Brcko his entire life. Over summer barbeques or winter glasses of 
domace vino (domestic wine) he talked of his life in Brcko, of picnics on the banks 
of the Sava, of shopping trips to Vinkovci or Trieste, and the challenge of keeping 
his factory running. It is difficult to gauge the effect of these and other day-to-day 
experiences on the outcomes of this thesis: again, I do not have a neutral position 
outside of the research from which to make an assessment. I can, however, 
document the series of ethnographic practices which were untaken in an attempt to 
record the complexity and heterogeneity of Brcko District. 
Figure 2.4 View of Srpska Varos, Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
The mam activity of this ethnographic methodology was writing a field 
journal. This required around an hour-and-a-half each day, and formed an inner 
monologue concerning my experiences, observations, embryonic theories and day-
to-day concerns. At the outset the journal was most often employed for this latter 
function, serving the same therapeutic 'sounding board' role that the interviews 
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seemed to play for the research participants. In these cases the journal played a 
similar role to the text boxes found in the work of Joe Sacco (200 1, see figure 2.1 ). 
In the early stages I was not sure what I was meant to write in this journal or what 
observations qualified as 'research observations'. In this respect I followed the 
advice given to Katy Bennett, to ')ust keep writing" (Bennett and Shurmer-Smith, 
2001: 255). Whilst the interview transcripts provided an account of what was said in 
the interviews, I used the journal to annotate these texts with other qualitative 
aspects of the interview experience, such as what the atmosphere was like, how I felt 
it went and what was discussed outside the formal interview process. These details 
appear throughout the thesis and provide vital context to the interview quotations. 
Though I was not an NGO employee or volunteer over the research period 
(for the reasons explained in the 'Research Position' section above) I did participate 
in the broader practices of the NGOs and international organisations in Brcko. This 
involved activities as diverse as attending NGO coordination meetings at the OHR, 
watching theatrical productions, taking part in a workshop concerning the Brcko 
environment, and attending a UNDP press conference, an event which culminated in 
the rather strange experience of being interviewed by Brcko television on the 
prospects for entrepreneurs in the town. However, a selective methodology which 
merely observed such activities would miss the more banal, and I would argue more 
important, activities which comprised day-to-day life for the NGOs. The formal 
activities were punctuated by regular visits to Brcko cafes to drink coffee, venues 
that seemed to hold far more insights into the practices ofNGOs than meeting rooms 
or seminar halls. Indeed, coffee was so important to the routines of the NGOs that it 
was often better to go to a specific cafe than attempt to track an individual down by 
telephone or visiting an office. These cafe trips were not, of course, restricted to the 
NGOs. When I met with the head of the Department of Records at Brcko District 
Government he refused to talk unless we could go to the Hotel Posavina and eat ice-
cream first. This rhythm of institutional activity provided the time to write the 
journal, as a good proportion of each day would be spent waiting in a cafe for the 
next interview or meeting. 
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The joumal also served as a text through which the Brcko landscape could be 
interpreted, providing a space to discuss the road signs, graffiti, monuments and 
even the car number plates. This text was supported by an archive of digital 
photographs, though there were restrictions on what I could photograph. Such 
restrictions were illustrated by a trip I made to photograph the Brcko suburb of 
Klanac, an area which had been destroyed during the conflict and is now the location 
of a number of retumed refugee families (see figures 2.5 and 2.6 overleaf). While 
walking through Klanac taking photographs I became aware of a van following me 
along the road. Finally it pulled over and two angry men emerged, demanding to 
know why I had been taking photographs. It was difficult to think of a reason; I 
thought my explanation of 'conducting research' would sound feeble. It did. After 
some time the two men called the police, who arrived promptly and, again, asked 
what I was doing. I explained that I was from a university in the UK and I was 
taking photographs for research purposes. The police did not seem impressed, 
though the two men were now more bemused than angry. In the absence of formal 
identification the police took details of my 'Young Person's Railcard' and I was told 
not to take any more photographs around Klanac. A few days later a friend 
explained that groups in Brcko used to take photographs of the homes of retumee 
families as a tactic of intimidation. 
Following this incident I was more selective of the photographs I took and 
more covert when I took them. The incident was, however, illustrative of more than 
Brcko's sensitive retums situation. This episode also demonstrated the importance of 
photography as a weapon in post-conflict Brcko. This example illustrates how a 
seemingly innocent activity can become a threat through its context (Smith, 2003). 
While the joumal and photography were useful in providing a record of my 
experiences, the incident in Klanac points to how these observations comprise a 
process of translation as ideas and practices are mapped between cultural contexts. 
The research was not simply a report of the activities of the NGOs and intemational 
agencies in Brcko, but an attempt to convey the meanings that they described in 
different linguistic and cultural terms. This process has demanded sensitivity to the 
politics and ethics of translation. 
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Figure 2.5 View of Klanac. Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
Figure 2.6 Catholic church. Klanac, Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
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2.4 Translation 
Pierre Bourdieu ( 1989) suggests that the ability to name and label social 
practices is a product of "symbolic capital". "Symbolic capital" he continues, "is a 
credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be 
in a position to impose recognition" (Bourdieu, 1989: 22). Amongst other contexts, 
Bourdieu applies this theorization to the process of academic research, where he 
suggests that the academic holds symbolic capital in the form of degrees and 
educational certificates (Bourdieu, 1988). The concept of symbolic capital is 
particularly relevant where the research involves the mapping of ideas and 
discourses from one cultural context to another. During the process of interpretation 
the meanings can be obscured and transformed as the cultural context is changed. In 
such instances, social practices can be reduced to sanitized discourses palatable to an 
academic audience. An attempt to retain the meaning of the ethnographic material 
gathered in Brcko required both learning the languages spoken in the interviews, and 
a strategy of involving the research participants in the process of interpretation. 
These strategies of linguistics and dissemination stimulated separate ethical 
challenges for the research methodology. 
2.4.1 Linguistics 
It should be stated at the outset that the challenge of translating the meanings 
behind the discourses and practices of the organisations in Brcko did not always 
mean negotiating a second language. Discussing the situation in Bosnia with 
members of international or developmental agencies, while in English, required 
knowledge of the 'Bosnia speak' through which their policies, activities and beliefs 
were phrased. This 'language' consisted of its own vocabulary of acronyms, peace 
agreements and political events. Like Serbo-Croat2, this language has demanded 
translation and interpretation, as the interview material was imbued with meaning in 
2 The name used for the language spoken in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia and Montenegro is not 
politically neutral, as discussed in this section. For convenience I will refer to this language by its 
pre-1990 title of Serbo-Croat for the rest of this thesis. 
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the analysis process. The experience of working for Firefly in Brcko gave me some 
familiarity with this 'Bosnia speak' of international and development agencies. This 
helped with the research methodology, though this did not resolve the challenges of 
translating the images and discourses of 'Bosnia speak' when analysing the research 
data. 
The greater challenge for the research process in Brcko was learning Serbo-
Croat. I had a basic knowledge of the language from working in Brcko, though to 
carry out ethnographic research demanded in-depth language training. Through the 
Modem Languages Department of the University of Durham I met a Bosnian 
undergraduate student who was reading Russian and offered tuition in Serbo-Croat. 
This tuition brought me to a conversational standard prior to the start of the 
fieldwork in Brcko. On arrival in Brcko I organised lessons with a language student 
and with a tutor at 'Proni ', a social education NGO based in Brcko. While these 
lessons were helpful in teaching the vocabulary and grammar of Serbo-Croat, they 
were also instructive in highlighting the politics of language in post-conflict Brcko. 
Language had been a key medium for developing and strengthening 
nationalist identities during the break up of Yugoslavia, an issue discussed in 
Chapter 3. Over the course of the conflict Serbo-Croat fractured between the three 
main ethno-national groups to form three languages, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. 
The differences in terms of grammar and vocabulary are negligible between the 
three languages, though the impression of distinct languages has been essential to 
nationalist political projects. It became clear during the research process that to call 
the language any one of these three titles was to demonstrate a tacit alignment with a 
particular ethno-national cause. Interestingly, in an attempt to circumvent this 
politics, the language was referred to as simply lokalni jezik ('local language') by 
the majority of research informants. This neutral label did not resolve all the 
methodological difficulties in using Serbo-Croat. In addition to the name of the 
language there were also political conflicts surrounding the dialect used and the 
script in which it was written. There are two broad dialects of Serb-Croat, the 
ekavski spoken in Serbia and parts of Bosnia and the ijekavski spoken in Croatia and 
parts of Bosnia. The central difference between these two dialects is the addition of 
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"j" in certain words. Examples include bread, (hleb in ekavski or hljeb in ijekavski), 
snow, (sneg in ekavski or snijeg in ijekavski) or river (reka in ekavski or rijeka in 
ijekavski). These dialects were explicitly linked to Croatian and Serbian causes 
during the conflict, with one friend recounting how there had been a popular 
Croatian slogan that the Eastern Croatian town of Osijek, besieged by Serbian 
troops, "[ ... ] would never become Osek!"3 The multi-ethnic status of Brcko meant 
that both the ekavski and ijekavski dialects were spoken. This dual dialect not only 
led to problems of understanding, but also meant that I had to shift between the two 
when I spoke Serbo-Croat so as to avoid suggesting an ethno-national affiliation. 
In addition to the dual dialects, the multi-ethnic status of Brcko also means 
that Serbo-Croat is written in both the Cyrillic and Latinic scripts (see figure 2.7). 
While Cyrillic has roots in the Serb Orthodox Church, it was drawn upon as a 
nation-defining quality by Serb nationalist politicians during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. As a consequence, the Serb parts of Bosnia solely use the Cyrillic 
script while the Bosnijak and Croat parts of the country use the Latinic script. As 
both Cyrillic and Latinic are used in Brcko it was important to learn Cyrillic for the 
fieldwork process. As my laptop could not produce Cyrillic script the NGOs survey 
was distributed in Latinic, though it was completed by two Serb youth organisations 
in Cyrillic. It was also important to know Cyrillic for the broader purposes of 
reading the Brcko landscape of road signs, cafe menus, election posters and graffiti. 
Despite learning Serbo-Croat to a conversational level the politicisation of 
dialect and script meant that it was vital to recruit a research assistant, not simply to 
help with the task of translating interviews but also with the wider task of mapping 
ideas and practices between different contexts. In post-conflict Bosnia translating 
had become a sought-after skill, and this has had an impact on the price of hiring 
translators in Brcko. Since professional translators were prohibitively expensive, I 
recruited assistants that, while fluent at English had only limited experience of 
translating. For the first five months I employed Dragana, an English student from 
Banja Luka University and for the second five months Sanela, a former NGO 
employee. The two research assistants added different perspectives to the study as 
3 Interview with Goran Mihailovic, Brcko 41h May 2003. 
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the first was a Serb and the second a Bosnijak. Both had lived in Brcko all of their 
lives, though like many of the Bosnijaks in Brcko, Sanela was displaced to the near-
by village of Gornji Rahic during the conflict. The inexperience of both RAs meant 
that concurrent translation was not always possible, or I would hear certain aspects 
of an informant' s answer being lost in the need to give a prompt English 
commentary. In an attempt to reduce the amount of lost information, the research 
assistant and I would always talk through the content of an interview in its 
immediate aftermath. 
Figure 2.7 Dual-script road sign, Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
Though vital for translating meanings between different contexts, the use of 
research assistants created the greatest ethical problems I faced during the research 
in Brcko. The selection process was extremely difficult, the job was well sought 
after and I risked alienating myself from a number of local NGOs by simply 
choosing the ' wrong' person at the outset of the fieldwork. Consequently I 
conducted a low-key recruitment procedure in an attempt to avoid raising 
expectations and leaving a large number of unsuccessful candidates. I was 
unprepared for the difficulties of acting as an employer, particularly when in case of 
one of the research assistants their wages comprised a main household income. This 
meant that research strategy had to be though out well in advance so that the length 
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of employment was established from the outset. It also led to the difficulty of 
finding activities when potential interviewees were either on holiday, unavailable or 
simply did not turn up. Another implication of sharing the research was the 
difficulty of retaining confidentiality. I briefed both assistants about the ethical duty 
of confidentiality, noting that the infotmation gained in the interviews must not be 
communicated with other individuals and organisations in Brcko. These issues of 
confidentiality re-emerged, however, when over the course of an interview with a 
donor organisation Dragana asked if they could help an NGO we had interviewed 
earlier that day. I discussed this breach of confidentiality with Dragana after the 
interview, drawing her attention to the importance of not discussing sensitive 
information gained from other organisations, and the need to separate advocacy 
activities from the practice of research. "Well" she responded "you obviously don't 
want to help the NGOs"4. 
Despite these practical and ethical difficulties, the research assistants were 
vital to the process of translating the social practices of the individuals and 
organisations in Brcko into a different language and cultural context. While careful 
translation may ensure that the meanings behind particular interview responses are 
retained, this does not reduce the role of the researcher in choosing how these 
meanings are reshaped through the process of interpretation and dissemination. In 
an attempt to draw the research participants into this process of interpretation I 
organised a dissemination event towards the end of the fieldwork period in Brcko. 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, this event also acted as a forum where the NGOs 
could voice their concerns relating to regulation and funding to representatives from 
the District Government and international agencies. 
2.4.2 Cartography 
The politics of cartography was a central consideration during the 
researching and writing of this thesis. There has been much work within human 
geography highlighting the role ofmaps as political texts (Wood, 1993; Dorling and 
4 Comment by Dragana, Brcko, 15°' October 2002. 
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Fairbaim, 1997). As suggested by Camp bell ( 1998a) "maps are exemplary moments 
that manifest the relationship between power and knowledge" (Campbell, 1998a: 
401). This nexus of power and knowledge was brought to the fore during the 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict, where resolutions were structured 
around the division of the Bosnian territory through numerous cartographic 'fixes' 
(an issue that will be discussed in Chapter 3). The culmination of such cartographies 
was the map produced at the Dayton Agreement, perhaps the clearest example in 
Bosnian terms of the power of cartography to solidify social difference in space. 
Through the writing process I have struggled with these issues of, on the one 
hand, wishing to illustrate the spatial context of Brcko through the use of maps, 
whilst on the other concerned that such maps are highly subjective and reify 
particular political projects. In the interest of consistency through the thesis, the 
maps in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 were all drawn using Adobe Illustrator 10, 
employing base map data and images from secondary texts and websites (the 
specific sources are indicated as footnotes). These maps should be deconstructed 
like any others - there point is not to represent 'reality' but to illustrate the changing 
way that territory has been divided and represented over the course of Bosnia's and 
Brcko's history. My control over aspects such as which maps to draw, the thickness 
of the lines and the colours used to represent and divide territory require particular 
consideration as they present another important aspect of the power afforded to the 
researcher by the process of writing and representing post-conflict Bosnia. 
2.4.3 Dissemination 
The dissemination event held at the end of the fieldwork period in Brcko 
presented a series of challenges for the research process. The first of these was 
logistical: I required a space large enough to accommodate all the research 
participants. It became apparent that the market for conference space had been 
inflated in much the same way as for translators following the arrival of international 
agencies in Brcko. This prohibitive cost meant that I would have to seek donor 
funding for the event, a situation which could compromise the appearance of 
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research autonomy that I had conveyed to the NGO representatives. This potential 
risk did not outweigh the value I placed on the discussion and feedback of the 
dissemination event, so I began searching for donors who would fund this one-off 
event. Finally, I approached the Head of OSCE Brcko, who agreed to sponsor the 
event on the understanding that he could invite officials from other OSCE field 
offices to attend, in addition to the members of the Youth Coordination Body 
(YCB)5. I was reticent to agree to these terms as the YCB involved political parties 
who, at that stage, had not participated in the research. However, these political 
parties had been regularly discussed by the NGOs in both positive and negative 
terms, and I felt their presence would certainly help stimulate discussion. Short of 
other options, I agreed to the OSCE's terms. This loss of ownership of the event 
would prove frustrating, as the choice of venue and number of invitations was 
outside my control. In the end the event was held at the International Press Centre in 
central Brcko, with invitations sent to all of the NGO representatives I had 
interviewed, members of the OHR, officials from the District Government, political 
party members and, most surprisingly, Brcko television. 
These logistical dilemmas and challenges were matched by concerns over the 
content of my presentation. As the day of the event drew near, the notion of sharing 
my findings with the NGOs, and now political parties, seemed daunting. Rather 
than suggesting potential conclusions or policy implications, I wanted the 
presentation to stimulate feedback from the NGO representatives. This meant 
avoiding academic jargon or theoretical references, and focussing instead on the 
experiences of the NGOs as they had been phrased in the interviews. By 
constructing a Power Point presentation around the external relationships of NGOs 
with other organisations (such as the state, international agencies, private enterprises 
and between different NGOs) I used the NGO interview responses to conjure 
questions about the role of NGOs in Brcko. These anonymous responses were 
placed in speech bubbles and appeared in the presentation in both Serbo-Croat and 
English (see figure 2.8 overleaf). These issues had often been presented in hushed 
5 The Youth Coordination Body was an initiative established by the OSCE in 2001 to encourage 
youth political participation in Brcko, discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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tones during the interviews, and the presentation provided a good opportunity to 
discuss them in a more open environment. 
The dissemination event began at around 11.30am in a third-floor room in 
the International Press Centre. As the name suggests, the space was more suitable 
for a press conference than a group discussion, with a raised table at one end of the 
room holding extravagant displays of plastic flowers. It was evident that the room 
was usually used for television purposes, as the walls were covered in garish 
advertisements for soft drinks, crisps and tobacco. These product placements made 
me unsure why I had been so concerned about the effect of donor funding on my 
research autonomy - these advertisements suggested the research had similar 
backing to a Formula One team. The turnout was very good, with around forty 
participants, and two cameras from Brcko television. My concerns over the 
ownership of the event were confirmed when an OSCE representative opened 
proceedings with a ten-minute discussion of the merits of recent Council of Europe 
regu lations concerning civil society. My presentation followed to the now suitably 
subdued audience, and I went slowly through some of the research findings. The 
presentation mirrored the plan for the interviews in following a rough structure from 
quantitative factors (number of NGOs and their activities) through to more 
conceptual questions of the role ofNGOs in Brcko. 
3. Odnosi nevladinih organizacija i Vlade 
[ 
;;-Prereglstrac'a je 
btla zbunjujuca I 
skupa" 
(
" Milm 
plsemo 
prljedloge'' 
3. NGO relationships: The Government 
"They don't 
understand 
NGOs" 
" Re-registration has 
been confusing and 
expensive" 
"We write 
proposals 
to them" 
! --
Figure 2.8 PowerPoint slides from the dissemination presentation 
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Though the television cameras lost interest at the mid way point, the rest of 
the audience seemed to follow the presentation. The ensuing discussion was lively, 
with the NGO representatives jockeying to make contributions, commenting on both 
the presentation and the outcomes of the research. These comments were extremely 
useful for the research and have shaped the writing of this thesis; in a number of 
places they have been used as direct quotations. The discussion was informally 
chaired by the Head of OSCE Brcko, though he seemed more intent on establishing 
a set of criteria, or demands, which the NGOs should present to the Brcko 
Government. This had been an ongoing theme of the Head of OSCE Brcko; he had 
stated on an earlier occasion that he felt the NGOs were "reactive rather than 
active"6• 
The one mam criticism of the presentation offered by the NGO 
representatives was that I had only concluded with a set of questions, a move I had 
made to promote discussion. A number of representatives wanted to know what I 
thought 'should be done'. This was a difficult question to answer. My opinion, or 
interpretation, had been manifest through the choice of quotations and the challenges 
I felt the NGOs faced. This approach had been designed to demonstrate the 
complexity of the NGO position in Brcko, that they faced challenges beyond simply 
a 'lack of money', as they struggled to gain recognition from a diverse range of 
agencies with which they were embroiled through various relationships. In short, I 
strived throughout the presentation, and this thesis, to avoid reducing the complexity 
of Brcko to a 'problem' to which I have an innovative 'sol uti on'. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Creating knowledge about a different cultural context is a fraught ethical and 
political process. Reflecting on past ethnographic methodologies lends a 
retrospective logic to this process, suggesting a pre-planned element to all the events 
which led to this thesis. This was certainly not the case in Brcko, where I often 
found myself down a research dead-end, perhaps standing in a village with a 
6 Interview with the Head of OSCE Brcko, 17th October 2002. 
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research assistant, no sign of an interviewee and no bus for two hours. This chapter 
has provided an opportunity to reflect on the importance and relevance of this 
eclectic process. A key ethical and political challenge has been negotiating and 
documenting my own positionality. The role of researcher granted a position to 
advocate for particular organisations, a privilege which is sure to have shaped the 
responses by certain organisations, keen to place their work in a 'good light'. I 
found myself deploying, or reshaping, my positionality in different research 
contexts, as I attempted to mould my persona to those I was interviewing. To see 
these shifts in research persona in terms of success or failure suggests some 
objective criteria on which they could be judged; the only real success was that I felt 
more comfortable by enacting these performances. 
Retaining the meanings of the interview responses from the context of Brcko 
to the academic environment of a UK university has involved a process of 
translation. It became apparent over the course of the research that meanings are not 
simply 'lost' in translation, but also found. The practices and discourses of the 
individuals in Brcko have been reformulated as they are mapped between different 
cultures. I have attempted to mediate, or at least recognise, this process of 
translation over the course of the research. This process of translation did not end 
with my return from Brcko. The writing of this thesis has required continued 
appreciation of issues such as positionality and changing contexts. The following 
chapter documents a task that exhibits both context and positionality: the challenge 
of writing a history ofBosnia. 
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Chapter 3 
Producing Bosnia: 
History, Yugoslavia 
and war 
The landscape of Brcko District is marked by signs of international 
intervention. Concrete is mixed in old metal drums with 'USAID Food Aid' printed 
on the side. The verges of the town are kept trimmed and litter-free by a band of 
workers dressed in orange UNDP-sponsored uniforms. The streets are subject to 
patrols by United States S-For (Stabilisation Force) troops in armoured personnel 
carriers. Over it all stands a billboard advertising the successes of the United Nations 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH). It is the aim of this chapter to 
examine the historical and geographical antecedents to this intervention. This is 
achieved through a chronological analysis of how Bosnia became a site of conflict in 
the early 1990s, a consequence of which was the emergence of Brcko as a 
strategically important and contested area. The origins of this contestation provide 
an important context for an examination of the discourses and practices of 
international intervention in Brcko in the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
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The aim of this chapter is to examine how the Brcko area assumed such 
strategic significance following the conflict in Bosnia. Before tracing the emergence 
of conflict on the Balkan Peninsula, it is necessary to discuss the problematic nature 
of writing history. Drawing on developments within historiography over the last 
three decades, I examine the role of the historian as an active agent in interpreting 
and constructing historical nanatives. This is particularly pertinent when examining 
competing nationalist discourses, dependent as they are on 'the past' as a space of 
national unity and shared understanding. These processes reflect Emest Gellner's 
assertion that "nationalism is not the reawakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist" (Gellner, 1964: 169 in Anderson, 2003: 6, 
emphasis in Anderson). While this national myth-making forms one area of 
historical manipulation, the other is the role of 'the Balkans' in contemporary 
academic, policy and popular texts as a 'European other'. 
The role of such imaginaries seems particularly important in the case of 
Bosnia, where 'the past' has become an arsenal of representations deployed to 
support specific political objectives. Consequently, this chapter does not (and 
cannot) present the definitive nanative of the events which led to conflict in Bosnia 
and the resulting strategic sensitivity of Brcko. There have been numerous attempts 
at such a linear account, each suggesting a different cause of the conflict, justified 
through 'rigorous' historical reconstruction. Rather than adding to these, this 
discussion will draw attention to the historical events that have been utilised to 
produce 'Bosnia' as an object of enquiry, a site of violence or as a locus for 
intervention. These discussions are vital in appreciating the complexity of Bosnia, 
and to understanding the cunent status of Brcko as an anomaly within its post-
conflict political landscape. 
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3.2 The Challenge of Writing History 
It is sometimes said that the aim of the historian is to explain the past by "finding," 
"identifying," or "uncovering" the "stories" that lie buried in chronicles; and that the 
difference between "history" and "fiction" resides in the fact that the historian "finds" his 
[sic] stmies, whereas the fiction writer "invents" his [sic]. This conception of the historian's 
task, however, obscures the extent to which "invention" also plays a part in the historian's 
operations. The same event can serve as a different kind of element of many different 
historical stories, depending on the role it is assigned in a specific motific characterization of 
the set to which it belongs. 
(White, 1973: 6-7) 
Hayden White's comment, taken from the canonical Metahistory (1973), 
highlights the role of historians as active agents in shaping, through processes of 
selection and omission, the historical narratives that they seek to present. This 
sentiment has charged an argument within historiography as to the ability of 
historians to make claims to 'fact'. On the one hand, Carr (1987) argues for greater 
relativism within historical accounts, suggesting "the belief in a hard core of 
historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the 
historian is a preposterous fallacy" (Carr, 1987: 12). On the other, Eric Hobsbawn 
( 1997), while concerned with the use and abuse of history in society and politics, 
sees dangers in suggesting that historical 'facts' exist only as a function of prior 
concepts (Hobsbawm, 1997: viii). Hobsbawm calls for a balance to be struck 
between a positivist notion of the historian carefully documenting a stream of 
historical fact and a boundless relativism that questions an objective reality, stating 
that "without the distinction between what is and what is not [ ... ] there can be no 
history" (Hobsbawm, 1997: ix ). 
These debates have brought to the fore the role of historical narratives as 
political texts, drawing on a certain vision of the past in order to justify or challenge 
the present. As reflected in the methodological theorisations of 'positionality' 
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discussed in the previous chapter, there is no 'objective' space where historians can 
avoid such politicisation. As Carr (1987) asserts, most historians have "bees in their 
bonnet, [ ... ] when you read a work of history, always listen out for the buzzing" 
(Carr, 1987: 23). There is a patticular need to "listen out for the buzzing" when 
dealing with historical narratives emerging from competing ethnic nationalisms. 
These accounts are themselves structured around myth-making and historical 
interpretation as nations "loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, 
glide into a limitless future" (Anderson, 2003: 19). As Hobsbawm (1997) comments: 
[ ... ] myth and invention are not merely bad intellectual jokes [ ... ] they are essential to the 
politics of identity by which groups [ ... ] try to find some certainty in an uncertain and 
shaking world by saying, 'We are different from and better than Others' 
(Hobsbawm, 1997: 9-10) 
Udovicki (2000) uses the term "mythologisation" to describe the 
manipulation of political discourse in the build-up to conflict in Yugoslavia over the 
late 1980s. She supports this with the examples of Slobodan Milosevic exploiting 
the anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo to remind the Serb population of their 
victimization, and President Tudjman "evoked early medieval kings - Tomislav 
from the tenth century, Kresimir and Zvonimir from the eleventh - as paleo-
emblems of Croatian statehood" (Udovicki, 2000: 3). As competing historical 
accounts were used to justify national claims (while excluding others) Udovicki 
suggests that "we had all together too much past" (Udovicki, 2000: 3). As 
discourses of nationalism dominated political debate across Yugoslavia, any illusion 
of historical objectivity disappeared as 'the past' was utilised as a tool for invoking 
specific claims for self-determination. In this way, the explicit interpretation of the 
historical narrative can act as a 'signpost' to the ideological standpoint of the 
individual historian or politician. Indeed, within an Open Society Fund collection of 
one hundred accounts from children who escaped the conflict in Sarajevo the young 
authors are left anonymous explicitly "to deter readers from reading their nationality 
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and trying to 'decipher' them ideologically" (Lesic, 1995: 17). 
However, an examination of historical sources, and the need to "decipher 
them ideologically", extends beyond authors from the Former Yugoslavia. The 
conflict of 1991-1995 has provoked a vast anay of literature on the Former 
Yugoslavia, characterised not by the invocation of a national "imagined community" 
(Anderson, 2003), but rather by an imagined space: 'the Balkans'. This work has 
often been guided by a notion of 'the Balkans' as a synonym for a reversion to "the 
tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian" (Todorova, 1997: 3). Wolff(l994) 
examines how Eastern Europe as a whole has been characterised as a 'land of 
shadows', with Winston Churchill's invocation of the 'Iron Curtain' as a "banier of 
quarantine" as the quintessential twentieth century example (Wolff, 1994: 2). Wolff 
goes on to suggest that these factors have meant that many studies in the region have 
been projects in 'philosophic geography', where it is not actually necessary to travel 
to Eastern Europe in order to participate in its intellectual discovery (Wolff, 1994: 
7). Maria Todorova (1997) uses the term 'Balkanism', drawing on Said's 
Orient a/ism ( 1978), to suggest that the Balkans have served as a "repository of 
negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 
"European" and the "West" has been constructed" (Todorova, 1997: 188). Yugoslav 
writer Ivo Andric, in 'The Days of the Consuls>~ ( 1941 ), a story of a French Consul 
posted in the central Bosnian town of Travnik, alludes to such 'Balkanism' when he 
describes the first impressions of the young French diplomat on arrival in Bosnia: 
The land was wild, the people impossible. What could be expected of women and children, 
creatures whom God had not endowed with reason, in a country where even the men were 
violent and uncouth? Nothing these people did or said had any significance, nor could it 
affect the affairs of serious, cultivated men. 
(Andric, 1941: 24) 
Examples of Balkanism within 'Western' media and literature abound. 
1 First published as 'The Travnik Chronicle' ( 1941 ). 
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Robert Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through Hist01y (1994), complete with 
faded sepia cover, suggests a haunted world located somehow beyond history. When 
Tony Blair announced that "Kosovo was on the doorstep of Europe" (quoted in 
Glenny, 1999: xxi) he exposed a 'philosophic geography' that resonated with the 
popular conception of the Balkans as a liminal space between Europe and the Orient. 
In Untangling Bosnia ( 1997) accountant Gale Kirking, who by his own admission 
knew nothing of Bosnia prior to driving there in 1998, exemplifies Balkanism' s self-
congratulatory tone: 
[ ... ] it seems a good idea to emphasise to local people that foreigners are paying to rebuild 
what the people of the fom1er Yugoslavia have destroyed. Perhaps that will deter them from 
smashing it up again. 
(Kirking, 1999: 71) 
There are no shortage of examples of Balkanism in policy literature and 
academic texts, and it is just as pervasive within popular media such as books, 
television and film. In The Secret of Chimneys ( 1925) Agatha Christie used the 
fictional Balkan land of "Herzoslovakia" as a homeland for the villain Boris 
Anchoukoff, a country where the national "hobby" is "assassinating kings and 
having revolutions" (Christie, 1925: 105). The use of a fictional name, a fusion of 
Herzegovina and Slovakia, seems to suggest that the Balkans are "so hopelessly and 
intrinsically confused and impenetrable that there is scarcely any point in trying to 
distinguish between them" (Fleming, 2003: 1). In 2002, I watched Bad Company 
(Dir. Joel Schumacher, 2002), a Hollywood buddy cop film, in a cinema in Banja 
Luka, the capital of the Republika Srpska. The story involved police officers chasing 
a criminal gang who had stolen a laptop with the arming device to a nuclear weapon. 
A groan was let out amongst the cinema audience when the criminal gang were 
exposed as a group of Serb terrorists (complete with stubble and generic 'East 
European' accents). While providing an example of the characterisation of the 
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Balkans as a region of criminality and deviance, on another level my sudden concern 
for my safety in the cinema points to the pervasiveness of the stereotyping inherent 
in Balkanism. This Hollywood strategy is exemplary of a trend of circumventing 
accusations of racism, as "it has become illegitimate to bash non-white races, non-
Christian religions, and non-European societies" {Todorova, 1997: 187). 
Therefore any historical investigation faces on the one hand a 
decontextualization of the Balkans through the spread of terms such as 
"Balkanisation" that create an "abstract demon" (Todorova, 1997: 3 6) separate from 
an ontological base, and on the other the deployment of myth and partial histories to 
pursue particular political interests. Bose (2002) rightly suggests that these 
essentialisms and binary dichotomies "do enormous violence to complex Bosnian 
realities" (Bose, 2002: 1 0). This suggests that what is required is an appreciation of 
complexity, of over-lapping and contingent pasts, in short not too much emphasis 
should be placed on "what Bosnia was 'really' like" but rather that there were 
"several Bosnia and Herzegovinas which coexisted and were in tension with one-
another" (Burg and Shoup, 1999: 60). One area where portrayal of such tension and 
complexity has perhaps been most successful has been within works of fiction, a 
resource that Ivo Banac called (when drawing upon it for a similar historiographical 
purpose) "imaginative literature" (Banac, 1988: xii). Films such as No Man's Land 
(1999, dir. Danis Tanovic), Pretty Village, Pretty Flame (1997, dir. Srdjan 
Dragojevic) and Underground (1995, dir. Emir Kusturica) have sought to use 
detailed characterisations, metaphor and allegory to portray the Former Yugoslavian 
society and history. In Theo Angelopoulos' Ulysses' Gaze ( 1995) the return of a film 
director to Greece in search of unseen footage from the early twentieth century is 
used as metaphorical device to explore the innocence of the filmmakers' gaze, 
particularly with reference to the ethnic and social divisions across the Balkan 
Peninsula. Ironically, one reviewer of this film displays Balkanism's tendency to 
view this region as an area of insecurity and danger by asking "why would he risk 
going to the Balkens [sic] to find rare film footage?"2 
2 Taken from the Internet Movie Database at www.imdb.com [accessed 8/4/04]. 
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Nuanced and creative representations of the Balkans are not restricted to the 
cinema. Similar themes and devices can be found within the literary work of authors 
such as Mesa Selimovic and Ivo Andric. It is Andric's Nobel Prize winning The 
Bridge on the Drina (2000) that is perhaps the most famous fictional history of the 
region, where the construction and lifespan of a stone bridge in Visegrad, eastern 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is used to trace one thousand years of history on the 
Balkan Peninsula. While it should be noted that these fictional works are not above 
being "deciphered ideologically"3 , their ability to translate complexity and conflict 
have led them to question dominant nationalist discourses and how they are 
constructed and transmitted. 
It is not only works of fiction that have resisted Balkanistic tendencies. Tone 
Bringa's (1995) Being Muslim the Bosnian Way provides an important ethnographic 
study of how multiculturalism is lived in the Balkans, offering a welcome alternative 
to Balkansitic descriptions of a 'haunted' or 'barbaric' land. By focussing on 
individual lives and struggles of the population, Bringa avoids reducing Bosnian 
history to a series of unquestioned nationalist or geopolitical images and instead 
examines the construction of hybrid or multicultural identities. The challenge of this 
chapter is to write a history of Brcko as such a lived and real location, a place that is 
more than 'strategically sensitive' or a 'flashpoint'. At the same time, it is essential 
to introduce the geopolitical and nationalist discourses that have shaped the position 
of Brcko as a site of international intervention. This historical challenge begins with 
the early histories of the region. Their distance in time has not diminished their 
importance as a rallying point for nationalist leaders. 
3 See for example the discussions of the imagery and politics in The Bridge on the Drina in 
Hawkesworth (2002). 
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3.3 Early Histories 
There is no such thing as a racially homogenous province there, let alone a racially 
homogenous state [ ... ] One reason for studying the early history of the region is that it 
enables us to see that even if it were right to conduct modem politics in terms of ancient 
racial origins, it would simply not be possible [ ... ] Nowhere is this more true than in the 
history of Bosnia. 
(Malcolm, 1994: 1) 
Brcko is located in the floodplain of the river Sava on the edge of the Dinaric 
Alps on the Balkan Peninsula of South East Europe (see Map 3.1 ). The concept of a 
homogeneous 'Balkan Peninsula' was first suggested by geographer Johann August 
Zeune in 1808, after the erroneous assumption that the Balkan range of mountains 
stretched from present-day Bulgaria to the Adriatic, rather than tapering out in 
present-day Serbia as is the case (Glenny, 1999: xiii). The earliest known 
inhabitants of the peninsula are the Illyrians, a loose collection of tribes that covered 
the area of former Yugoslavia and Albania and spoke an Indo-European language 
related to modern Albanian (Malcolm, 1994: 2; Wilkes, 1992). Following their 
conquest of the 111yrian lands in the third century AD, the Romans transformed the 
peninsula with the constmction of a network of roads and settlements (Wilkes, 
1992: 205). In the seventh century there is evidence of migrations ofCroats from the 
Adriatic coast settling in an area of land roughly coterminous with contemporary 
Croatia. At a similar time the Serbs settled in the Western part of the Balkan 
Peninsula. Following the division of the Roman Empire in 395 AD, the Croats fell 
under the influence of Catholic Rome, the Serbs increasingly hosted missionaries 
from Orthodox Constantinople (Judah, 2000: 9). The influence of St Cyril, an eighth 
century Greek missionary to the Serbs, is still felt today through his translation of 
the Gospels and Orthodox liturgy, thus establishing the Cyrillic alphabet (Locke, 
2002: xiv). Echoing the division of the Roman Empire, the Serbs, Bulgars and 
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Russians adopted the Cyrillic script, their Croat and Muslim neighbours retained the 
Latinic alphabet. This alphabetic polarisation was played upon in the late 1980s as 
"nationalists bewailed the fact that many Serbs in Croatia were becoming 
assimilated because they did not know how to write in Cyrillic" (Judah, 2000: 44). 
0 Kilometres 300 
'---' 0 Metres above 
sea level 
Map 3.1 The Balkan Peninsula 
(Source: adapted from www.history.uiuc.edu/fac dir/todorovalindex.htm 
accessed 13/09/04) 
In the eleventh century the Serbian kingdom emerged in the mountainous 
terrain of present-day Montenegro. In the I I 60s, Stephan Nemanja founded a 
dynasty that was to last 200 years and created an "expanding Serbian state that was 
to become a major power in the Balkans" (Judah, 2000: 9). However, with the death 
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of Tsar Dusan in 1355 the Serbian kingdom began to disintegrate. By 1371, the 
Serbs experienced their first defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Turks, an event that 
was to be repeated with far greater historical portent in the Battle of Kosovo Polje 
('The Field of the Blackbirds') in 1389. The Battle of Kosovo has become the focal 
point to discussions of Serbian history. How this has occurred, with its roots in 
Serbian epic poetry, mythologizing the death of Prince Lazar and the associated 
nationalist discourses of a 'kingdom in heaven', is perhaps more interesting than the 
historical attributes of the battle itself. The conflict represented the next phase of the 
Ottoman penetration into Europe and resulted in the death of both the Ottoman 
Sultan Murad and the Serbian Prince Lazar. The Battle has been mythologised as a 
turning point in Serbian history, and particularly a moment where Prince Lazar 
chose an eternal 'kingdom in heaven' over a temporal 'kingdom on earth'. This 
attribute to Kosovo is captured within Serbian epic song, a highly developed oral 
folk tradition that was first gathered in a major collection by Vuk Karadzic (1787-
1864). Geoffrey Locke (2002), in the foreword to a new English language edition of 
Serbian epic song, points to the key facets of historical significance and imagery that 
the Battle ofKosovo encapsulates: 
[ ... ] the Serbian perception was that it was at Kosovo that they had thrown everything they 
had into the balance, and that it was there that the flower of their chivalry and manhood had 
sacrificed itself in a final effort to defend the nation from slavery and Europe from Islamic 
domination[ ... ] they saw that before Kosovo they had been an independent and justifiably 
proud kingdom: after it nothing could halt their decline into vassaldom under a foreign and 
heathen occupier, stripped of their wealth and dignity, but never their pride. 
(Locke, 2002: xvii) 
To invoke the spirit of Kosovo, then, is to touch the nerve of Serbian 
victimhood, a potent historical myth that would play a leading part in the rise of 
nationalist political parties six hundred years later. The significance of this battle 
(and epic poetry) was impressed upon me while walking through Brcko town in 
September 2001 with Dragana, my research assistant, who is a Bosnian Serb. As we 
46 
Chapter 3 Producing Bo.wia 
walked past a small theatre in the centre of town, a building which held a number of 
Serb cultural associations, Dragana told me that while she was at school (in 1999) 
she had come second in a poetry recital there. I asked more about this cultural 
event: 
AJ: Which poem won? 
D: Oh, a girl doing a poem about Kosovo and all that. 
AJ: Do you think you should have done a poem on Kosovo? 
D: I did, it was just that hers was longer. 
(Extract from fieldjournal141h November 2002) 
While the centrality of the battle within Serbian mythology is unquestioned, 
some contemporary analysts have cast doubt over the significance of Kosovo Polje 
to the more general history of the region. The immediate historical consequences 
appear to have been negligible and the battle is perhaps best seen as "more of a 
draw", rather than a heroic defeat for the Serbs marking the beginning of several 
centuries under the Ottoman rule (Kumar, 2000: 3). Misha Glenny (1999) points out 
that Serbian power collapsed gradually over the following sixty years and "[t]he 
fortress in Belgrade did not fall under Ottoman control until the sixteenth century" 
(Glenny, 1999: 11 ). 
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, the Brcko area is first mentioned in 
historical documents as the location of a Turkish palisade fortress on the banks of 
the river Sava, located in what is now North East Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
name derives from the town's location on the mouth of the river Brka, which flows 
from the slopes of mount Majavica to the south and into the River Sava at Brcko. 
The surrounding fertile floodplain, known as the Posavina region (literally 'around 
the Sava '), favoured agriculture and the area became known for the production of 
dried fruit and Rakija (plum brandy). The development of the Brcko region was 
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influenced by its role as a borderland, with the Sava providing a natural boundary 
for the Ottoman (up to the mid 19th Century) and then Austro-Hungarian Empires 
(from 1876 to 1918). In the past the river has been regarded as continental 
boundary, much like the Turkish Bosphorus is viewed today, as the historian Sir 
Arthur Evans (1877) suggests: 
The Bosniacs themselves speak of the other side of the Save [sic] as "Europe" and they are 
right; for all intents and purposes a five minutes' voyage transports you into Asia. Travellers 
who have seen the Turkish provinces of Syria, Armenia, or Egypt, when they enter Bosnia 
are at once surprised at finding the familiar sights of Asia and Africa reproduced in a 
province of Turkey. 
(Evans, 1877: 89) 
During the 19th Century there were regular insurrections by forces from both 
Empires into the Posavina area, leading to marked economic and social 
consequences for the development of Brcko. In economic terms, the town grew as a 
trading post and port facility, benefiting from cross-border profiteering, as the river 
provided safe passage to Belgrade and the Danube away from the marauding gangs 
of hajduci (armed bandits) patrolling the countryside. In social terms, the transition 
from one imperial control to another led to significant population transfers. An 
example is the fall of the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1876, 
which saw "hundreds of thousands of refugees swamp ... the border areas of the 
Hapsburg [Austro-Hungarian] Empire" (Glenny, 1999: 124). These demographic 
shifts have left 'border areas' such as the Posavina with ethnically mixed 
populations, as will be discussed in the case of Brcko later in this chapter. 
The emergence of the region's modem geopolitics can be traced to the fall of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire following World War I. The latter part of the 19th 
Century had seen growing support for the unification of the Southern Slavs, or 
Yugoslavism, through visions of national liberation, modernization and the 
development of characteristics deemed unique to South Slav culture on the Balkan 
Peninsula (Prpa-Jovanovic, 2000: 44). This movement had emerged amongst 
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Croatian intellectuals in the 1840s as 'Illyrianism' (after the oldest known tribe 
known to have inhabited the Balkan Peninsula), calling for ethnic and political unity 
of the Southem Slavs. There were, however, varied motivations for Yugoslavism 
among the two largest Slav groups, the Croats and the Serbs. For Croat intellectuals, 
Yugoslavism fmmed a central strand of a broad goal of stimulating a Croatian 
cultural renaissance in order to overthrow Austro-Hungarian rule (Cohen, 1995: 2). 
In Serbia, the Prime Minster Ilija Garasanin set out his motivations for support of 
Yugoslavism in the 1844 publication Nacertanije, or Memorandum. This document, 
which only became public in 1906, called for the unification of all areas of the 
Balkans with large Serbian populations, amounting to a blueprint for an expanded 
'Greater Serbia' (MacKenzie, 1996: 216). For most Serbs, then, the idea of South 
Slav unity before World War I was a useful concept only to the extent that it might 
facilitate and hasten the achievement of Serbia's distinct national and tetTitorial 
goals (Cohen, 1995: 6-7). These differing motivations between Serbs and Croats 
were perhaps most acute where concemed with the territory ofBosnia: 
[ ... ]when it came to regions with ethnically mixed populations such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where Serbs and Croats had advanced sharply conflicting tenitorial claims, even genuine 
advocates of the Yugoslav idea could find little ground. 
(Cohen, 1995: 7) 
With growmg support for Yugoslavism, albeit with potentially conflicting 
motivations, new alliances in the early 201h Century began to alter the geopolitical 
power bases within the region. First, in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 the Balkan 
League (comprising Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria), with the support of 
Russia, drove the Ottomans out of Europe and then went on to divide the territory of 
Macedonia. Following this success against the Ottoman Turks, self-confidence 
amongst the Serbs ran high, as they "saw themselves cutting loose from the decaying 
corpse of an empire and uniting with a young and triumphant democratic state" 
(West, 1940: 355). These victories seemed to shift the orientation of Croatian and 
Slovenian commitment to the Yugoslav idea as the growing strength of Serbia in the 
49 
Cbapter 3 Producing Bosnia 
Balkans was viewed with suspicion. While still calling for the unification of the 
Slavs, it was suggested that this could take place through the Hapsburg monarchy, 
thus avoiding direct union with the Serbian state. These calls represent an interesting 
mobilisation of 'empire', as opposed to 'the state', as a practice through which 
competing nationalisms could be accommodated. Within such an imperialist Slav 
alliance the status ofBosnia appeared uncertain. 
The question of Bosnia, and more broadly Slav unity, was to leave an 
indelible mark on both European and global geopolitics through the assassination of 
the Hapsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. The 
perpetrator, Gavrilo Princep, was a member of Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), "a 
loose association of youthful and nationalistic Bosnian Serbs" (MacKenzie: 1996, 
247). Austria-Hungary did not wait long to respond and, amid accusations of 
sponsoring the assassination, declared war on Serbia on July 281h 1914. As Germany 
supported the Austro-Hungarian cause, and with Great Britain, Russia and France 
rallying to the Serb side, this theatre of conflict marked the beginning of World War 
I. The chaos and violence of this conflict, which pitched the Southern Slavs against 
each other, saw the loss of an estimated 1 900 000 lives in the region. However, the 
war also resulted in the collapse of Austria-Hungary, leaving the political conditions 
for the unification of the Southern Slavs. Such an outcome had become a reality 
through the Yugoslav Committee, an exiled collection of Croat, Serb and Slovene 
politicians, whose work culminated in the Corfu Declaration of 1917 calling for a 
democratic constitutional monarchy uniting Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Prpa-
Jovanovic, 2000: 49). This declaration was the precursor to the formal recognition 
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1st 1918, later renamed 
Yugoslavia4 • 
Brcko no longer found itself on the imperial border, but at the edge of 
Bosnia, which with Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Serbia, made up the new 
Kingdom. The constitution of the multi-ethnic kingdom described the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes as "three tribes" of the same nation. This left Muslims, the majority of 
4 This state is often referred to as 'the first Yugoslavia' to act as a distinction to socialist 'the second 
Yugoslavia' formed in 1945. 
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Bosnia's (and Brcko's) population, with little voice, as although they were 
authorised to practice their religion and form political parties, they were not 
considered a "tribe" or a nation. Establishing the legitimacy and maintaining the 
cohesion of a state composed of such varied historical traditions and sub-cultural 
groups represented a substantial challenge for the country's political leadership 
(Cohen, 1995: 13). The political system in the kingdom was prone to 
misunderstanding, distrust and intolerance, as the liberal democratic principle of 
'one-person, one vote' enabled the most numerous nation- the Serbs- to outvote 
and dominate the others (Jelavich and Jelavich, 1977: 38). The concentration of 
power in Serbia led to protests among the Slovenian and Croatian political elite, who 
had not fought to overthrow centralism from Hapsburg Vienna to have it replaced by 
reorganised centralism from Belgrade. In a climate of deteriorating economic 
conditions, reorganisation of the Yugoslavian state was a certainty, and throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s Croat politicians lobbied Belgrade to increase the autonomy of 
Croatia. A turning point in this political struggle came with the assassination of the 
Serbian King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic in Marseilles in October 1934 at the hands 
of Croatian and Macedonian extremists. This event focused the campaigns against 
Serb domination and eventually led to an accord between Serbia and Croatia on 
August 26, 1939. However, this agreement failed as Croat politicians were angered 
by the limited nature of their autonomy and Serbian politicians by the loss of their 
domination, the abandonment of centralism, and the new division of administrative 
powers (Prpa-Jovanovic, 2000: 57). 
3.4 Tito's Yugoslavia 
These political conflicts were overshadowed by the outbreak of war in 
Europe in 1939. Though Yugoslavia was not envisaged as part of Hitler's 
Lebensraum, between 1939 and 1940 Germany placed considerable political 
pressure (with the threat of violence) on the Balkan Peninsula, primarily with a view 
to Romania's valuable oil supplies (Glenny, 1999: 458-459). Yugoslavia maintained 
a neutral position in these early years of the conflict and, as such, became the focus 
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of considerable lobbying and enticements from both the Allied and Axis powers. 
Early 1941 saw a change of tactic, as the German invasion of Romania and Hungary 
increased insecurity within Yugoslavia. As an attempt to prevent an attack, 
Yugoslavia signed up to the Tripartite Pact with Germany. However, this act 
provoked a coup d 'etat on March 27th 1941, led by the head of the Yugoslav Air 
Force, General Dusan Simovic. This popular uprising met little opposition from 
forces loyal to King Aleksandar, the head of the Yugoslav state, as "they saw no 
point in resisting" (Glenny, 1999: 474). Rather bizarrely, while this coup had been 
based on opposition to the Tripartite Pact, once General Dusan Simovic seized 
control he decided, perhaps pragmatically considering the army ranged against them, 
to honour the pact. However, this was too late for the Fiihrer who had become 
"irritated by the intricacies of Balkan politics" and ordered the bombing of Belgrade 
on the 6th April, 1941 (Glenny, 1999: 476). Hitler and Mussolini abolished the 
country of Yugoslavia less than two weeks later, partitioning its territory between 
Germany and Italy (Prpa-Jovanovic, 2000: 57). The conflict within Yugoslavia 
during the Second World War could perhaps best be described as 'all against all', 
with "terror on a horrifying scale" (Glenny, 1999: 486). Following the creation of 
the Independent State of Croatia (Nevavisna Drzava Hrvatska or NDH) across an 
area roughly equitable with present-day Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia, pro-Axis 
Ustase ('Insurrectionists') emerged out of the extremist wing of Croatian 
nationalism and attacked Serb Cetniks ('Irregulars') led by Dragoljub 'Draza' 
Mihailovic and loyal to the King (who, along with the rest of the Serbian royal 
family, sought exile in London). However, in Belgrade a rival resistance force began 
to emerge from the Communist party, a negligible and persecuted political presence 
during the 1920s and 1930s. This group, led by the half-Croat, half-Slovene Josip 
Broz under the nom de guerre Tito5, urged partisan warfare (gaining them the name 
'the Partisans') and sought to defend the ideal of Southern Slav unity. This ideology 
was one factor in their successful resistance: it constituted a moderate alternative to 
5 MacLean (1949) recalls how Tito gained this name on account of continually telling people what to 
do: "'you' he said to them 'will do this; and you, that,' in Serbo-Croat, 'Ti, to; ti, to'. He said this so 
often that his friends began to call him Tito" (MacLean, 1949: 311 ). 
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the ultranationalist causes of the Croat Ustase the Serb Cetniks'. In addition to their 
broad support base, the Partisan movement also gained the backing of the Allied 
forces, traditionally supporters of the Draza MihailoviC's Cetniks. In Eastern 
Approaches ( 1949), a remarkable account of British Secret Service manoeuvres 
during the Second World War, Fitzroy MacLean describes this changing allegiance: 
lnfonnation reaching the British Government from a variety of sources had caused them to 
doubt whether the resistance of General Mihailovic and his Cetniks to the enemy was all that 
it was made out to be. There were indications that at least as much was being done by anned 
bands bearing the name Partisans and led by a shadowy figure known as Tito. Hitherto such 
support as we had been able to give had gone exclusively to Mihailovic. Now doubts as to 
the wisdom of this policy were beginning to creep in. 
(MacLean, 1949: 279) 
The Allied support for the explicitly Communist Partisans involved 
"swallowing ideological scruples" (Zimmerman, 1996: 6), particularly as the Serbs 
(as represented in this conflict in Mihailovic' s Cetniks) had been staunch supporters 
of Great Britain in World War I. Nevertheless, "they weren't killing the most 
Germans" (Mac Lean, 1949: 281) and following the capitulation of Italy in 
September 1943 supply lines were established across the Adriatic to assist Tito 's 
Partisan forces. On November 29, 1943, the wartime Partisan parliament convened 
in the Bosnian town of Jajce, liberated from the German occupiers, and voted for a 
new Yugoslavia that would, in its final form, be a federation of six republics, with 
two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, joined to Serbia (see Map 3.2). 
Under Allied pressure, the exiled royal government backed the Jajce Declaration 
and, in September 1944, broadcast an appeal to "all Yugoslav patriots to rally to 
Tito" (Singleton, 1976: 96). Mihailovic made frantic efforts during 1944 to wrest 
the political initiative from Tito, particularly in the form of the proposals emerging 
from the Ba Congress of January 1944. However, these attempts were destined to be 
unsuccessful in the face of growing international recognition, and acceptance, of 
Tito's Partisans as a government-in-waiting. Indeed, Soviet troops entered 
53 
Chapter 3 Producing Bosnia 
Yugoslavia from Romania and Bulgaria and assisted the Partisans in liberating 
Belgrade on 201h October 1944. 
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*skopje 
While the Belgrade liberation marked triumph over the invading Axis 
powers, it did not translate for Tito into complete victory over domestic military 
enemies. During 1945 Tito struck at Ustase and Cetnik forces with savage brutality. 
He used these attacks to justify the rapid growth and unchecked authority of the 
Partisans' wartime security service, the Organisation for the People's Defence 
(OZNa), with an explicit remit to "strike terror into the hearts of those who did not 
like this sort of Yugoslavia" (Lampe, 1996: 223; Glenny, 1999: 531 ). The focus of 
this purge of opponents, initially fixed on pro-Axis war criminals, shifted to include 
54 
Chapter 3 Produdng Bosnia 
suppression of what it viewed as 'reactionary nationalistic tendencies', particularly 
in Croatia and Kosovo (Tepavac, 2000: 65). It is estimated that over the period of 
1945-1947 as many as 100 000 people across Yugoslavia were executed, with many 
more interned for their wartime activities or political views (Lampe, 1996: 223). In 
total the conflict had resulted in the death of 1 700 000 of the Yugoslav population. 
In the shadow of this five-year conflict, and with the shaping of a unified state in 
mind, Tito drew on the slogan Bratstvo i Jedinstvo ('Brotherhood and Unity') to 
unite Yugoslavia. The slogan embodied a policy of equality between the nations of 
Yugoslavia. In this respect, Tito sought to equalise the blame for the atrocities that 
had been carried out by the Ustase, Cetnik and Nazi forces during World War 11. 
The commemoration of the conflict was based more on the heroics of the Partisans 
against a 'fascist enemy', than seeking to present the multiple lines of difference that 
fractured the population over the five years of war (Judah, 2000). 
To confirm, rather than to threaten, Tito's grip on power, elections were held 
m 1945 with the professed intention of granting the Yugoslav population the 
opportunity to vote on their country's future. In reality, and unsurprisingly 
considering the activities of the OZNa in crushing nationalist opposition through 
internment and summary execution, the ballot box choices in this post war election 
amounted to a vote for Tito's Communist Party or, if you were keen to express 
opposition, ticking a blank box. Other political parties had either been 
disenfranchised (often for claims of wartime collaboration with the Cetniks or 
Ustase) or had excluded themselves from the election out of protest (Lampe, 1996: 
226). Following the 'election', Communist representatives dominated the 
Constituent Assembly which first convened in Belgrade on November 29, 1945. 
The delegates voted unanimously to abolish the monarchy, ending the regency of the 
exiled King Petar II, in whose name Tito had ruled since March of that year (Lampe, 
1996: 229). The new Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (SNRJ) now took its 
place. Tito drew up a constitution mirroring closely Stalin's Soviet model of 1936, 
while making specific clauses to help foster his vision for Yugoslavian unity. 
Malcolm (1994) points out how attempts to devolve power to the six Republics were 
contradicted within the constitution itself: 
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It [the constitution] contained the usual mixture of fine-sounding declarations and logical 
black holes, proclaiming, for example, that each constituent republic was 'sovereign', but 
also eliminating the right to secede by declaring that the peoples of Yugoslavia had decided 
to live together for ever. 
(Malcolm, 1994: 194) 
In reality the constitution of 1946 established a Yugoslavian state that was, 
initially at least, highly centralised. The ruling principle of the constitution was that 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, exercised by the ruling party in the name of the 
workers. The controlling hand of the Socialist party was evident at all levels of 
political, economic and cultural life, though the party itself was not mentioned in the 
constitution (Singleton, 1976: 1 06). This socialist rhetoric was matched by a radical 
reorganisation of the post-war Yugoslavian economy with the nationalisation of 
industry and, albeit at a slower pace, collectivisation of agriculture. In the early 
years of the new Yugoslav state, Stalinism was enforced with great brutality 
(Glenny, 1999: 551 ). However, the enthusiasm for Soviet methods of 'iron rule' 
masked a growing schism between Tito and Stalin. There are many different 
opinions as to the roots of the split between these two leaders. Some, such as 
Allcock (2000) primarily view the conflict as an economic issue emerging out of 
Yugoslav dissatisfaction with the terms of trade between their country and the Soviet 
Union (Allcock, 2000: 71). Others see the dispute as a reflection of Stalin's general 
disapproval of the independence and self-confidence ofYugoslavia, and in particular 
his anger at criticisms levelled by members of the Yugoslav government at the 
conduct of the Red Army in Belgrade (in particular their treatment of the Yugoslav 
population) during the final days of World War 11 (Tepavac, 2000: 66). Whatever 
the underlying cause, the rift between the two countries led to a terse exchange of 
letters over 1948 that resulted in the ejection of Yugoslavia from the Cominform 
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(Communist Information Bureau6). Lydall (1984) summanses the accusations 
levelled at the Yugoslav government in these letters: 
The Yugoslav Party leaders were accused of deviation from Marxism-Leninism, of being 
hostile to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Party, of borrowing from 'the arsenal of counter-
revolutionary Trotskyism', of becoming nationalists, of ignoring the class struggle in 
agriculture, of disguising the role of the Party, of refusing to accept criticism, and of 
'boundless ambition, arrogance and conceit'. 
(Lydall, 1984: 62) 
It is clear from the reaction of the Yugoslavian leadership that the split with 
Stalin was unexpected, and the almost instant economic impact left the country's 
five year plan, instituted to deliver rapid industrialisation, in disarray. The Soviet 
bloc attempted to teach the "arrogant and conceited" leadership a lesson by 
enforcing an economic blockade that, by 1950, had halted all trade between 
Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe (Lydall, 1984: 63). In the face of economic crisis, 
Tito was faced with a dilemma. On the domestic front he was keen to increase the 
pace of agricultural collectivisation "demonstrating that it was not Yugoslavia but 
the Soviet Union and its allies that had strayed from the path of Stalinist orthodoxy" 
(Glenny, 1999: 547). However, in order to survive Yugoslavia had to move closer to 
the West to attract foreign aid and foster trading links. An attempt to meet these 
apparently contradictory domestic and international objectives was forged through a 
reappraisal of centralised Soviet practice. This process involved denouncing the 
Soviet socialist system as a 'bureaucratic deformation' of Marxist principles due to 
the vast centralised power of the state over the economy (Lydall, 1984: 62). In order 
to circumscribe the centralised role of the state, a system of 'workers self-
management' was proposed in 1949, suggesting a move away from centralisation 
and toward workers' councils and self-managed enterprises. Initially these broad 
intentions appear to have been merely rhetoric with little real power being devolved 
to the workers, whose contribution was limited to representation on advisory bodies 
6 Stalin's postwar coordinating body of nine European Communist parties. 
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(Singleton, 1976: 126). However, this changed with the passing of new laws and 
constitutional reforms over the following decade, in particular the Law of the 
Management of State Economic Associations by Work Collectives in 1950 and the 
new constitution of 1953. This legislation saw certain authority passed to local level 
opistine (communes or municipalities), including powers of taxation and control 
over the affairs of certain business enterprises within their territory (Allcock, 2000: 
77). 
These developments provoked a distinct post-Stalin Yugoslavian foreign 
policy. In light of its greater independence, coupled with the signs of a more 
participatory form of governance (albeit with a lingering lacunae for human rights 
abuses), Western powers saw the benefit of closer ties to this European socialist 
anomaly. In recognition of this new geopolitical position, Tito helped establish the 
Non-Aligned Movement, eventually launched in 1954-55 with member-states from 
across Asia, Africa and Latin America. This movement was 'non-aligned' in its 
broad neutrality between the capitalist and Soviet powers. This position of 
independence, while open to the entire world, proved vital in preventing a Soviet 
attack on Yugoslavia while also encouraging overseas aid, trade and investment 
(Tepavac, 2000: 71). Non-alignment and greater proximity to the West meant that 
during the 1950s overseas aid underpinned an ambitious scheme of Yugoslavian 
industrialisation (in favour of other sectors such as agriculture), while also 
subsidising consumption, "especially that of the state" (Allcock, 2000: 75). While 
these aspects were to lead to economic problems in the future, such as balance-of-
payment deficits and inflationary pressure, the Yugoslav economy grew faster from 
1953 to 1961 than most others in the world, including those of the Soviet bloc 
(Lampe, 1996: 272). In the case of Brcko, this period marks a phase of 
modernisation of production facilities in the town as small-scale handicraft 
enterprises were replaced by large-scale industry (Brcko Development Agency, 
2002: 18). This shift was exemplified by the construction of the large meat canning 
factory 'Bimeks', together with footwear and textile factories. These developments 
were replicated across Yugoslavia, and by 1961 industrial production was increasing 
by 13 percent per annum, leading commentators to talk in economic terms of a 
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"great leap forward" (Dyker, 1990: 28). 
However, this macro industrial optimism masked two underlying economic 
and social phenomena that, together, are thought to have contributed to the fall of 
Yugoslavia: increasing rural to urban migration and the growing economic disparity 
between the six republics of Yugoslavia. In terms of the migration from rural areas, 
from 1948 to 1971 the ratio of rural to urban population throughout the country 
changed from 70:30 to 40:60 (Singleton, 1976: 222-223). By the 1980s this 
phenomenon was widely being described as a 'rural exodus' (McFarlane, 1988). 
Much of this migration can be attributed to the ambitious industrialisation 
programme, which led to a decline in the proportion of the economically active 
population engaged in agriculture, from 67 percent at the end of the Second World 
War to 38 percent by the census of 1971 (Allcock, 2000: 89). 
The migration of large sections of the population from rural to urban areas 
was more than an economic phenomenon. Slavenka Drakulic ( 1996) describes the 
rural to urban resettlement in Eastern Europe following the Second World War as a 
"giant leap from feudalism to communism" (Drakulic, 1996: 36). Glenny (1999) 
suggests that Yugoslav society was particularly polarised as a consequence of its 
exposure to Western Europe which "accentuated the cultural divisions between rural 
and urban life as nowhere else in the Communist Balkans" (Glenny, 1999: 628). 
These cultural divisions between the rural and the urban were depicted by research 
participants at a number of stages in the fieldwork process. One UN worker from 
Sarajevo, who had grown up in the southern city of Mostar, explained the 
significance of this division after mentioning a village she had recently visited: 
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Her village is a Croat village amongst Bosnijak villages. But it is a pure Croat village, you 
would never have a Muslim person moving into this village. This is how it stayed during 
Socialism, villages stayed as they were, they were purely Catholic, purely Muslim or purely 
this, purely that[ ... ] While in the city you have experience over generations of people living 
with each other, together. And the urban was a common culture, an urban culture and people 
shared so many moments. They were completely mixed, there was no Muslim pa11 of town 
or Serb part of town[ ... ] And these people didn't know who others were in a way, you had 
urban people who were cool and mixed and lived together and went to school together. And 
this is how you can explain it also. Obviously urban people had more access to shared 
things. Just think of the all the educational, cultural, health, whatever, institutions where 
people worked together non-stop. Like in Mostar, the Mostarian Theatre, Mostarian 
Hospital, the Mostarian University. 
(Interview with Saska Haramina, Brcko 22nd August 2002) 
The patchwork of mono-ethnic villages, as described in this passage, was 
evident in pre-1991 Brcko District. The 1991 Yugoslav census points to the multi-
ethnicity of the population of the Brcko municipality: 44 percent Bosnijak7, 26 
percent Catholic and 21 percent Serbs, with 6 percent recognising themselves as 
Yugoslav, and 3 percent other, mainly Roma, though this distribution was not evenly 
spaced over the Brcko municipality (an area of 427 km2). Prior to the 1991-1995 
conflict the urban population was majority Bosnijak, while the majority of the 
villages lying to the south were Serb or Croat. The broad picture across Yugoslavia 
was one of urban areas constituting centres of cosmopolitanism and population mix, 
while the countryside retained ethnic polarisation and depended upon peasant and 
subsistence agricultural production. As the economic and cultural disparity between 
rural and urban areas grew over the 1960s and 1970s, so too did mutual antipathy 
and distrust. Glenny (1999) views this friction as having an "enormous impact" on 
7 Throughout this thesis the label 'Bosnijak' will be used to refer to Bosnian Muslims, though it 
should be stressed that not all Bosnijaks practice Islam and not all Bosnian Muslims would label 
themselves Bosnijak. The term 'Bosnijak' has unfortunate nationalist connotations, though it seems 
more satisfactory as a collective noun, rather than relying on religious labels for a predominantly 
secular group. 
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the Yugoslav wars of succession in the 1990s (Glenny, 1999: 588). 
The second phenomenon that tempered the optimism of growmg 
Yugoslavian industrial prosperity was the widening economic inequality between 
the six republics. The southern republics of Macedonia, Serbia (in particular the 
autonomous province of Kosovo ), Montenegro, and Bosnia never had the economic 
success of Slovenia and Croatia, and under Tito's stewardship this inequality was 
growing. As an example, in 1952 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita in 
Bosnia was 95.5 percent of the Yugoslav average, but by 1960 it had declined to 76 
percent (Allcock, 2000: 83). While Croatia and Slovenia enjoyed proximity to the 
lucrative Italian and Austrian markets, sustained by the legacy of historic links to the 
Habsburg Empire, areas such as Kosovo were poorly industrialised and still reliant 
on agricultural production. Tito 's regime had resisted investing in agriculture 
(beyond the bureaucratic requirements of collectivisation) preferring instead to 
appease vocal impoverished communities with the construction of 'political 
factories', that is, enterprises located more for their political expedience than 
economic efficiency. Such considerations are evident in the example of the 
Montenegrin plant designed to manufacture refrigerators located on a mountain top 
and only accessible by an unpaved road that was impassable for the better part of the 
year. The reason for its precarious positioning was the unwavering support by the 
local population for the Partisan cause during World War I and, perhaps equally as 
important, Montenegro was a hugely overrepresented republic in the Communist 
Party leadership (Lampe, 1996: 276). 
As the republics urbanised and became increasingly insular over the 1960s, 
calls increased for a loosening of the centralised federal government and increasing 
'republicanisation' (devolving power to the six republics) of the Yugoslav state. 
There was an emergent resentment amongst the Croatian economic elite, benefiting 
as they were from tourism along the Dalmatian coast, who felt that Croatia was 
"milked of the fruits of its economic success in order either to support economically 
dubious projects in the underdeveloped regions or to subsidise government 
profligacy in Belgrade" (Lampe, 1996: 90). These concerns solidified into wider 
calls for greater autonomy for the Croatian people and, echoing the claims made in 
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the last days of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the 1930s, accusations 
of subjugation of Croats under the political control of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. 
Tito characteristically crushed this 1971-72 movement, known as the 'Croatian 
Spring', and its principal participants (mainly Croat scholars and academics) were 
imprisoned. Tito faced similar problems in Serbia where, in the wake of alleged 
oppression of Serbs by the majority Albanian (Kosovar) population in Kosovo, 
nationalist stirrings were causing unrest and rejection of Yugoslav principles of 
'Brotherhood and Unity'. Again, this uprising was forcibly curtailed, though the 
sentiments of greater republican autonomy and calls for a democratization of the 
Yugoslav system were more difficult to silence. -
Tito's solution lay in further amendments to the constitution and, finally, an 
entirely new Yugoslav constitution in 1974. This document, running to 406 articles 
(at the time the world's longest constitution), established a regimented, and highly 
confusing, pyramid hierarchy with Tito at it head. At the local level, six groupings 
(workers in the social sector; peasants and farm workers; liberal professionals; state 
officials and soldiers; local communities, and socio-political organisations) were 
eligible to send delegates to the next level above, the Assembly of the Commune 
(opistine) and the Assembly of the Republic. These bodies would then send 
delegates to the next level - the Federal Assembly. The notion of representation 
through delegates, as opposed to electoral competition and universal suffrage, was 
championed by Tito who suggested that "a determined break has been made with all 
the so-called representative democracy which suits the bourgeois class" (Tito, 1974: 
46). In contrast, Lydall (1984) suggests that the delegate system appeared to be 
designed to stifle potential opposition: 
[u]nder the system of delegations and the pyramid stmcture to higher bodies, coupled with 
the complete ban on organised opposition, there is no possibility of a candidate with an 
independent viewpoint and popular support entering a commune assembly, let alone the 
Federal Assembly. 
(Lydall, 1984: 126) 
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In addition to the delegate system, the constitution devolved significant 
power to the republics, giving each a central bank and separate police, educational 
and judicial systems. It also gave these functions to Kosovo and Vojvodina which 
became 'autonomous provinces' within Serbia. Perhaps as a reaction to the recent 
nationalistic tendencies, these measures circumscribed Serb power within 
Yugoslavia, and the constitution was perceived to "cut Serbia down to size" (Silber 
and Little, 1995: 34 ). Significantly for Bosnia, the constitution granted the Bosnian 
Muslims the status of a constituent nationality (Narodna) of Yugoslavia (together 
with the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs). While this status did not translate to any 
concrete political representation within the Bosnian republic (in which they had a 
plurality), it did introduce specific measures for cultural and linguistic protection 
within the Yugoslav federation (a right that was conspicuously not extended to the 
Kosovar Albanians). While such constitutional reform would appear to indicate 
devolution of power from the centre, Tepavac (2000) suggests that in reality 
centralist power was "simply transferred to the level of the republic" (Tepavac, 
2000: 72). In addition, the rotating system of representation at the federal level, 
established to "prevent any single republic or politician accumulating too much 
power" (Glenny, 1999: 623), proved confusing and was poorly understood by the 
Yugoslav population (Lampe, 1996: 306). 
As the 1970s progressed, the worsening economic position of Yugoslavia 
was to overshadow constitutional debates. The economic decline of the federation 
was masked in the short-term by the import of capital (and the associated build-up of 
debt) and the export of labour, particularly in the form of gastarbeitern (guest 
workers) to Austria and Germany. In the wake of global oil price rises in 1973-74 
and 1978-79, interest repayments on overseas loans increased, and, as 
unemployment rose in Western Europe, gastarbeitern began to return to Yugoslavia 
seeking work. The political changes necessary to alleviate the worsening economic 
position at the federal level looked increasingly difficult considering the frailty of 
Tito's leadership and the complex and over bureaucratised constitution. Somogyi 
( 1993) suggests that by the late 1970s the federation was being run by "informal, 
non-elected, non-institutionalised, and uncontrollable oligarchies" (Somogyi, 1993: 
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46). Following Tito's death in 1980 the infighting between the republics continued, 
and in his place the rotating presidential system (as established by the 197 4 
constitution) further entrenched political stagnancy. Yugoslavia's precarious 
economic position began to impact upon the inflation rate over the early 1980s and 
by the end of 1984 it reached an annual rate of between 60 and 100 per cent, 
requiring some lower income Yugoslav families to spend 70 per cent of their 
monthly incomes on food (Ramet, 1985: 6). Lampe (1996) suggests that faced with 
these economic and political crises the republics, and their corresponding media, 
turned on each other: 
The modem and therefore sensation-hungry media of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia exposed 
social problems and individual abuses of power, but stopped short of confronting their own 
republic's communist leadership. They suggested instead that the disadvantages suffered by 
their republic came at the others' advantage. Intellectuals growing restive over the spreading 
corruption tended to question the framework of the federation more than the troubled system 
of social ownership. 
(Lampe, 1996: 326) 
In this political and economic climate, the principle of 'Brotherhood and 
Unity' was again under threat. In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Science and the 
Arts leaked a Memorandum to a popular newspaper, a document that claimed that 
the Serbs were in an unjust position in Yugoslavia and were being exploited by 
Slovene and Croatian countrymen. In a phrase that would be repeated often over the 
following decade (with or without any grounding in the military realities), the 
Memorandum asserted that Serbia had "won the war but was losing the peace" 
(Silber and Little, 1995: 31 ). It went on to denounce the "creeping genocide" 
inflicted on the Serbs in the "cradle of Serbian culture", Kosovo (Zolo, 2000: 19). 
This call-to-arms unsettled the Yugoslav leadership, who almost unanimously 
denounced the document; one notable exception was Slobodan Milosevic, then a 
young Socialist party chief and friend of the Serbian president I van Stambolic. Over 
the following years Milosevic was to see first hand the power of nationalistic 
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discourse in winning the support of Serbs, first in Kosovo (the designated spiritual 
homeland of the Serbian people) and then across Yugoslavia. Following a televised 
parliamentary showdown with Stambolic in 1989, Milosevic gained the Serbian 
leadership. He also managed to engineer the dissolution of the autonomous 
provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. This meant that, with Montenegro, he held four 
of the eight votes in the Yugoslav parliament. The other four republics (Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia) lacked any unity of opposition to Milosevic's 
creation of what Misha Glenny (1999) describes as "Serbo-slavia" (Glenny, 1999: 
628). 
3.5 The Fall of Yugoslavia 
As Slobodan Milosevic rose to power within Serbia, the geopolitical position 
of Yugoslavia shifted in light of the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The status that Yugoslavia had enjoyed as a Cold War Socialist ally to the 
West was now of little strategic worth and, as a consequence, the preferential loan 
agreements and aid assistance were under threat. Further to these economic 
considerations, the revolutions across Central and Eastern Europe seemed to 
undermine the legitimacy of one-party Socialism as an acceptable form of rule and, 
as such, the Yugoslav League of Communists lost its mandate of political monopoly. 
As the Socialist system appeared threatened, conservative forces gathered behind 
nationalism as a means of political survival: 
In nationalism, conservative forces found an instrument against fundamental social, political 
and economic change that threatened their social positions and privileges. All three social 
institutions (by their very nature the most conservative ones)- the party apparatus, the army, 
the state controlled media- rallied behind Slobodan Milosevic. 
(Udovicki and Torov, 2000: 83) 
The rise of nationalism in mainstream politics was not restricted to Serbia. In 
Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, a leader within the Croatian Spring 1971-72, swept to 
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power with his political party the HDZ (Hrvatska Democratija Zajednica) in April 
1990 on a pledge of "a Croatia for Croatians only" (Lampe, 1996: 352). After only 
two months in office, Tudjman drew up a draft constitution for an independent 
Croatia. This document redefined Croatia as the sovereign state of the Croatian 
nation, with no reference to other nations or ethnic groups (Silber and Little, 1995: 
96-97). These events were of portent for the large Serb population living in the area 
of Croatia known as the Krajina (or 'borderland'). This area curved around the 
north-western tip of Bosnia and covered a vital strategic corridor between Zagreb 
and Split. Fear spread amongst the Serb population invigorated by propaganda from 
Belgrade inciting the memory of the war crimes of the Croatian Ustase of World 
War Il. Tudjman himself did not help, by claiming that "the NDH [the Independent 
State of Croatia formed under Hitler] was not simply a quisling creation and fascist 
crime; it was also the historical aspiration of the Croatian people" (cited in 
Stitkovac, 2000: 156). The actions of Tudjman in trying to give legitimacy to a pure 
Croatian state seemed to lend credibility to the claims of Milosevic that "the Serbs 
could never feel safe again" (Stitkovac, 2000: 157). In the shadow of this political 
fervour, the situation on the ground in the Krajina degenerated over the summer of 
1990 with the routes to each Serb-majority town guarded by gangs of armed 
civilians. 
In December 1990, as a background to the deepening crisis between Croatia 
and Serbia, Slovenia held a referendum where 95 percent of the electorate voted for 
independence. Since coming to power in April the Slovenian Government, headed 
by Milan Kucan, had pursued a policy of intense diplomacy with a view to gaining 
international support for a declaration of independence. This proved a shrewd 
strategy as Europe stood divided and uncertain on the 'Yugoslav question'. Austria 
and Germany were both in strong support of recognising both Slovenian and 
Croatian independence, a sign of the close historical relationships between these 
countries and, perhaps more importantly, recognition of their own status as potential 
refugee recipient states if Yugoslavia were to be destabilised. Britain, on the other 
hand, remained firmly opposed to the recognition of either Slovenia or Croatia, 
preferring instead to support the integrity of the Yugoslav international borders. 
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However, not for the last time in the Yugoslav conflicts of 1991-1995, events 
overtook the ponderous pace of European diplomacy. On July 25th 1991, Slovenia 
declared independence and rapidly took control of the borders of the republic, 
banishing federal officials and raising the recently designed Slovenian flag. These 
actions provoked a swift response from the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavija 
Narodna Armija or JNA), who found themselves in the unusual position of 
occupying foreign soil by merely staying in their banacks in Slovenia. The 
Slovenian Territorial Defence forces, trained and mobilised through the police force 
and local volunteers, barricaded the JNA in their banacks, cutting utility supplies 
and obstructing the re-supply of provisions. The JNA responded by mobilising 
battalions from Croatia and Serbia, directed by the Belgrade govemment to take 
back control of the borders and the intemational airport in the Slovenian capital of 
Ljubljiana. These manoeuvres handed a crucial public relations victory to the 
Slovenian govemment, as they portrayed themselves a plucky Westem-orientated 
alpine country attempting to throw off the yoke of Socialist oppression, a theme that 
global audiences were sympathetic towards following the events across Central and 
Eastem Europe in 1989. Slovenian television completed this representation by 
juxtaposing images of tanks rolling towards the border with footage of the 1968 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
In reality, however, the deployment of the JNA was limited to fewer than 
2000 troops and scarcely resembled a credible invading force. This is perhaps 
evidence of a clandestine agreement between Kucan and Milosevic concemmg 
Slovenian independence, forged as much as six months earlier at a meeting in 
Belgrade on January 24th 1991 (Silber and Little, 1995: 166). Slovenia, devoid as it 
was of a Serb minority, held little interest for Milosevic. His attention tumed to 
Croatia, in particular to the newly declared 'Serb Republic of the Krajina' and other 
Serb-held areas within the Croatian Republic. The battle for Slovenia was over only 
ten days after it has started, with intemational criticism heaped upon the JNA as it 
withdrew into Croatian tenitory. Slovenia found itself 'free to go' from the 
Yugoslav federation, not an entitlement it would share with Croatia. 
Tudjman rightly viewed the Slovenian secession with grim portent. He had 
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rushed through a declaration of independence on the same day (July 25111 1991) 
though, unlike Slovenia, Croatia was ill prepared in terms of both earning 
international approval and establishing control over federal-level competences. This 
declaration only increased the intensity of the "undeclared and dirty war" (Silber and 
Little, 1995: 169) across Croatian territory. The now-Serbianized8 JNA lost any 
pretence of defending Yugoslav territorial integrity and, instead, intervened in 
Croatia in support of the autonomous Serbian regions. Tudjman, however, refused to 
declare war on the JNA on Croatian soil, deciding not to employ the same (effective) 
guerrilla strategies carried out by Slovenia against the JNA barracks. Tudjman took 
this decision in order to bolster international support, as he felt that he would lose 
the moral high ground if he actively declared war as opposed to being the subject of 
external Serbian aggression. Warren Zimmerman (1996), the last US ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, notes how Tudjman alluded to his certainty of international intervention 
in conversation in mid-1991: 
I agreed with him [Tudjman] that the JNA was not acting in a neutral fashion but asked how 
he could possibly hope to take it on with his neophyte army. "Oh," he said offhandedly, 
"your country will come to my rescue with military force." I told him there wasn't a speck of 
credibility in this assertion and urged him not to base any military calculations on an 
American bailout. I failed to puncture Tudjman's serenity. "Perhaps I know more about your 
country than you do, Mr. Ambassador," he said with a smile. 
(Zimmerman, 1996: 154) 
This faith in a decisive military intervention perhaps asked a little too much 
of the contradictory and disorganised international response to the growing 
Yugoslav crisis. The reunification of Germany and the growing political proximity 
8 Croatia and Slovenia had halted conscription programmes to the JNA as long as eighteen months 
before declaring independence and following JNA action in Slovenia more non-Serbs deserted, 
joining instead their own territorial defence forces. Even prior to these events, the officer corps of the 
army always held a disproportionately high percentage of Serbs (Gienny, 1999). Later in Bosnia, the 
Prime Minister Alija Izetbegovic claimed that a distinction could be made between the reservists 
(who, he claimed, were Serb oppot1unists) and the regular army (who were more professional and 
non-aligned) (Zimmerman, 1996: 191). 
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of member states had engendered a fresh optimism at the diplomatic capabilities of 
the European Community (EC), prompting the Luxembourg foreign minister 
Jacques Poos to declare that, in confronting the Yugoslavian issue, "the hour of 
Europe had dawned" (quoted in Silber and Little, 1995: 159). Over the following 
months, and then years, this statement gained a hollow tone as the member states of 
the EC stood divided on what action to take regarding the slow disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. The UK and France continued to counsel against recognition of an 
independent Croatia, citing a concern that it would inflame violence and lead to an 
escalation of the conflict. Instead, they preferred to pursue a negotiated settlement 
through the establishment of the International Conference on Yugoslavia under the 
chairmanship of former British Foreign Secretary and NATO Secretary General, 
Lord Carrington. These initial peace-building attempts drew on a rhetoric that would 
become familiar over the course of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. Rather than 
assessing underlying political factors precipitating conflict, such as control over the 
resources of the Yugoslav state or the poor implementation of the 197 4 Constitution, 
Lord Carrington resorted to lamenting the Balkan temperament and stressing the 
complexity of 'ancient ethnic hatreds'. As Simms (2001) notes: 
Canington 's strategy hinged on a flawed presumption and a flawed tactic. From the outset 
he held all sides to be more or less equally responsible for the violence. They were, he 
subsequently claimed, 'all impossible people ... all as bad as each other, and there are just 
more Serbs'. 
(Simms, 2001: 17, emphasis in the original) 
This Balkanistic equivalency would characterise diplomatic intervention, 
particularly from the UK, over the coming years. Silber and Little (1995) lament 
how foreign diplomats "behaved as though the war had no underlying structural 
causes at all [ ... ] They behaved as though all they had to do was to persuade the 
belligerents of the folly of war" (Silber and Little, 1995: 159). In September 1991, 
as if to reaffirm the notion that all sides were equally to blame and that 'they would 
come to their senses', an arms embargo was placed on the whole of the former 
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Yugoslavia. This action played into the hands of the heavily armed Serbianized 
JNA, while disadvantaging the Croatian and, soon after, Bosnian govemment forces. 
Seemingly as a statement of the futility of this embargo, in October 1991 the JNA 
began to bombard the Croatian town of Vukovar, in the east of the republic on the 
banks of the river Danube. Simultaneously, and representing even less of a military 
threat, heavy artillery around the medieval Adriatic port of Dubrovnik began to shell 
this UNESCO World Heritage Site. These actions drew a belated response from the 
UN who, through the mediation of former US Secretary of State Cyrus Yance, 
brokered a temporary settlement to allow the deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
force, UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force), to four regions ofCroatia. 
3.6 War in Bosnia 
The gesture of UNPROFOR troops was too little, and too late, to have an 
impact on the future of Croatia's neighbour, Bosnia. Following heavy diplomatic 
pressure, in particular at the meeting of EC foreign ministers in December 13 111 -151h 
1991, Germany succeeded in pushing through the international recognition of 
Croatian independence and, in doing so, established the Badinter Commission to 
assess the independence claims of any Yugoslav republic that wished to secede. 
This decision provoked alarm amongst the Serb communities in Croatia, spreading 
concem that an independent Bosnia would leave no land bridge between themselves 
and their protectors in Belgrade. The retreat of the JNA following the deployment 
of 10 000 UNPROFOR troops amplified these concems. Consequently, attention 
(both regional and intemational) switched to the ethnically mixed Bosnia, where the 
political elite were struggling with the division of Yugoslavia. As Silber and Little 
( 1995) suggest, the options were stark: 
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Bosnia, which had consistently cautioned against early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, 
was now caught in the dilemma it most feared: its choice now was to join Slovenia and 
Croatia in seeking independence and, by so doing, tisk provoking a civil war against its own 
Serbs, or to stay inside a rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia and, by so doing, suffer the 
same fate, ultimately as Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro which had been brought under 
the complete control of Belgrade. 
(Silber and Little, 1995: 201) 
Elections in the republic on July 30111 1991 had seen a narrow victory for the 
SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije), a Bosnijak orientated party headed by Alija 
Izetbegovic, which stood for a multi-ethnic and united Bosnian state. Due to the 
demographic balance in the country, along with Izetbegovic as president, the 
appointed speaker of parliament was a Serb and the Prime Minister was a Croat. It 
was an uneasy coalition, disposed more to creating political stagnation than seeking 
consensus on the future of the republic. The rise of nationalist political parties, such 
as the SDA, the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka or SDS) of 
Radovan Karadzic, and the Croat HDZ under the patronage of Tudjman, began to 
polarise the Bosnian population. This anonymous passage from a collection of 
children's accounts of the conflict describes the confusion as the rigid ethno-
religious categories emerged in the Bosnian classroom: 
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Vlado walked into the classroom, raised two fingers high in the air and said: 'HDZ!' 
Djordje was quick to answer, but instead of two, he raised three fingers and cried: 'SDS!' 
Vedad did not even raise a finger. He just said: 'SDA!' 
The tone of the conversation was humorous. I thought I must have missed part of the joke, 
so just went along and laughed. 
Later that evening, after I got home, I told my mum about it, hoping she would find it funny, 
laugh, and clarify the joke for me. I didn't want to tell her, or anyone else, that I didn't have 
a clue about what was going on. My mum did not laugh. She looked down and told me that 
she did not want to talk to me about such things. 
('D.V' in Lesic, 1995: 28-29) 
During the fieldwork, a number of young respondents agreed with this 
passage, detailing their surprise at their 'ethnic' group and claimed to have no 
knowledge of this identity prior to the emergence of nationally orientated political 
parties. Serbian leaders, such as Radovan Karadzic, called for the division of Bosnia 
down ethnic lines, citing it as the only option for avoiding civil war. A glance at the 
intermingled distribution of different ethnicities in 1991 points to the absurdity (and 
cartographic impossibility) of this suggestion (see Map 3.3). 
Over the course of 1991 Serb politicians began to ignore the protestations of 
Izetbegovic and established their own 'Serbian autonomous areas in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', a tactic they had learnt from the war in Croatia. On November 11th 
1991, the Serbs held a plebiscite and voted unanimously to stay in the Yugoslav 
Federation. Later, in January 1992, they declared their territory the 'Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina' (later changed to the Republika Srpska) as a 
"defence against the Muslims" (Silber and Little, 1995: 218). The international 
community made a somewhat belated intervention to the rising tension in Bosnia in 
the form of the Lisbon Conference of March 181h 1992. This event, mediated by 
Portuguese EC mediator Jose Cutilero, proposed the cantonment of Bosnia into three 
nationally defined territorial units, while retaining the existing external borders of 
the republic. This plan is of significance as it marks the first occasion where the 
international community drew on the logic of cartographically defined ethno-
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national areas in an attempt to prevent (or stop) conflict in Bosnia. All sides initially 
agreed to the Lisbon plan, though after returning to Sarajevo Izetbegovic, perhaps 
aware of the implications of agreeing to national territorial areas, changed his mind 
(Silber and Little, 1995: 219). Ominously, the Serbs and the Croats continued 
bilateral talks concerning the division of Bosnia. For Karadzic, the key question was 
the 'northern corridor', the link area of land joining the Serbs in north-west Bosnia 
and the Krajina with those in eastern Bosnia and Serbia itself. This prospective 
' land-bridge' skirted along the Sava River, encompassing Brcko at it narrowest 
point. 
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Map 3.3 The distribution of ethnic groups in the Bosnia 1991 census 
(Source: Adapted from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia/ethnic majorities 97.jpg 
[accessed 19/09/04]) 
By this stage, Bosnia seemed to be on an irrevocable path to war. On the 291h 
February 1992 an independence referendum was held across Bosnia, in which the 
Bosnian Serbs played no part branding it "i llegal" (Zimmerman, 1996: 188). Serb 
forces, including the JNA, erected barriers around Serb villages and demarcated 
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Serb areas in Sarajevo. One month later the European Community and the United 
States recognised Bosnia's independence, citing the majority vote at the referendum. 
This act played into the hands of Radovan Karadzic who claimed that then, as in the 
past, the outside powers were bent against Serbian sovereignty (Udovicki and 
Stikovac, 2000: 179). These nationalist proclamations were taken as a call to arms 
as during April 1992 Serbian paramilitaries begun fighting for territory across 
Bosnia. These efforts were aided by the JNA, who had redeployed out of Slovenia 
and Croatia and had seen a vast swelling of their number in the Serb areas of Bosnia. 
In early April 1992, heavy artillery surrounded Sarajevo, positions they would hold 
until the signing of the Dayton Agreement three and a half years later. 
It seems surprising considering the precedent of Slovenia and then Croatia 
that the international community found it so difficult to predict this emerging 
conflict in Bosnia. Government ministers in the UK continued to draw upon the 
rhetoric of regional complexity and 'ancient ethnic hatreds' to justify a policy of 
non-intervention. For UK Prime Minister John Major the whole conflict appeared to 
emerge out of thin air: 
The conflict in Bosnia crept up on us while our attention was on the turmoil in the Soviet 
Union, and took us almost unawares[ ... ] Its roots were bewildering 
(Major, 1999: 532) 
On countless other occasions during the Bosnian war, the UK government, and other 
members of the international community, would reproduce this strategy of casting 
confusion over this 'bewildering' conflict. What was avoided within these 
geopolitical scripts was any suggestion of the "banality" of the conflict and the 
possibility that it was driven not by a frenzy of mass ethnic-based nationalism but 
"largely by small groups of politically empowered thugs (substantially drawn from 
the ranks of bands of soccer hooligans, criminal gangs and released prisoners)" 
(Andreas, 2004: 32). Instead it seems that Balkanism (Todorova, 1997, as discussed 
above) had a pervasive effect on UK policy making. Non-intervention was justified 
through a portrayal of the events in B()snia as a collective "moral sickness" (()wen, 
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1998: 1 ). One particular tactic was to draw a parallel between North em Ireland (as 
opposed to the Falklands or Iraq) and Bosnia, in doing so evoking the long-term 
'quagmire' of military intervention (Simms, 2001: 5). The US administrations of 
Bush (Senior) and Clinton, who were keen to draw parallels between Bosnia and 
Vietnam, echoed this policy (6 Tuathail, 1996). At this crucial stage in the 
destruction of Yugoslavia, the foreign policy of the UK appeared to be dictated by a 
dispassionate realism, that the only way to stop the war was to control the supply of 
arms (through the embargo) and wait to see who wins. As one joumalist at the time 
suggested: 
Ministers don't say so in public, but the fundamental British view remains that only a strong 
Serbia can ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans. 
(Sheridan, 1995 quoted in Simms, 2001: 12). 
However, the strong Serb presence in Bosnia was guaranteeing everything 
but security. Brcko, with its location on the 'northern corridor', became a vital 
strategic target of the Serb forces. In April 1992, fighting broke out in the centre of 
town (the location of JNA barracks), while Serb forces simultaneously attacked from 
the nearby villages of Razljevo and Grcica. These troops met little resistance from 
Bosnijak or Croat forces. The battle for Brcko is thought to have lasted only two 
days, after which the frontline shifted to the southern outskirts of the town, where it 
stayed for the duration of the conflict. As with Bijeljina9 before it, the official Serb 
terminology for the attack was 'a liberation' and, to this day, a large concrete 
monument stands in the centre of town as a memorial to "the Serb liberation of 
Brcko". Following the invasion of Brcko, Serb paramilitaries rounded-up the 
Muslim population of the town (which constituted the majority of the 41 000 
inhabitants). This was one town amongst many in Bosnia that at this time 
experienced Cis cenje terena (the cleansing of the ground), more commonly known 
as 'ethnic cleansing'. Bosnijak women and children were either expelled 
9 A town of similar size to Brcko, around 60 kilometres east, near the Serbian border. 
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immediately or exchanged for others in swaps organised by the UNHCR (the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees). Men and boys, if unlucky enough to be 
kept in Brcko, were held at informal 'collection centres' where their fate was 
uncertain. Helsinki Watch (1992), the human tights observation group, report the 
account of a Bosnijak man who was taken to the White Mosque (the largest Mosque 
in Brcko): 
Approximately I 00 to !50 men, between the ages of 15 and 80, were already in the mosque. 
We were forced to sing Cetnik songs. At night, we were ordered to squat in a single line and 
told that if we fell asleep we would never wake up. During the night, local Serbs from Brcko 
who dressed up in Cetnik uniforms would come and beat us with their boots. Usually, three 
to four Cetniks would come in every ten minutes; they were not always the same men. They 
beat people at random, including the old men. Each person was beaten for approximately ten 
minutes. The president of the town council and I were beaten together but they beat him 
more severely. They seemed intent on breaking his bones and knocked out most of his teeth. 
Seven or eight men were taken out of the mosque and never returned. 
(Brcko resident in Helsinki Watch, 1992: 96) 
The central concentration camp in Brcko was located at the port (luka) on the 
nver Sava. Two men, Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic, have been indicted for 
genocide and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugolsavia (ICTY) at the Hague for their part in the atrocities in the camp 
over 1992 10 • Over the course of the following six months the police station, the 
headquarters of bus company 'Laser' (which operates to this day) and the local 
Sports Hall were all locations of war crimes against Bosnijak men and boys (ICTY, 
2003). In addition to the human atrocities, Serb forces engineered the removal of 
all physical symbols of Islam from the landscape, as the streets were renamed and all 
four mosques in the town razed. One interview respondent, a local Serb who was 
resident in Brcko at the time, described the day of the pre-meditated destruction of 
10 The indictments relating to Brcko can be found at: www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/jel-
2ai981 019e.htm (Jelisic) and www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/ces-3ai021126e.htm (Cesic). 
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the White Mosque: 
It was crazy. They advertised that they would blow up the Mosque on the local radio in the 
moming and said they would do it at such-and-such a time that evening. It was done so that 
residents near-by could open their windows so they were not smashed with the force of the 
blast [ ... ] When it happened it totally destroyed the building, and the remains were taken 
away. You couldn't even see that it had been there. 
(Interview with Goran Mihajlovic, Brcko 4111 May 2003) 
Such extreme lengths meant that Brcko was 'cleansed' not only of its 
inhabitants but also its past. The streets were renamed, signs were changed to 
Cyrillic script and monuments were erected to Cetnik heroes such as Draza 
Mihailovic. The town itself survived the remainder of the war as a transit route for 
Serb forces between the Eastern and the Western halves of the Republika Srpska. At 
its narrowest, this 'land-bridge', crucial to uniting the Serbs, was only five 
kilometres wide and from vantage points the towers of Croatian churches to the 
north across the Sava and the minarets of mosques over the frontline to the south 
could be clearly seen (Glenny, 1996). This narrow stretch of land was, however, the 
Serbs "Achilles' heel" (Silber and Little, 1995: 283). This was not simply a 
reference to military weakness, for Serb retention of this 'ethnically cleansed' 
territory would be difficult to justify in any peace settlement. 
By 1993 Serb forces had taken control of around seventy percent of the rest 
of Bosnia. Sarajevo remained under siege and the war in Southern Bosnia, primarily 
between Bosnijaks and Croats, had escalated as the town of Mostar experienced 
fierce fighting. International diplomacy showed little sign of a breakthrough, with 
the first major peace effort, the cantonal arrangement of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
(VOPP), finally rejected by Karadzic's Bosnian Serbs. The most 'Western' 
governments seemed able to do was brand the conflict a 'humanitarian crisis' and 
deliver aid and food accordingly. Such a stance appeared to classify the war as a 
natural disaster, although this is entirely consistent with a reading of the conflict as a 
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'moral sickness'. David Rieff (2002) connects this strategy with a reluctance to 
become militarily involved with the conflict: 
Deploying and being willing to sacrifice soldiers was never intended to be a principal form 
of the West's response [to the Bosnian conflict]. Humanitarianism was. The idea was simple, 
coarse and brutal, and it would prove astonishingly effective. Instead of political action 
backed by credible threat of military force, the Western powers would substitute a massive 
humanitatian effort to alleviate the worst consequences of a conflict that they wanted to 
contain. 
(Rieff, 2002: 131) 
Following their successful peacekeeping mission in Croatia, UNPROFOR 
were deployed across Bosnia. However, with an inadequate and poorly defined 
mandate and limited in number, their presence had little impact on the conflict. One 
soldier I interviewed in Brcko was assigned to UNPROFOR in the central Bosnian 
town of Jajce for one six-month rotation. He described each patrol as a "mobile 
garage sale" due to the tendency for make-shift roadblocks to stage ambushes where 
equipment and arms were stolen, safe in the knowledge that UNPROFOR did not 
have the mandate to open fire unless they were fired upon first 11 • UNPROFOR was 
given the task of protecting the three UN 'safe areas' at Zepa, Gorazde and 
Srebrenica, established as an attempt to stem the exodus of refugees leaving Bosnia, 
primarily for Germany, Austria and Italy. The impotence of this force in the face of 
war atrocities was starkly underlined by the genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995, 
where UN troops were unable to stop the murder of as many as 8 000 Bosnijak men 
and boys. The activities of the UN in Srebrenica have since come in for considerable 
criticism, not least from the UN itself, recognising that 'impartiality' is not morally 
justifiable in situations of war crimes and genocide (see Annan, 1999: 6). 
The events of Srebrenica, coupled with increased civilian loss of life m 
Sarajevo, increased the international political pressure to resolve the conflict. It 
11 Interview with S-For Civil Affairs Officer, Brcko 22"d May 2003. 
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seems that at this time, in late 1995, the foreign policy script of the international 
community shifted from the 'quagmire' (as discussed above) to the post-Second 
World War notion that "never again would observers stand by and witness genocide 
on the European continent" (6 Tuathail, l996a). The US Clinton administration had 
increasingly advocated a policy of 'lift and strike', where the arms embargo would 
be selectively lifted (specifically so the Bosnijak government forces could defend 
themselves) coupled with air strikes on Serb heavy artillery positions. European 
governments had resisted this policy for some time, stating that it would put their 
troops at risk. This was not a problem that American faced: following the shooting 
down of the Black Hawk helicopters in Somalia in 1993 and associated loss of 
military life, it had not contributed any troops. However, in autumn 1995, three and 
a half years after the start of the Bosnia conflict, NATO intervened militarily to 
strike the Serb positions around Sarajevo. At much the same time Croatian forces, 
with the tacit approval of NATO, began 'Operation Storm' in the Krajina, with the 
direct intention of expelling all the Serbs. Some made the journey to Belgrade, 
whilst others simply crossed the border, welcomed into freshly vacated housing in 
Bosnia's Republika Srpska. Over this period, support from Belgrade for the Bosnian 
Serbs began to diminish, as did the enthusiasm of the army, where four years of 
fighting began to take its toll in greater rates of desertion and poor levels of 
conscription. The Croat and Bosnian forces, in a shaky alliance since 1994, began to 
counter attack, taking back large tracts of land, particularly in the north west of 
Bosnia, near the town of Bihac. 
The combination of air strikes and the improving fortunes of the Bosnijak-
Croat forces increased the pace of international diplomacy, in part due to the fact 
that the Serbs, with declining fortunes on the battlefield, were keen to come to the 
table. The rejection of the VOPP had marked the end of a solution based upon 
(nationally orientated) cantons. Instead, the focus shifted to finding a resolution 
involving a partition of Bosnia, between the newly allied Muslim-Croat federation 
and the Serbs. Such an agreement would be easier to settle than the VOPP, 
mirroring as it did the battlefield realities across Bosnia in late 1995. The fall of the 
UN 'Safe Areas' removed a significant obstacle to the creation of a Serb territory in 
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Bosnia, as the pockets of Bosnijak displaced persons were evicted or killed. Fully 
subscribing to the tyranny of nationalist cartography Richard Holbrooke, the former 
US Ambassador and chief peace negotiator, encouraged the Croatian President 
Tudjman to 'recapture' the Bosnian towns of Sanski Most, Prijedor and Bosnaski 
Novi as they had become "worldwide symbols of ethnic cleansing" and suited the 
territorial distribution of his fledgling peace plan (Holbrooke, 1999: 160). This 
astonishing intervention is perhaps a little easier to understand in the context of what 
became the Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace12 , signed in November 
1995 on a remote air base in Dayton, Ohio. 
There was much made of the success of the Dayton Agreement, it ended the 
war and created a 'multi-ethnic' Bosnian state, leading Holbrooke (1999) to suggest 
that it was a "good agreement on paper" (Holbrooke, 1999: 335). However, despite 
the rhetoric of the creation of a 'multi-ethnic state' the agreement conceded to 
nationalist cartography: the creation of ethnically defined territories dividing the 
Bosnian state. In effect, the borders legitimised at Dayton were the solidification of 
the front lines of the conflict itself. Campbell (1999) describes Dayton as an act of 
'apartheid cartography' (a cartography that had its roots in the Lisbon conference in 
1992), through the creation of two sub-state 'Entities': the Muslim-Croat 
Federation 13 and the Republika Srpska (RS) (see Map 3.4). 
12 The Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace will be referred to as the 'Dayton 
Agreement' for the remainder of the thesis. 
13 The Muslim-Croat Federation will be referred to as 'the Federation' for the remainder of the thesis. 
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Map 3.4 The division of Bosnia at the Dayton Agreement 
(Source: Adapted from Bose, 2002: 2) 
The enduring ' success' of the Dayton Agreement seems to have been the 
opportunity for each fact ion to claim a varying degree of victory: for the Serbs 
producing the near-sovereignty of the RS, for the Bosnijaks retaining the Bosnian 
state, for the international diplomats marking the end of military action in a 
politically damaging conflict. The Federation comprised 5 1 percent of Bosnia' s 
territory, the RS the remaining 49 percent, in recognition of the greater population in 
the Federation. As Kumar (1997) suggests, the Dayton Agreement seemed more like 
"the partition of Bosnia with a get out clause for outside powers" (Kumar, 1997: 22). 
The agreement called for the deployment of 60 000 peacekeeping troops, or as they 
were known an ' implementation force ' (I-For), and the establishment of the OHR, 
an unprecedented international governing body, which held executive and legislative 
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powers over Bosnian territory. However, the institutional presence of the 
international community did not end with the OHR as Holbrooke (1999) suggests: 
Unfortunately, we had created a stmcture for implementing Dayton in which responsibility 
and authority would rest with no single individual or institution. Although Bosnia would 
play host to fewer agencies than it had during the UN days, too many still remained in the 
process, including NATO, the UN and UNHCR, the OSCE, the EU, the World Bank and the 
IMF- and ... the Office of the High Representative, headed by Cart Bildt. 
(Holbrooke, 1999: 319) 
The peace negotiations themselves had been a painstaking process of 
assigning contested towns and territory to either the Federation or the RS. 
Accordingly, the RS was 'awarded' Srebrenica, while the Federation retained 
control of a larger part of Sarajevo. Such contentious territorial assignations could be 
defended with reference to Dayton's 'right to return' of refugees and displaced 
persons. Negotiating the settlement of Brcko at the Dayton Peace Accords proved 
particularly contentious. Richard Holbrooke saw the resolution of Brcko as the 
"toughest of all issues at Dayton" (Holbrooke, 1999: 296). Similarly, according to 
Carl Bildt, the EU Special Envoy for Bosnia, Brcko posed "the mother of all 
difficulties in the Bosnian peace process" (Bildt, 1997). Bosnijak and Bosnian Croat 
delegates argued that giving the area to the Serbs would reward ethnic cleansing 
while also denying access for the Federation to the Sava River. Serb negotiators 
countered that the RS would not be viable in two parts, sensing that this would leave 
the western part subject to the same fate as those Serbs in the neighbouring Krajina 
region of Croatia. Without the Brcko link, the viability of the Republika Srpska 
would be in jeopardy (International Crisis Group, 2003: 2). This impasse almost 
proved too much for the Dayton negotiators, with all sides laying claim to Brcko and 
its surrounding municipality. However, Slobodan Milosevic broke this deadlock by 
agreeing to put Brcko under international arbitration with a decision reached within 
one year (Silber and Little, 1995: 376). As such, Annex 2 ofthe Dayton Agreement 
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(article 5) states that: 
The parties agree to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the Inter-Entity Boundary 
Line in the Brcko area on the map attached in the Appendix [ ... ] No later than six months 
after the entry into force of this agreement, the Federation shall appoint one arbitrator, and 
the Republika Srpska shall appoint one arbitrator. A third arbitrator shall be selected by 
agreement of the Parties' appointees within thi11y days thereafter. .. The third arbitrator shall 
serve as presiding officer of the arbitral tiibunal. 
(Dayton Agreement, Annex 2, article 5 in OHR, 2000: 37) 
As no map was actually attached, the first decision for the prospective 
arbitration panel was to define the borders of the area under dispute. Following the 
selection of former legal advisor to the US State Department Roberts Owen as 
presiding arbitrator, with Professor Cazim Sadikovic (representing the Federation) 
and Dr. Vitomir Popovic (representing the RS), the former pre-war Brcko 
Municipality was identified as the area under the panel's authority (see Map 3.5 
overleaf). As the map shows, the Brcko Municipality had divided into three 'mini-
municipalities' during the conflict, each with an ethnic orientation: Brcko Orad 
(Serb), Ravne-Brcko (Croat) and Brcko-Rahic (Bosnijak). The task of the arbitration 
process was to establish a coherent strategy for the future governance of this 
fractured municipality, with any structure for the organization of a future authority at 
the disposal of the panel. It is the outcome of this process, and its consequence for 
the development of civil society, which is examined in detail in the next chapter. 
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Map 3.5 The area under International Arbitration -the former Brcko Municipality 14 
(Source: Adapted from www.posavina.de/prostor/karta/ravne.gif and Kemencic and 
Schofield, 1998) 
3.7 Conclusion 
Since the conflict in Bosnia there have been numerous attempts to 'uncover 
the truth', to establish a unifying narrative that can explain the violence that marked 
the fall of Yugoslavia. Many such attempts invoke a founding teleology, a moment 
where an inevitable decline to conflict began, often identified as the events of the 
14 This map depicts only the approximate territories governed by the war time sub-municipalities of 
Brcko Orad, Ravne-Brcko and Brcko-Rahic from 1992 to their dissolution in 1999 (discussed in 
Chapter 4). The boundaries between these administrative entities were contested over this period and 
could be characterised as 'zones' rather than a fixed and universally agreed lines. 
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Second World War or the death of Tito. From the outset a reductive project of this 
nature is flawed in its denial of heterogeneity and the existence of many competing 
'Bosnias'. This chapter has not attempted to establish the facts behind the conflict, 
but rather to explain the historical events that have since been deployed in order to 
produce Bosnia as an object of enquiry, a site of violence or as a locus for 
intervention. This is an attempt to portray the complexity of the Bosnian war, as 
opposed to isolating key factors and reducing them to consumable causes. This 
strategy should not be confused with a critique of the possibility of knowledge or a 
position of detached indifference. Rather, an acknowledgment of heterogeneity, the 
every-day, the contradictory and the banal provides the researcher with a powerful 
set of tools to examine the essentialised and reductive interpretations of post-conflict 
Bosnia. 
The casting of the Balkans as a site of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' on the 
'hinterland' of Europe served as a strategy to encourage non-intervention by 
European and American governments during the conflict in Bosnia. The Dayton 
agreement did not mark a significant departure from this logic, focussing as it did on 
the demarcation of ethno-national territories within a weak decentralised Bosnian 
state. The cartographic trick of omnipotence has fixed the Bosnian conflict onto 
territory, and has simultaneously acted to justify essentialised images of Bosnia as a 
divided community. The clean lines of the Dayton Agreement's maps had one 
uncomfortable area of cross-hatching at Brcko, a territory too difficult to fix and left 
open to negotiation through a process of international arbitration. The following 
chapter documents the course of these negotiations. It examines how the Brcko 
'question' was resolved through a departure from the logic ofDayton and an attempt 
to produce a multi-ethnic alternative within Bosnian territory. By utilising the 
qualitative ethnographic methodology discussed in the previous chapter, these 
negations and solutions are examined in the everyday context of Brcko life as the 
gaze of international agencies has shaped it. 
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State: 
The consecration 
o]P11r£7ko lJistrict 
4.1 Introduction 
Space is a social product[ ... ] it is not simply "there", a neutral container waiting to be filled, 
but is a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control and hence of domination, of power. 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 24) 
The central problem we faced in Brcko was simply creating it, the laws, the institutions[ ... ] 
[and] making people think in terms of Brcko District. 
(Former OHR Official, Brcko 201h February 2003) 
This chapter will examme how the 'problem' of Brcko was resolved 
following the Dayton Agreement. As the comments above suggest, this process 
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involved increased intemational intervention to produce a new tenitory within the 
Bosnian state termed 'Brcko District'. Drawing on the theories of PietTe Bourdieu 
( 1989), this chapter examines how the process of creating Brcko has led to the OHR 
accumulating symbolic capital and, consequently, gaining the power to legitimise 
particular activities, institutions and discourses. In drawing upon such an economic 
metaphor I argue that the state, left weak and decentralised following the Dayton 
Agreement, is 'improvised' in post-conflict Brcko by both intemational and local 
agencies, though ultimately legitimised by the OHR. This improvisation has guided 
the political, economic and symbolic landscapes of Brcko as particular discourses of 
democracy and multi-ethnicity have been reproduced in the post-conflict period. It 
is the effect of these discourses on the practices and production of civil society that 
is explored in greater detail in later chapters. 
First it is necessary to examine the historical events that led to the creation of 
Brcko District, in particular the negotiations of the intemational arbitration tribunal. 
For the town and surrounding countryside this was a period of stagnation: the 
population transfers violently enacted in the conflict remained unchanged during the 
peace. In addition, intemational donors (and investors) were wary of allocating 
money to an area with an uncertain future. Unlike the Dayton negotiation process, 
which had comprised a short period of intensive talks carried out on a secluded 
American airbase, the attempt to resolve the fate of Brcko was drawn out over a 
series of intemational conferences and declarations over the late 1990s. This 
protracted process meant that the conclusions of the arbitral tribunal could be shaped 
and influenced by events in Brcko. The panel paid particular attention to the success 
of the retums process (referring to the retum of refugees and displaced persons to 
their pre-war homes) and the holding of state and district elections. After a series of 
delays, the arbitration process was finally brought to a close with the publication in 
March 1999 of the 'Final Award'. This document decreed that the pre-war Brcko 
Municipality (see Map 3.5) would become a special multi-ethnic district of Bosnia. 
This decision, unique within post-Dayton Bosnia, was predicated on the 
intensification of intemational intervention in the District, through the strengthening 
of OHR control, the continued presence of S-For (Stabilisation Force) NATO troops 
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at a nearby base and the belated arrival of a senes of multi-lateral donor 
organisations. The remaining sections of the chapter examine the implications of 
these processes on the political, economic and symbolic landscapes of Brcko 
District. 
4.2 The Arbitration Process 
Beyond a cessation of military conflict, little changed in Bosnia following 
the signing of the Dayton Agreement. Implementation of the agreement over 1996 
and 1997 proved slow and chaotic, as poorly organised international agencies met 
with strong resistance from nationalist political parties. The division of Bosnia into 
two 'Entities' (the RS and the Federation) had empowered nationalist political 
parties: territories within the Bosnian state were 'linked' to particular national 
identities. This division acted as a significant barrier to the return of refugees, while 
also providing a disincentive on the part of the RS to take an active part in the 
central Bosnian state institutions. These obstructions again demonstrate the duality 
at the core of Dayton: nationalist political parties (in particular the Serbs) had agreed 
to sign on account of the creation of the Entities, while international observers and 
pro-Bosnijak groups had been reassured by the promise of a multi-ethnic state and 
refugee return. While this paradox may have seemed less important during the tense 
negotiations to bring military violence to an end, it became an intractable political 
reality. 
The political will to break this stalemate and re-think the implementation of 
Dayton had not existed in 1995 and 1996. NATO countries 1 had committed the 
required number of I-For troops (60 000), though this did not include providing the 
necessary political mandate. In light of the events in Somalia in October 1993, 
where 18 American soldiers had been killed and 84 injured when two 'Black Hawk' 
helicopters were shot down, there was concern amongst the Clinton Administration 
as to the domestic political damage of troop casualties in Bosnia. Perhaps the 
reticence towards sending troops into Bosnia should not be seen as a surpnse 
1 !-For was predominantly provided at the outset by the US, the UK and France. 
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following a conflict where the US and UK media had largely subscribed to 
Balkanistic discourses of primordial hatreds held by barbaric peoples. The outcome 
was a restricted mandate that was weak and purely defensive. During 1996, 1-For did 
not attempt to arrest indicted war criminals or actively reduce criminal or violent 
activity, as their mandate stressed their monitoring role as opposed to direct 
intervention. The central focus of Annex la of the Dayton agreement, which 
outlines the military aspects of the peace agreement, was the cessation of military 
hostilities, and therefore the remit of 1-For involved ensuring that the armies of the 
Entities kept the ceasefire (see Dayton agreement, 1995: Annex la in particular 
article 11). The unrest that they faced following the signing of Dayton was almost 
universally civilian in nature, fuelled by ultra-nationalist media and wartime political 
leaders. 
Over the period of arbitration, Brcko experienced nationalist political 
intransigence and civilian unrest. The division of the District by the IEBL (the inter-
entity boundary line) meant that the de facto partition of the pre-war municipality 
continued in the immediate post-war period, with the northern urban section of the 
district (Brcko Grad) controlled by the RS, while the other two 'mini-municipalities' 
(Ravne-Brcko and Brcko-Rahic) were part of the Federation. The fact that Brcko 
Municipality was subject to international arbitration had little impact on its division 
on the ground. Radovan Karadzic' s SDS remained in firm control of the 
government, media, police and judiciary within Brcko town, while the Croat HDZ 
controlled Ravne-Brcko and the SDA Brcko-Rahic. The arbitration negotiations, 
however, were not taking place in a vacuum. The conclusions of the tribunal were 
directly influenced by the extent of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement in 
Brcko and to this end, the negotiations seemed to focus on two main indicators: the 
return of refugees and the holding of democratic elections. 
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4.2.1 The Returns of Refugees 
One of the central tenets of the Dayton Agreement was the right for 
displaced persons (DPs) to retum to their homes: 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to retum to their homes of origin. 
They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in 
the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be 
restored to them. 
(Dayton agreement, Annex 7 article I in OHR, 2000a: 51) 
This was an ambitious principle in a country where approximately 50 percent of the 
pre-war population of 4.3 million was displaced during the 43 months of war. Over 1 
million of the displaced persons remained in the country while over 1.2 million were 
dispersed throughout 25 host nations (UNHCR, 1997a: 30). A UNHCR survey 
found that by early 1996 Germany hosted the largest number of refugees from 
Bosnia (345 000), followed by Croatia (288 000), the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (253 000), Austria (80 000), Sweden (61 500), Switzerland (26 000) and 
Norway (12 000) (UNHCR, 1997a: 5). In light of these figures, the intemational 
motivation for establishing a successful retums process is clear. Of these refugees, 
Bosnijaks constituted the largest number (610 000), followed Bosnian Croats (307 
000), Bosnian Serbs (253 000) and others (23 000) (UNHCR, 1997a: 7). In Brcko 
Municipality alone it was estimated by the UNHCR that by the end of the war there 
were 35 073 displaced persons in parts within the Muslim Croat Federation (Ravne-
Brcko and Brcko-Rahic) and 17 261 in the RS part (UNHCR, 1997b). 
Despite these statistics, the political conditions in Brcko Municipality (as in 
other areas of Bosnia) acted as a significant barrier to the (almost non-existent) 
retums process in 1996, and in particular to Bosnijak and Croat families retuming to 
their pre-war homes in Brcko town. Indeed, over this initial post-war period the 
displacement of the population continued in Brcko, as RS authorities drew on the 
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vacant housing stock to house displaced Serbs from Sarajevo, Glamoc, Jajce, Sanski 
Most and Bihac. This situation was echoed across Bosnia: 'non-military ethnic 
cleansing' occutTed in concert with continuing dominance of the wartime nationalist 
pm1ies intent on creating homogenous 'ethnic' spaces (Campbell, 1998a: 230). One 
pm1icular area of concern in Brcko was the Zone of Separation (ZOS), the mined 
and destroyed tetTitory between the former front-lines that, following Dayton, 
became known as the IEBL (the Inter-entity Boundary Line, see Figures 4.1 and 
4.2). The ZOS covered a significant area of the Brcko suburbs, including 
neighbourhoods such as Omebegovaca, Dizdarusa, Gajevi and Brod that had 
previously accommodated significant Bosnijak and Croat majority populations. 
There was concern among the RS authorities in Brcko that the demographic 
alterations brought about by the returns to the ZOS could weaken their claim to 
Brcko within the arbitration process. As a former OHR Official explained during the 
fieldwork, the RS authorities were reluctant to "alter the facts on the ground"2. This 
concern provoked a two-way reconstruction effort over summer 1996, with both 
Federation and RS authorities attempting to fill the vacant housing in the Brcko ZOS 
with members of 'their' ethnic group. The RS authorities had further leverage over 
returnees to the RS side of the ZOS as these individuals were subject to the laws of 
the entity (as specified in Annex 7), one of which was the requirement to hold a 
valid RS identity card. Returnees were understandably reluctant to hold an ID card 
with the Serb insignia of the twin-headed eagle, a symbol that many connected with 
fascism and the violent removal from their homes. In addition, Serb authorities often 
refused to issue new identity cards, thus justifying enforced removal of recent 
returnees on the grounds that they were not complying with entity law (with the full 
force of the Dayton Agreement behind them). 
2 Interview with former OHR Official, 20th February 2003. 
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Figure 4.1 Klanac, former ZOS. Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
Figure 4.2 The 'lzbor' shoe factory, Klanac. Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
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As the returns process threatened the fragile peace within the Brcko area, I-
For, themselves located in the new 'Camp McGovern' army base on a large tract of 
former agricultural land in the ZOS, declared a two-week moratorium on 
construction in the ZOS over July 1996. In this period, the OHR (in conjunction 
with the UNHCR, IPTF3 and I-For) established the International Housing 
Commission (IHC) to screen return applications to insure the rights of the claimants 
to the properties. However, the IHC was to prove an abject failure in this attempt. 
While there was a clear need to oversee the return of families to their pre-war 
homes, the complex bureaucracy of IHC coupled with the explicit lack of a 
guarantee of security to returning families (see above for a discussion of the limited 
mandate of I-For) undermined the international efforts. Consequently, incidents of 
damage to property or individuals were common over this period of the IHC, as 
documented by the International Crisis Group (ICG): 
On the 11th November 1996, 9 reconstructed houses were dynamited in Brod and 
Omerbegovaca. Between the 28th of February and 11th March 1997, 11 newly pre-fabricated 
houses were destroyed in Gajevi. In all, 200 houses owned by displaced Bosnijaks were 
either blown up or burnt down before the IHC programme was halted. 
(International Crisis Group, 1997: 2) 
This example highlights the fragile security situation in Brcko over 1996. 
The 'right to return', as enshrined in Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement, was being 
denied to Bosnijak and Croat returnees to Brcko as I-For had no mandate to 
intervene to ensure the returnees safety. The arbitration tribunal took particular 
interest in these events: the activities of RS officials were deemed to be blocking the 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The focus of the tribunal on these events 
led Gojko Klickovic, then Prime Minister of RS, to pull out of the arbitration 
proceedings in December 1996 (ICG, 1998: 3). However, when the formal 
arbitration hearing began in Rome in January 1997 the RS changed its mind, perhaps 
3 The UN-led International Police Task Force. 
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concerned that the entire Brcko Municipality would be handed over to the 
Federation. The outcome of the Rome negotiations, issued on Febmary 14111 1997, 
was an interim decision, with a final resolution deferred for another year. The lack 
of a binding decision was an acknowledgement of the failings in Brcko over 1996: 
Given the ongoing failures to comply with the Dayton Accords in the RS area of the Brcko 
Opstina (particularly in terms of freedom of movement and the return of former residents to 
their Brcko homes), and the high level of tension resulting therefrom, there is a clear need to 
establish a program for the implementation of the Dayton Accords in the area [ ... ]. 
(Arbitral Tribunal, Article I in OHR, 2001) 
The strategy selected for ensuring Dayton implementation in the future was a 
radical scaling-up of international intervention in Brcko. The cornerstone of this 
approach was the formation of a new OHR office in Brcko (OHR-North), headed by 
a Deputy High Representative for Brcko, otherwise know as the 'Brcko 
Supervisor'4• In order to break the stagnancy that surrounded the political, economic 
and legal realms in Brcko, this post was granted a wide-ranging set of powers. 
These were set out in vague terms within the Rome interim declaration, partly on the 
basis that the remit of the post was to be decided by the Supervisor: 
The Supervisor will have authority to promulgate binding regulations and orders in aid of the 
implementation program and local democratization. Such regulations and orders shall 
prevail against any conflicting law. All relevant authorities, including courts and police 
personnel, shall obey and enforce all Supervisory regulations and orders. The parties shall 
take all actions required to cooperate fully with the Supervisor in the implementation of this 
provision. 
(Arbitral Tribunal, Article II in OHR, 200 I) 
4 Referred to as simply 'the Supervisor' for the remainder of the thesis. 
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In March 1997, in a supplementary award published at a Peace 
Implementation Council Meeting (PlC) in Vienna, High Representative Carl Bildt 
appointed US diplomat Robert Farrand as Supervisor of Brcko for one year, with 
deputies from Russia and the UK. The first significant declaration produced by 
Ambassador Farrand was, perhaps unsurprisingly, a 'Procedure for Return to 
Brcko', a document that established a new Returns Commission charged with 
implementing Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement. This body was composed of 
representatives from OHR, UNHCR, SFOR, IPTF and the Mayors of Brcko, though 
decisions required a quorum of only four. This new commission had a positive 
impact on the rate of returns, in particular speeding up the processing of claims and, 
more importantly, introducing a new Brcko ID card without Serb symbols on the 
front cover. By January 1998, the Returns Commission had approved the return 
2461 families, most of whom were Bosnijak (ICG, 1998: 8). Of those, 710 had 
actually 'returned', the criterion of which was spending at least one night at the 
property. In this narrow definition, the 'return' in the returns process appears to 
relate to property as opposed to actual demographic shift, thus the actual numbers of 
people settling back in Brcko were (and are) difficult to quantify. 
During 1997, as the fledgling returns procedure appeared to be increasing, a 
series of symbolic barriers to returning Bosnijak and Croat families appeared within 
the Brcko townscape. As has been noted previously, during the conflict the street 
names had been changed to reflect the Serbian domination of the town. The main 
shopping street was renamed 'The Serb liberation of Brcko', while the central traffic 
route was called Bulevar Draia Mihailovic after the World War II Cetnik leader. In 
place of the four mosques destroyed during the conflict (see Chapter 3), the Serb-led 
Brcko authorities began the constructing new Orthodox churches in the suburbs of 
GrCica and Meraje. In the case of Meraje, the OHR had designated the 
neighbourhood for Bosnijak returns, with the new church taking prime position in 
the centre of a former residential area (see Figure 4.3 overleaf). Despite 
reassurances from the Mayor and Orthodox priest, intervention from the Supervisor 
designed to suspend building work at Meraje was fruitless (ICG, 1998: 9). On 
September 81h 1997, a concrete statue of Draza Mihailovic was unveiled in the centre 
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of Brcko (fittingly on 'his ' boulevard), though he had no connection with the town 
during his lifetime. Two weeks later, a fifteen-foot memorial dedicated to the 'Serb 
Liberators of Brcko' was unveiled nearby (see Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17). These 
strategies were clear attempts to 'Serbianise' Brcko and use any means necessary to 
forge an historical link between the Serbian people and the townscape (a fallacy that 
had been deployed during the peace negotiations5). In comparison to violent 
intimidation or the imagery of the RS ID cards, the OHR initially found these 
intangible symbolic aspects of the Brcko landscape difficult to legislate against. As 
with earlier infringements, these factors were taken into consideration by the arbitral 
tribunal. 
Figure 4.3 New Orthodox Church, Meraje, Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
5 During a meeting of Croat and Serb forces in 1994, Croat forces asked for control of Brcko. 
Radovan KaradziC erroneously reported that "the Serbs refused because they built it and it was 
completely Serb" . (Silber and Little, 1995: 308). 
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4.2.2 Presidential and Municipal Elections 
Another area that concerned both the tribunal and the new Supervisor were 
elections. Similar to the returns process, the Dayton Agreement contained an annex 
outlining the timing and conditions for democratic elections. It stated: 
Elections shall take place on a date six months after entry into force of this Agreement or, if 
the OSCE determines a delay necessary, no late than nine months after entry into force. 
(Dayton agreement, Annex 3 article Ill in OHR, 2000a: 39) 
Considering the political, economic and social conditions in Bosnia, this was an 
extremely ambitious timetable. A number of commentators have suggested the 
reason for this compressed electoral timetable was that they would coincide with the 
US presidential election and allow the Clinton administration to claim a foreign 
policy triumph (Rieff, 1995; Griffiths, 1998; Donais, 2000). This appears a 
plausible argument. The downing of the Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu in 
1993, with subsequent television footage of dead American soldiers being dragged 
through the streets, had influenced public opinion against sending troops to Bosnia. 
In his account of the Dayton implementation, chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke 
documents the difficulties he faced convincing the Clinton administration to commit 
large numbers of troops (Holbrooke, 1999). In light of this risk, there was a clear 
need to see rapid results in Bosnia, and the possibility of the all important 'exit 
strategy' was provided by the nationwide elections in September 1996. Williams 
( 1996) suggested that the US desire for the September 1996 Bosnian vote was so 
great that "if the earth needs to be declared flat in the process, so be it" (Williams, 
1996: 15). 
The early elections suited the nationalist political parties and there is 
evidence that all three (SDS, SDA and HDZ) mutually reinforced and supported 
each other's electoral positions within their respective areas (Donais, 2000: 239). 
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Under the electoral system designed by the OSCE, the nationalist parties only had to 
secure the majority vote from their own ethnic group in areas under their control to 
stay in power. As Griffiths ( 1998) notes, the control of nationalist parties over the 
key domestic institutions and agencies such as police and media "ensured that they 
determined the agenda and discourse of the election campaign in 1996" (Griffiths, 
1998: 61). In the RS, the reporting by official Serb media was deemed so offensive 
and biased to the ruling SDS party that High Representative Carl Bildt accused them 
of broadcasting propaganda that "even Stalin would be ashamed of' (ICG, 1996: 15 
in Donais, 2000: 240). Such incidents led Human Rights Watch to declare in a pre-
election report that: 
Elections that are conducted under current conditions - where persons indicted for war 
crimes monopolise the media, using it for their own nationalistic goals; and those who would 
voice an alternative, multi-ethnic view of Bosnia and Herzegovina are silenced - will only 
consolidate the power of the extremists. 
(Human Rights Watch, 1996: 2) 
In addition to the dominance of the wartime nationalist parties, the dispersed 
population meant voter registration was a central problem facing the OSCE. This 
was perhaps exacerbated by granting voters the option of either voting where they 
resided in 1991, where they resided after ethnic cleansing in mid-1996 or, perhaps 
most confusingly, where they intended to reside in the future (Campbell, 1998a: 
222). This ambiguous principle was an invitation for electoral fraud, as electoral 
registers within the RS were manipulated (through the media and incentives of 
humanitarian aid) to include the maximum number of Serbs. Indeed, radio 
broadcasts in the RS suggested that those who planned to vote in their pre-war 
places of residence were "directly attacking the Serbian nation" (Campbell, 1998a: 
222). This strategy was also employed within Serbia itself, where some 31 000 were 
'assigned' to vote in Brcko, while an additional 20 000 were registered in the 
formerly Bosnijak-majority town of Srebrenica (Donais, 2000: 241 ). Within this 
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context, it was not surprising that the elections simply ratified the continued rule of 
the wartime nationalist patties. 
The OSCE decreed that the elections were 'free and fair' despite significant 
evidence of serious electoral fraud and an impossible turnout of 103.9 percent, 
(Griffiths, 1998: 61). This declaration prompted accusations that the OSCE were 
under pressure from the US Government to herald successful elections in Bosnia 
(Donais, 2000; Chandler, 2000). However, the elections did not succeed in giving 
the international agencies in Bosnia their 'exit strategy', as noted by Susan 
Woodward (1997): 
Far from producing a smooth transition and an easy exit for 1-For, the election predictably 
gave the democratic stamp of approval to the three nationalist parties that had waged the 
war. 
(Woodward, 1997: 97) 
The Dayton objective of a united and multi-ethnic Bosnia looked further 
away than ever after the 1996 Bosnian presidential elections. However, the elections 
did provide the OSCE with some lessons for the 1997 municipal elections in terms 
of voter registration and attempting to stem nationalist tirades in the media. The 
OSCE had previously scheduled the municipal vote for the same date as the 
presidential election, though the organisational demands and possibilities of electoral 
fraud forced a one-year delay. The OSCE made structural changes to the procedure 
of voter registration in an attempt to construct an accurate list of eligible voters. The 
process through which displaced persons could vote in their pre-war municipality 
was simplified, while the bureaucratic requirements for voting in a 'future 
municipality' 6 were tightened. 
In Brcko, the Supervisor perceived that the District elections could act as a 
vehicle for establishing a multi-ethnic governing body in Brcko Orad, following five 
years of dominance by the SDS. With this objective in mind, and with the backing 
6 A 'future municipality' is defined by the OSCE as one in which the voter had not lived before the 
war. 
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of the OSCE, the Brcko elections were held only in the RS side of the District 
(Brcko town), while those Displaced Persons (DPs) from the town based in the 
Federation part of the District were given the opportunity to vote. This approach 
met with considerable opposition, as it suggested (most importantly to the arbitral 
tribunal) that Brcko could be treated in a similar fashion to other split municipalities 
across Bosnia. Thus, though Brcko was the only municipality in Bosnia in which the 
IEBL was subject to international arbitration, it was cut in two by the very 
organisations committed to multi-ethnic power structures and democratization 
(Griffiths, 1998: 64). There was also evidence of the 'carrot-and-stick' of arbitration 
as Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia, warned that taking pmt in 
the elections was compulsory: 
[ ... ] any attempt by either pa~ty to boycott the elections would undoubtedly be viewed by 
the Arbitrator as an extremely serious obstruction of efforts toward a democratic solution in 
Brcko, and could prejudice the case of whichever side took such action. 
(Frowick in OHR, 1997a) 
Despite such threats, and the extra measures employed by the OSCE, preparations 
for the municipal elections in Brcko were as chaotic as they had been for the 
presidential elections a year earlier. The decision to limit the election to the RS part 
of the pre-war municipality provoked consternation among the Federation political 
parties (SDA and SDP), and initially they refused to register for the vote. Following 
a meeting at OHR-North between the three mayors of Brcko District, coupled with 
pressure from the Supervisor, these parties grudgingly rejoined the contest. On the 
other side of the political spectrum, the SDS also threatened to withdraw from the 
election, in protest at the decertification of voters from the lists used in the 1997 
presidential vote (particularly those who had speculatively viewed Brcko as a 'future 
municipality'). However, these confrontations were overshadowed in late August 
when the simmering confrontation within the RS between 'reformists' based in 
Banja Luka (led by Biljana Plavsic) and 'hardliners' based in Pale (led by Radovan 
Karadzic) resulted in violent civil unrest on the streets ofBrcko. Karadzic supporters 
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took to the streets, directing their anger at the intemational agenctes such as the 
OHR and OSCE, which they labelled "the occupying army" (ICG, 1998: 6). A 
small IPTF police station was ransacked, and a number of S-For, OHR and UN 
vehicles were destroyed, resulting in the injury of several intemational workers. This 
riot clearly demonstrated the control of the Pale SOS over the local DP population 
and police. As Griffiths ( 1998) notes, these acts also illustrated the attitude of DPs 
toward members of the intemational agencies in Brcko (Griffiths, 1998: 72). 
It could be expected that this violence would harden intemational agencies 
against manipulation of the Municipal elections and urge them to take action against 
the SOS. However, this was not the case. Following the riots, the SOS continued to 
threaten a boycott of the elections, aware that their hegemony within the political 
administration of Brcko town was under threat. Their final participation in the 
election was secured at the last minute when the OSCE discovered an 'error' that 
boosted the electoral register of the Municipality by 2 660 names. This irregularity 
has never had adequate explanation by the OSCE or the OHR, and there was 
widespread suspicion of the events surrounding the 'lost voters'. The ICG (1997) 
reflected the attitudes of many intemational observers: 
Deals struck in smoke-filled rooms to "save" this weekends poll may have compromised the 
integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina's first post-war municipal election. Unless the elections 
supervisory body can provide a full and transparent explanation of these !I th hour 
agreements, the election must be considered flawed. 
(Intemational Crisis Group, 1997: 1) 
It has been suggested that the "11th hour agreements" with the SOS, coupled 
with the OSCE's decision to limit the election to Brcko town, were designed to 
prevent a Federation party (such as the SDA) winning the election (Griffiths, 1998: 
81 ). While it is difficult to speculate on the motivations behind these initiatives, the 
result certainly helped the SOS maintain control of Brcko, albeit sharing power with 
representatives from the SDA, SDP and HDZ. This avoided the secmity-threatening 
situation of an outright SDA victory, and left the OHR claiming a victory for a 
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multi-ethnic democratic Brcko (OHR, 1997b). Following the election, the 
Supervisor issued a Supervisory Order outlining the structure of the new Brcko 
Municipal Government (OHR, 1997c ). At its heart was the declaration that the 
Brcko Municipal Assembly would have a president, vice president and secretary, 
with all three posts held by individuals of different nationalities. Similarly, the 
president of the executive board of the municipality (the Mayor) would have two 
deputies, again all three of different nationalities. This structure and multi-ethnic 
weighting would be replicated in future multi-ethnic administrations in Brcko. The 
Supervisory Order was careful to specify that the Supervisor retained control of the 
section of specific parties that would sit in the assembly: 
The President and the Vice-President of the executive board shall ensure that the staff 
composition of the municipal administration of Brcko ... shall reflect the composition of the 
population of the RS Municipality of Brcko, based on the voters registry and as reflected by 
the results of the municipal elections of 13 and 14 September 1997. After the technical 
certification of the municipal elections, the Supervisor shall inform the Patties of the exact 
proportion which is to form the basis for the composition of the multi-ethnic administration 
in Brcko. 
(OHR: 1997c, paragraph 5) 
This order marks the first attempt by the OHR to establish a multi-ethnic 
government in Brcko. The wording of the pronouncement has since met criticism, 
not least from David Chandler (1999) who portrays this Supervisory Order as an 
annulment of the municipal elections, "only for the international community to 
select the structure and make-up of the new Brcko administration" (Chandler, 1999: 
87). While this is partly true, it misses the origins of the electoral engineering that 
took place in Brcko over 1997. Had the OSCE held the election across the former 
Municipality, then the outcome would have handed Brcko town back to the 
Federation. After the orchestrated riots of August 1997, there seemed to be no doubt 
that such a hand over of power would present a significant security threat to the 
international agencies working in Brcko. In the post-conflict climate of nationalist 
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party politics where voting was occurring almost exclusively down ethnic lines, the 
control by the OSCE over who was eligible to vote was equivalent to controlling the 
result itself. The Supervisory Order issued after the election was less influential in 
dictating the ethnic constitution of the new municipal authorities than the 
manipulation of voter registration by the OSCE before it. This marked a lost 
opportunity for the electorate, the OHR and the OSCE as these would turn out to be 
the last elections in Brcko for seven years. 
The internationally orchestrated multi-ethnic administration in Brcko 
continued to leave the result of the arbitration tribunal in the balance. The litany of 
Serb violations of Dayton continued, in particular through barriers to freedom of 
movement and blocking the return of refugees. However, the rift between Karadzic's 
hard liners and Plavsic 's reformists grew within the authmities of the RS. The OHR 
grasped this opportunity and, in November 1997, Ambassador Farrand met Plavsic 
in Banja Luka to seek endorsement for the new administration in Brcko. Plavsic, 
apparently reluctantly, endorsed the parliament and suggested candidates for the 
Serb executive positions that were loyal to her and willing to cooperate with the 
OHR (ICG, 1998: 7). In January 1998, Plavsic went further in establishing a new 
pro-Dayton political party (the SNS) and appointing Milorad Dodik, a political 
moderate, as Prime Minister of the RS. In a speech given on the night, Dodik 
rejected the philosophy of the SDS, called upon the RS to comply with the Dayton 
agreement, and espoused the democratization of RS society (OHR, 1998: paragraph 
10). 
These developments within RS had a significant impact on the arbitration 
process. A final announcement was scheduled for March 1998 and, in light of the 
continued Dayton non-compliance by the RS in Brcko, there were predictions that 
the entire municipality would be handed to the Federation. While recognising the 
moral arguments to making this shift, the arbitral tribunal resisted, citing the new 
political climate in the RS and the prospect of future returns and freedom of 
movement. Prior to the declaration of March 1998, Milorad Dodik had outlined a 
new vision for the IEBL in Brcko in what became a highly influential testimony to 
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the arbitration tribunal: 
[ ... ] he went on to say that, if nationalist politics were put to one side and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became truly democratic, the "IEBL will be an irrelevant issue"- apparently 
meaning that the IEBL would cease to have any more political effect than the border 
between, for example, two internal political districts of a Western European country. 
(Supplementary Award, paragraph 11 in OHR, 2000a: 265) 
The dismantling of the political relevance of the IEBL was a central aim of 
the Dayton agreement and the arbitration panel saw that a final decision on Brcko 
could destabilise the fledgling administration of Dodik and thus undermine his 
moderate politics. It seems that the Brcko decision was the only leverage that the 
OHR had over the RS, and to lose it would perhaps jeopardise the implementation of 
Dayton in other parts of Bosnia. To a certain extent this was also true of the 
Federation, where the dismal returns situation in Sarajevo was cited as a reason why 
a final decision in their favour was inappropriate at that time (ICG, 2003: 6). To this 
end, the tribunal deferred the decision once again for one year, with a warning that 
unless significant developments were made in the implementation of the Dayton 
agreement by both sides then the pre-war municipality would be reunited as a 
'neutral' district outside the exclusive control (ICG, 2003: 6). In an 
uncharacteristically metaphoric passage of the Supplementary Award, the tribunal 
declared that continued international supervision was necessary as the multi-ethnic 
institutions they have been "nurturing are still very shallow rooted" (Supplementary 
Award, paragraph 14 in OHR, 2000a: 266). This casting of the OHR as a 
benevolent gardener is perhaps a misrepresentation of the extent of their powers. 
Following this award, the Bonn Peace Implementation Conference granted the same 
executive and legislative authority to the Brcko Supervisor that had been previously 
granted to the High Representative in Sarajevo (what are referred to as the 'Bonn 
Powers'). This comprised the power to sack any public official who obstructed 
Dayton implementation (that is, the returns process, the strengthening of democratic 
institutions and the revival of the economy) and the ability to pass any law that was 
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perceived to help such implementation. 
4.2.3 The Final Award 
At their meeting in March 1999, the arbitration panel was under considerable 
pressure to make a final decision. It was increasingly apparent that in addition to the 
intransigence of the local politicians, the uncertainty regarding Brcko 's future was 
itself acting as a barrier to the implementation of the Dayton agreement. The 'new 
political dawn' in the RS, much anticipated by the March 1998 supplementary 
award, was thwarted at the next electoral opportunity as the ultra-nationalist Nikola 
Poplasen defeated Biljana Plavsic's SNS party at the September presidential 
elections. This result placed Milorad Dodik in a difficult position as RS Prime 
Minister, and Poplasen set about attempting to destabilise his government. These 
actions led to the High Representative, then Carlos Westendorp, to sack Poplasen for 
abuse of power, coincidently on the same day (March 51h 1999) as the arbitration 
tribunal announced the Final Award. Despite this political context, the tribunal 
decided on the 'neutral district' approach, perhaps unsurprisingly as this option had 
been circulating for some time as the preferred outcome from international agencies 
and commentators (see in particular ICG, 1998). At the heat1 of the Final Award 
was the unification of the pre-war Brcko municipality: 
[ ... ] upon the effective date to be established by the Supervisor each entity shall be deemed 
to have delegated all of its powers of governance within the pre-war Brcko Opstina to a new 
institution, a new multi-ethnic democratic government to be known as "The Brcko District 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina" under the exclusive sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The legal effect will be permanently to suspend all of the legal authority of both entities 
within the Opstina [municipality] and to recreate it as a single administrative unit. 
(Final Award, paragraph 9 in OHR, 2000a: 284-285) 
This decision meant that Brcko would nominally be part of both Entities, 
their territory uniquely overlapping, while the Bosnian state-level institutions would 
105 
Cbapter 4 I mprrwising tbe Slate 
protect the interests of the District itself. This solution meant that the Entities would 
both 'gain' territory even as they 'lost' administrative authority (ICG, 2003: 7). This 
consolation was not enough to stop the resignation of Milorad Dodik in protest at 
what was perceived by many in the RS as the division of Serb territory in Bosnia. 
However, the resignation had little real impact as Dodik remained the de facto prime 
minister as he was the only person with the votes to form a proper government and 
the only possible interlocutor for the OHR (ICG, 2003: 8). Serb discontent was 
exacerbated by the outbreak of NATO bombing in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) in late March 1999 at the culmination of the Kosovo crisis. Attempts were 
made by the FRY government to draw Bosnia, and the RS in particular, into the 
conflict through media campaigns depicting the bombing as an act of aggression on 
the Serb people as a whole (ICG, 2001: 7). These attempts were broadly 
unsuccessful, perhaps on account of the tacit threat by the NATO forces that if Serb 
behaviour rendered the security situation in Bosnia unstable then the bridges across 
the River Drina that joined the RS with FRY would be destroyed (ICG, 2001: 8-9). 
In the context of the Serb anger at the perceived injustice of the Poplasen 
sacking/arbitration decision/NATO bombing trinity, the Final Award's reliance upon 
the protective role of the Bosnian state over the independence of Brcko was 
optimistic. In reality, with the central institutions left so weak following the Dayton 
Agreement (as opposed to the strong Entities), the Final Award is underwritten by a 
commitment for intensified international supervision to defend the interests of the 
District from incursions from either entity until such time that the state can take over 
this role. The District Supervisor at the time of my research in Brcko, US 
Ambassador Henry Clarke, saw entity encroachments as one of the key future 
threats to Brcko: he felt that a strong District was a necessity "otherwise the Entities 
will eat Brcko alive when the Supervisor is gone. It sounds a little dramatic but if 
you knew how much time I spent worrying about RS encroachments on Brcko in 
particular then you would know why I am inclined to use strong words"7• The 
objective of the Final Award appears two-fold: establishing a multi-ethnic 
democratic District with strong connections to the Bosnian state, while producing an 
7 Interview with Ambassador Clarke, Brcko 24th March 2003. 
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independent structure of governance over the territory that has the strength to resist 
incursions by either entity. 
The role of the Supervisor, and that of the Brcko OHR more broadly, has 
been to implement the Final Award (indeed, in September 2002 the OHR Brcko 
office, formerly 'OHR-North', changed its name to 'The Office of the Final 
Award'). When interviewed, the Supervisor was clear about his duty, while 
attending to criticisms of his comprehensive powers (see Chandler, 2000): 
I try not to appear dictatorial but everyone knows my agenda: it is the Final Award, you can 
go and read it. It says basically change everything, and my predecessors and I think that you 
cannot change everything at its present level but you have to improve it as you go along. 
(Interview with Ambassador Clarke, the Brcko Supervisor 241h March 2003) 
However, simply reading the Final Award does not give a full indication of its remit, 
as the Arbitration Tribunal left much of the detail (and more significant substance) 
to the Supervisor's individual discretion. The creation of a multi-ethnic District 
Assembly, an aim at the heart of the Final Award, reflects the centralised power of 
the Supervisor: 
All legislative responsibilities within the District shall be vested in the District Assembly. 
The total membership, composition and modality of selection of the Assembly shall be 
specified by the Supervisor in the Statute for District Government. The initial election of 
members of the Assembly shall take place when and as directed by the Supervisor, and 
subsequent elections shall take place as provided by the enactment of the Assembly with 
approval of the Supervisor. If he deems it necessary, the Supervisor may devise and 
incorporate into the Statute an "ethnic formula" designed to minimize the incentive for any 
ethnic group to seek to increase its population in the District in order to achieve exclusive 
political control [ ... ] 
(Annex to the Final Award, Paragraph 2 in OHR, 2000a: 285 emphases added) 
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This extract illustrates the comprehensive powers vested m the Brcko 
Supervisor, as the head of Brcko OHR, following the Final Award. These powers 
can be best understood as an accumulation of 'symbolic capital' (Bourdieu, 1984, 
1989). While the OHR comprised one of a number of international and local 
agencies involved in implementing the Final Award, its capacity to legitimise 
activities and institutions in the wake of the Final Award point to its accumulation of 
symbolic capital. Bourdieu defined symbolic capital as "the power granted to those 
who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition" 
(Bourdieu, 1989: 23). Steven Engler (2003) suggests that symbolic capital is better 
thought of as "statist capital", as it is the modem state that has claimed the right of 
legitimization and naturalization of social difference (Engler, 2003: 446). This 
practice of legitimization is termed by Engler as 'consecration' as he argues that in a 
pre-modem era religion was the primary holder of symbolic capital (Engler, 2003: 
451 ). One attribute of such consecration is, according to Bourdieu ( 1989), that it 
confers upon the perspective of the state an absolute, universal value, thus 
"snatching it from a relativity that is by definition inherent in every point of view, as 
a view taken from a particular point in social space" (Bourdieu, 1989: 22). Such 
mechanisms of consecration can lead to what Bourdieu refers to as symbolic 
violence, as those who do not have the 'means of speech' or do not know how to 
'take the floor', can only see themselves in the words or the discourses of others -
that is, those who can name and represent (Mahar et al., 1990: 14). 
Not only did the Final Award provide the symbolic capital necessary for the 
Supervisor to consecrate Brcko District, it also enabled the Supervisor to set the 
discourses and terms through which the District was understood and reproduced. 
This authority demonstrates how, in conjunction with a range of international and 
local agencies, the Supervisor improvised the role of the state following the Final 
Award. Since Brcko District was demilitarised following the conflict and following 
the arrival of S-For troops at Camp McGovem in the outskirts of the town the 
Supervisor retained a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (Weber, 1968). The 
Supervisor thus monopolised the means of violence and had accumulated the 
symbolic capital to define threat. The effects of these processes of legitimisation are 
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explored below through an examination of the production of the political, economic 
and symbolic landscapes of Brcko. 
4.3 The Political Landscape 
Following the establishment of Brcko District on March 81h 2000, the 
Supervisor set to work dissolving the former Municipal Assemblies of Brcko Grad, 
Ravne-Brcko and Brcko-Rahic and reforming them into one District Government 
and Assembly. The District Government consisted of a Mayor and nine government 
department heads, while the Assembly involved the appointment of a speaker and 
twenty-nine councillors. The Supervisor chose these individuals from the three post-
war municipal councils that had been established over the territory of Brcko District. 
Members were also picked from the fledgling civil society organisations in the town. 
One former OHR employee recounted how an individual had been 'awarded' a place 
on the District Assembly because of their efforts in establishing an NG08. On 
several occasions over the fieldwork period individuals referred to the power of the 
Supervisor, and even the appointed Mayor moved off a sensitive topic by exclaiming 
that he had to stop talking about it "or the Supervisor will replace me!"9 The 
supervisor himself alluded to his control over individual careers by stating that he 
could find out any information he wished from the District Government "as the guy 
would be in fear of his job [laughs]". 10 As suggested in the Final Award, the 
composition of the new structures of governance within Brcko District followed a 
strict "ethnic formula"'\ with a Serb Mayor, a Bosnijak as speaker in the Assembly 
and a Croat deputy speaker. Such roles reflect the ethnic make-up of the District in 
the 1991 census, which has been 'fixed' as the definitive yardstick for the 
demographic constitution of former Yugoslavia. The symbolic capital of the 
Supervisor and OHR is demonstrated in this reduction of multi-ethnicity to a 
mathematical formula of ethnic weightings within the District Government. This 
8 Interview with fom1er Brcko OHR Official, Brcko 19th May 2003. 
9 Interview with the Brcko Mayor 8th May 2003. 
10 Interview with Ambassador Clarke, Brcko 24th April 2003. 
11 This is how it is described in the Annex to the Final Award (OHR, 2000a: 285). 
- -- -- -- -
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approach seems to support Hayden's (1996) assertion that "extreme nationalism in 
the former Yugoslavia ha[s] not been only a matter of imagining allegedly 
'primordial' communities, but rather of making existing heterogeneous ones 
unimaginable" (Hayden, 1996: 783 in Camp bell, 1999: 401 ). This sentiment has 
been reproduced within the "ethnic formula" approach, where each politician can be 
reduced to a member of an ethnic group. 
As District elections were not held until October 2004, there had been no 
opportunity over the fieldwork period to examine whether the reform within Brcko 
District has been sustainable without interference from the OHR. Even within the 
existing District administrations the intervention of the Supervisor has been critical 
to the decision-making processes. Each politically sensitive decision (such as the 
reintegration of the police or schools) has ended in deadlock within District 
Government, with both sides acknowledging that if a decision cannot be reached 
through the Assembly voting system then the Supervisor will merely impose it (as 
has happened on both occasions). There appears to be a certain measure of pride 
and pragmatism about this approach, as characterised by the viewpoint of this 
former Brcko OHR Official: 
Ninety percent of the success of Brcko Dist1ict specifically has been because there is no 
democracy here. That is why it has been successful. It is a purely pragmatic point of view 
[ ... ] Right from the very beginning certainly from the beginning of the supervisory regime 
we did not seek to do things by consensus. It was just imposed. It is not simply the 
councillors and heads of government and people like that it has happened in every single 
area even before we created the District. There is a simple example of the multi-ethnicisation 
of the police. We didn't hold a meeting to get people to agree that multi-ethnicisation was a 
good idea we just imposed it on them and said "this is what you will do". It was nothing to 
do with how many of each of the particular nations there were in the District at that time, we 
just took the view that that is what we will do. And the same with a whole load of areas. You 
know, 'democracy' came fairly low down the list of what was required in terms of getting 
the job done. 
(Brcko OHR Official, 2nd June 2003) 
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This comment would suggest that the mathematical 'multi-ethnicity' (as an 
indicator of progress in tetms of the Final Award) has taken precedence over 
democratic participation or reaching a debated (and perhaps contested) resolution 
concerning the form of new District institutions. This attitude seems to have stifled 
genuine political debate within the new District government, as there is little to gain 
for representatives of parties in opposition to the Final Award in attempting to reach 
consensus (and thus incur the wrath of the wider political party and potentially face 
removal from party lists). On the other hand, less important political decisions are 
regularly made with complete consensus and little debate, as individual members of 
the Assembly do not want to "put their heads above the parapet" 12 and risk the wrath 
of the Supervisor. 
Similar to the declarations of 'multi-ethnicity' based upon selective 
recruitment of candidates of the 'right' ethnic origin, this approach to 
democratization demonstrates the symbolic capital of the District Supervisor. The 
Supervisor uses this capital to label the activities of the District Government and 
Assembly as 'democracy'. This narrow interpretation suggests a performance of 
democracy where political debate is played out in scenes, in which the OHR District 
Supervisor provides the actors, scenery and script. The lack of a District election is, 
contrary to many indicators of democratic consolidation (for example Dahl, 1986), 
perceived as unimportant, as the definition of democracy assumed by the OHR 
facilitates the widening of public opportunity to monitor the governing process, 
providing an 'audience' for the theatre of democracy. The Supervisor himself saw 
the increasing 'transparency' of the District administrative structures as evidence of 
increasing 'democratization'. In a particularly candid passage of the interview, he 
commented on the new avenues of participation created in Brcko District: 
12 Interview with Brcko OHR Official, Brcko 2"d June 2003. 
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The Assembly meetings are open and most of them are recorded more or less endlessly, well 
at least by Brcko Radio and sometimes by others. I mean, I don't go over there all the time 
because it would make them look like more of a mbber stamp than they already are [laughs] 
But when I do go over there do I see Business representatives and NGO representatives 
sitting in the audience watching what is going on? No I don't. Do I hear councillors 
discussing their meetings with people representing groups of citizens other than party 
meetings'? Not much. 
(Interview with Ambassador Clarke, 241h April 2003) 
Despite the seeming satisfaction with an election-less democracy, there is an 
acknowledgement that a vote will be required in the near future. The reason given 
for the delay in District elections is that the Supervisor is waiting for the emergence 
of "political parties with 'Brcko-based agendas "' 13 • In doing so, he exposes an 
underlying motivation to wait for the support base of the nationalist parties, in 
particular the dominant SDS (Serb Democratic Party), to diminish. The 
International Crisis Group, in a report entitled Bosnia 's Brcko: Getting In, Getting 
On and Getting Out (2003), perceives a clear link between nationalist politics and 
the election delay: 
[ ... ] the US is opposed to calling elections that the SOS might win. As one diplomat 
remarked, all parties in BiH may be corrupt, but the SOS is also 'evil'. An SOS victory 
might undo everything. 
(International Crisis Group, 2003: 29) 
This evidence would suggest that the OHR and the District Supervisor have 
placed curtailing nationalist politics at the heart of establishing 'multi-ethnic 
democracy' in Brcko District. However, the absence of nationalist political parties 
from the District government and the attempt to empower moderate political 
participation has only strengthened the position of such nationalist parties in Brcko. 
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From their marginalised positions, these political parties have been able to criticise 
the intemationally appointed members of the govemment and focus on building 
popular support for the elections, when they eventually happen. Rather than 
establish 'a Brcko-based agenda' the most popular parties (the Serb SDS, the 
Bosnijak SDA and the Croatian HDZ) see the greatest political capital in supporting 
'their' nationality. The OHR has employed other less direct strategies in an attempt 
to attempt to undermine these parties, such as restricting access to the training 
schemes of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), an American NGO providing 
campaign training for the future election. Such acts, however, only serve to 
strengthen the legitimacy of these parties, as they are seen to be independent of 
intemational control, unlike the more moderate politicians engaged in the 
performance in the District Govemment. While the OHR attempts to link democracy 
with non-nationalism, the outcome seems contradictory. By trying to oversee and 
mathematically build a 'multi-ethnic democracy', the lack of critical democratic 
participation and debate appears to only strengthen the nationalist political parties 
that are waiting to exploit a future election. 
In attempting to construct the new political constituency of 'Brcko District', 
the OHR made efforts to establish a 'multi-ethnic' and 'democratic' administration. 
Rather than devolving power away from the OHR or Supervisor, this process 
demonstrates the symbolic power of these intemational actors in declaring certain 
activities and institutions as legitimate. Through the Supervisors intervention the 
discourses were set through which the political landscape could be understood. 
These activities and powers demonstrate the OHR as an 'improvised state', stepping 
in to perform consecration in the absence of a legitimate centralised power. The 
notion of 'improvisation' is used to draw attention to the collection of local and 
international agencies that loosely articulate to perform the functions of the state. 
For example, the USAID-funded District Management Team assisted in policy 
formation; the OSCE engaged with public administration reform; and the UN trained 
the police through the IPTF. In addition, the entity governments (RS and 
Federation) retained a presence in the District in an attempt to hold some jurisdiction 
13 Interview with OHR Official, Brcko 241h May 2003. 
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over their 'lost' territory. All of these organisations could not only be 'trumped' by 
the symbolic capital held by the Brcko Supervisor, but their practices were often 
phrased (intentionally or not) in official discourses that were initially legitimised by 
the OHR. A central part of such discourses is the primacy given to economic 
stability in the future of Brcko District. 
4.4 The Economic landscape 
The economy m Bosnia had been ravaged by conflict, reflected in a 65 
percent fall in the per capita GDP between 1990 and 2000, from $10 725 to $4 3 70 
(UNDP, 2002: 11). This decrease in GDP was not consistent across the two Entities 
with the RS suffering a greater downturn in economic performance on account of 
larger army pension commitments, insufficient collection of taxes and, more 
significantly, the low levels of international aid following the conflict. As a 
consequence of this disparity: in 2002 the UNDP estimated that 24.8 percent of the 
RS population lived 'general poverty' 14, as compared to 15.6 percent of the 
Federation population (UNDP, 2002: 51). In addition, over this period criminality 
had grown, in particular war profiteering through the trafficking of arms, drugs and 
people across Bosnian territory (Human Rights Watch, 2002). 
This trio of economic deterioration, poor entity harmonization and high 
levels of criminality were acutely felt in Brcko. As discussed in Chapter 3, due to its 
location on the river Sava, Brcko had been a thriving port before the war, and also 
the location of a meat-canning factory 'Bimeks' (see Figure 4.4 overleaf), a 
vegetable oil factory 'Bimal' (see Figure 4.5 overleaf) and a large shoe factory 
'Izbor' (see Figure 4.2 above). All three of these industries had closed, or reduced 
production to nearly zero, following the end of the conflict. In terms of 
harmonization, the division of Brcko District between the RS and the Federation in 
the post war period saw differential support to either 'side', with little aid or funding 
coming into the Serb town until after the announcement of Final Award and 
14 The line for 'general poverty' was calculated as on or below 1843KM (approximately £615) per 
year (UNDP, 2002: 50). 
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considerable difficulties in terms of equalising levels of taxation and social welfare 
(Sommers, 2002). In addition to these harmonisation difficulties, Brcko became 
renowned in the post-war period as an area of criminality and trafficking. The 
Brcko area had acted as a transit point not only between the two Entities, but also 
between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The economic effect of this location is perhaps 
best demonstrated by the emergence of Arizona Market during the conflict. This is a 
35-acre site around ten miles south of Brcko, located close to the frontlines that had 
been cleared of mines by UNPROFOR to allow trading, with the Pentagon 
apparently supplying $40 000 of the start-up costs (Andreas, 2004: 46). While the 
Market retains a role selling clothes and produce, in the post-war period its de-
regulated nature has led to it gaining notoriety as a focal point of arms smuggling 
and human trafficking. 
This impoverished and criminalised economic situation in Brcko ensured that 
the Final Award provided a mandate for Supervisorial intervention: 
It being clear that one of the main causes of tension in the Brcko area is its general economic 
depression and high rate of unemployment, all relevant international institutions are strongly 
encouraged to support the Supervisor in his [sic] efforts to revitalise the District's economy 
in the interests of reducing tensions in the area and promoting the cause of international 
peace. 
(Final Award, Paragraph 46 in OHR, 2000a: 282) 
This discursive tactic of forging a link between "international peace" and the 
economic development of Brcko District handed full authority to the Supervisor to 
implement whichever strategies were deemed necessary to improve the economic 
conditions of the District. This approach has yielded some measure of success, as 
noted in a recent ICG report: 
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Figure 4.4 'Bimeks'. Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
Figure 4.5 'Bimaf. Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
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The establishment of fiscal discipline, a sensible and effective tax regime, and a business-
friendly environment have resulted in significant foreign investment, a prom1smg 
privatisation program, and the highest average wages in the country. 
(International Crisis Group, 2003: i) 
This healthy report, however, masks the increased intervention, control and 
management that have been required to realise such economic vitality. Economic 
improvement has been won in Brcko District at the cost of strengthening the statist, 
or symbolic, capital of the Supervisor. 
As democracy was defined by the supervisory regime in narrow terms as 
transparency, economic development has been cast in terms of security for private 
capital. The privatisation scheme in Brcko has been rapid and comprehensive, with 
thirty enterprises being prepared for sale in 2000. By January 2004, 16 enterprises 
had been privatised within Brcko, creating 1 112 jobs (Clarke, 2004: 20). On 
account of the logistical difficulties of ameliorating the laws of the Federation and 
the RS, the Supervisor drew on his symbolic resources (in this case 'Supervisory 
Orders') to expedite the process. Henry Clarke, Supervisor from 2001-2004, 
explained this process: 
[ ... ] it soon became clear there would be no privatization in Brcko unless the Supervisor 
launched it. Rather than impose a law, I issued a series of Supervisory Orders having a 
similar effect. 
(Clarke, 2004: 1 0) 
Through the release of Supervisory Orders the privatisation process revitalised the 
authority of the District Supervisor. In addition, by granting primacy to privatisation 
as the preferred discourse of economic reform, the improvised state was also 
strengthened through the need for 'foreign expertise' to assist the District 
Government. This is most explicitly demonstrated by the formation in 1999 of the 
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District Management Team (DMT), run until 2002 by Washington-based 
Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) and funded by the USAID. This group 
assisted in the privatisation process through techniques such as the preparation of 
"concept papers" which were "adopted by the intemational supervisory authority" 
(Morfit and Feit: 2002: 4). 
The economic reform m Brcko demonstrates the symbolic capital of the 
Supervisor exercised through the ability to confer legality on certain practices (such 
as privatisation) and illegality on others. This division between legitimate and 
illegitimate economic activity did not seem an easy one to make in Brcko District. 
The repeated use of 'black' and 'grey' economies in Brcko terminology reflects the 
existence of a socially-constructed sliding scale between legality and illegality of 
economic practices. This seems to support Carolyn Nordstom's (2003) assertion that 
"clear distinctions between legal and illegal, state and non-state, or local and 
intemational are often impossible to make" (Nordstrom, 2003: 332). This hybridity 
was demonstrated in an exchange with the District Mayor (OM) during a fieldwork 
interview: 
DM: What we need in Brcko is a casino, perhaps in the old hotel Revena. If we had a casino 
we could put a large sign outside it that said, "this casino is funding the schools ofBrcko". 
AJ: But Brcko already has a Casino in the boat moored on the Sava [Figure 4.6 overleaf]. 
DM: [smiles] Shhh! That one is illegal. 
(Excerpt from an interview with the Brcko District Mayor, Brcko 8111 May 
2003) 
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Figure 4.6 The casino boat 'Ga/eb', Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
Though the Supervisor did not confer legality on the boat casino, neither was there 
the political will to remove it. This 'official non-existence ' was evident in other 
areas of economic reform, such as the regulation and privatisation of public housing. 
The demand for housing in Brcko has far outstripped supply since the conflict on 
account of the large number of Serb DPs in the town and the relatively high levels of 
return. To meet this demand extra floors had been built illegally on top of existing 
residential buildings (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8 overleaf). This was described by a 
UN Official in Brcko as "a neat idea" 15 to cater for the increased population in the 
town. Like the casino boat there was no mention of these extra floors in official 
documentation such as court lists or OHR documents, and they were neither 
regulated nor was it clear who owned them. While this was proving a serious barrier 
to privatisation it was not until there was a serious fire in April 2003 (Figure 4.9) 
that the Supervisor 
15 Programme Manager UNDP Brcko Local Action Programme, Brcko 18th February 2003 . 
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Figure 4.7 Building with an extra floor. Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
Figure 4.8 Building with an extra floor. Brcko 
(Source. Author's collection) 
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Figure 4.9 Brcko fire, April 2003 
(Source: Author's collection) 
intervened to ensure that "all issues related to public buildings are clearly regulated 
before the process of privatisation of the apartments is concluded" (OHR, 2003). 
Again, it was through the deployment of a Supervisory Order that the apartments 
were rendered legal and visible to the law (through inspections and regulation) 
whilst also functioning as a catalyst to the privatisation process. 
The most controversial example of the production of illegality and the 
associated incorporation of economic activity into the gaze of the improvised state is 
the case of Arizona Market. By 2002, the Market had grown to over 2 500 stalls, 
sprawling next to the main road between Brcko and Tuzla (see Figure 4.10 overleaf). 
As discussed above, the Market was janus-faced: it was a multi-ethnic goods and 
produce trading area with a regular cattle market representing "an engine of peace" 
(Morfit and Feit: 2002), and at the same time, a zone of human trafficking, drugs 
smuggling and arms trading (see Sherwell , 2000). The former sentiment is further 
evidence of the primacy given to mathematical multi-ethnicity in Brcko, as any 
activity, regardless of legality, is given a positive sheen by the existence of people 
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from 'different ethnicities' carrying it out. From 1999 onwards, preparations were 
made to privatise Arizona Market. Following an EU and UNICEF eo-initiative in 
200 I entitled 'STOP', the brothels and trafficking way-stations were shut down at 
Arizona Market, representing another manifestation of the improvised nature of the 
state in Brcko District. The DMT formulated a concept paper detailing a strategy to 
legitimise trade at Arizona and register all of the stallholders directed towards 
encouraging private investment (Morfit and Feit, 2002). This seems a particularly 
audacious proposal, as Arizona Market could be seen as the most privatised space 
imaginable with little or no state intervention or regulation. The idea of attempting to 
encourage further private investment demonstrates the symbolic capital of 
legitimising certain investment. One of the key difficulties behind the proposed 
privatisation of Arizona Market was purchasing the land, rumoured to belong to a 
Croatian 'mafia group' (see Voss, 2001). This was resolved through a compulsory 
purchase order in 2002, bringing this site under the gaze of legal regulation and 
legislation for the first time in ten years. Following a bidding process the site and 
market were sold to Ita!Projekt, an ltalian-Bosnian joint venture, which held plans to 
redevelop the market as a large shopping complex, with all the stores in uniform 
warehouses. 
Figure 4.10 Arizona Market. Brcko District 
(Source: Author's collection) 
122 
Chapter 4 ImproiJising the S !ate 
This process of privatisation rendered Arizona visible to the instruments of 
taxation and regulation, but when I interviewed a stallholder she seemed 
uninterested, commenting: "really, we pay our money to the Croats or to the people 
from Ita/Projekt, it makes no difference to us" 16 • This comment provides an insight 
into the interchangeable nature of the 'state' in a system of uncertainty and 
improvisation. The stallholder was referring to paying for the stall in order to 
guarantee security, look after the interests of the Market and pay for external 
lighting. Arizona Market was far from anarchy prior to 'regulation', but was 
similarly regulated through instruments that were invisible to the gaze of the state. 
This scenario of institutionalisation and regulation conjures images of Nordstrom's 
"non-state sovereignty", used to describe the governance exercised by networks of 
'informal' actors (Nordstrom, 2003: 340). While privatisation has not removed these 
patterns of regulation, they will continue to exist and could be defined as acts of 
resistance (see Scott, 1985), it has brought them into the machinations of the 
improvised state in Brcko District. 
These examples demonstrate that the economic management of Brcko should 
not be conceived as a technical matter, divorced from more 'political issues'. Since 
the Final Award, the rendering of economic practice as privatisation has revitalised 
the authority of the District Supervisor and strengthened the agencies of the 
improvised state as they have been granted the power to legitimise certain practices. 
These practices of state regulation have operated through a variety of techniques and 
tactics, including passing laws, Supervisory Orders and concept papers. At the same 
time, the District Government has been weakened as assets have been sold and 
'new' discourses of privatisation have been endorsed. These processes of 
revitalisation of the improvised state in Brcko District are also reflected in the 
management of the symbolic landscape. 
16 Interview with Arizona Market Stallholder, Brcko, 3'ct May 2003. 
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4.5 The Symbolic Landscape 
As suggested by the comment by the former OHR Official at the start of the 
chapter, the struggle following the Final Award was "making people think in terms 
of Brcko District" 17. This effort to create a political community in Brcko District 
was incorporated into the Final Award, where it was the duty of the Supervisor to 
'neutralise' the symbolic landscape: 
The District Assembly shall determine all symbols for the District, provided that all such 
symbols shall be politically and ethnically neutral and subject to the approval of the 
supervisor. There shall be no specific flag for the District, but the flag of one entity will not 
be flown without the other being on essentially equal tenns. Both the Latinic and Cyrillic 
alphabets will be used on essentially equal terms for all official purposes. 
(Final Award, paragraph 11 in OHR, 2000a: 286) 
The OHR deemed the Brcko District street names and road signs initial items for 
'neutralisation' following the Final Award. During the conflict, the Serb forces, in 
order to invent an historical connection between their people and the urban 
landscape, had comprehensively renamed the streets. The entire street plan was 
renamed in 2001 to reflect Brcko's new 'multi-ethnic' status. As new street names 
were allocated, each building was given a uniform house number plate, designed in 
the Bosnian colours of yellow and blue (themselves selected by the OHR in Sarajevo 
as the colours of the Bosnian flag) and clearly displaying the name of the street in 
both Cyrillic and Latinic Scripts (see Figure 4.11 overleaf). For example, Bulevar 
Draia Mihailovii: was changed to Bulevar Mira (Boulevard of Peace, see Figure 
4.12 on page 126) and the central square was renamed Trg Mladosti (Youth Square). 
Specific strategic objectives were also written out of the landscape, such as the main 
western route leaving Brcko (the primary road in the Serbian 'northern corridor') 
that lost the name Krajiska Put (Krajina Way) and was given the name Dejtonska 
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(after the Dayton agreement). In this example the renaming of the street embeds the 
shift in power relations, as the vision of Greater Serbia (seen as dependent upon a 
connection with the Krajina) is literally erased, only to be reinscribed with the new 
vision for Bosnia, that of Dayton. This procedure seems to exemplify the assertion 
of Azaryahu ( 1996) that the act of renaming "asserts that a radical restructuring of 
power relations in society has indeed been accomplished, or is underway, and it 
indicates a profound reconstruction of social and political institutions" (Azaryahu, 
1996: 318). 
Figure 4.11 New house number. Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
17 Interview with former OHR Official, Brcko 201h February 2003. 
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Figure 4.12 Bulevar Mira, Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
The strategy of renaming the streets, while an attempt to banish particular 
nationalist claims and myths, seems to have been mobilised in an effort to stimulate 
a collective identity for Brcko. This is a unique effort within post-conflict Bosnia, as 
other towns and cities in the RS and the Federation have mobilised the labelling of 
the landscape in order to evoke collective memory and strengthen group identity 
(Takei, 1998). There are three categories of names that have been chosen for the 
renaming exercise. The first are those intended to inspire a general multi-ethnic 
reconciliation (the examples of 'peace' and 'youth ' above), names that echo closely 
the names inscribed on the landscape when the town was under Socialism 1945-
1991. The second group of names are those that are designed to naturalise 
international intervention, while connecting Brcko to other areas of Bosnia 
('Dejtonska', 'Sarajevska' or 'Mostarska' are key examples). The final group of 
names, and comprising the majority, are those that invoke a shared Yugoslav past, 
through the deployment of names such as Nikola Tesla (the magnetic fields pioneer) 
and lvo Andric (the Nobel Prize winning author). The popularity of such individuals 
is universal, moving beyond the confines of ethnicity and recognised as explicitly 
'Yugoslav'. It is these powerful referents, with their ability to trigger notions of an 
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era before conflict and division, which the Brcko renaming process seeks to 
disseminate. 
Another strategy has been to disrupt the landscape through graffiti and 
tagging. The politics of graffiti is discussed by Tim Cresswell ( 1996), and in this 
instance it acts to subvert the strategy of 'neutralisation' and re-inscribe nationalist 
symbols. Graffiti covers contemporary Brcko, much of it with a national orientation. 
Figure 4.13 (overleaf) shows a wall near the centre of town daubed with the words, 
in Cyrillic to situate its nationality, "JEEEM BAM J{lfCTP lfKT' ("Fuck your 
District"). It is instmctive that the word used for the District is not a 
Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian one, such as opistina (municipality), but rather 'Distrikt', 
a localised spelling of the English word. While this is perhaps not surprising as it 
avoids the possibility of confusion with the RS 'Opistine' which are the entity's 
central division of the territory (as opposed to the Federation's Cantons), this 
spelling only seems to reinforce the 'foreign' nature of the District's existence. In 
another example of Brcko graffiti, the author has used Cyrillic again to write "EOr 
If P ADOBAH' ("God and Radovan"). This comment suggests a battle-cry, with the 
reference to the Bosnian Serb leader and founder of the SDS, Radovan Karadzic. 
The interesting point in this example is that the Cyrillic has been corrected, as the 
author originally wrote a Latinic 'D' as opposed to Cyrillic 'Lr (see enlarged detail 
of Figure 4.14 overleaf). A similar error can be seen in Figure 4.15, where the 
graffiti simply reads "CPEIYA" ("Serbia"), though again the author has corrected 
their Cyrillic, mistakenly writing a Latinic 'I' instead of a Cyrillic 'H'. These error-
strewn examples display better that any others the improvised nationalisms assumed 
within Bosnia, as people hurry to learn Cyrillic and embrace its nation-defining 
qualities. 
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Figure 4.13 Graffiti. Brcko town centre 
(Source: Author's collection) 
Figure 4.14 Graffiti. Brcko town centre 
(Source: Author's collection) 
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Figure 4.15 Graffiti, Brcko town centre 
(Source: Author's collection) 
While ' neutral ' (or Yugoslav) individuals and events have been 
commemorated in the new street names, there is a significant absence of 
memorialisation of the 1992-95 conflict itself. As Johnson ( 1994) notes: "statues, as 
part of the cityscape or rural landscape, act not only as concentrated nodes but also 
as circuits of memory where individual elements can be jettisoned from the popular 
consciousness" (Johnson, 1994: 63). The popular consciousness is guided away from 
remembering the events of genocide and ' ethnic cleansing' that scarred Brcko in 
1992 and dramatically changed its demographic constitution (as discussed above). 
Instead, the Supervisor, in a fashion simi lar to honouring peace agreement in 
'Dejtonska' , invented the tradition of a ' Brcko District Day ', held on the 8th March 
each year. By controll ing the process of commemoration the OHR is again 
reflecting its status as the lead agency of the improvised state, controll ing which 
events should be celebrated and which deaths should be mourned 18 • 
In contrast to the ce lebrations of ' District Day', no monument marks the site 
of the Luka internment camp in Brcko, and there is no plaque on the shoe factory 
where the conflict is considered to have broken out. While the collective memory of 
Brcko is ' allowed ' to invoke lvo Andric or Nikola Tesla in the street names, 
memories of the conflict are not encouraged. The community shou ld collectively 
18 For insightful discussions of this aspect of state power see Edkins, 2003 and Butler, 2004. 
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'forget'. This strategy has historical precedent, as following World War 11, Tito 
employed an approach of equalising the blame for the horrors of the conflict 
between the Nazis, the (mainly Croatian) Ustase and the Serbian Chetniks. 
Following a purge of potential opponents from 1945-4 7, Tito drew a line under the 
events of the conflict as a strategy for building a cohesive state in Yugoslavia and 
foster 'Brotherhood and Unity' (Judah, 2000: 136). 
The lack of commemoration of war atrocities has been encouraged by the 
OHR, who appear perceive that, due to its absence from the Final Award, this kind 
of activity is not part of their remit. More than one interview respondent from the 
OHR described considerations of memorialisation as a "soft issue" 19• However, in 
place of a cross-national memorial to acknowledge the events of the conflict, partial 
monuments stand as a testament to specific mythologised historical narratives. One 
such monument is the 'Serb Liberation of Brcko' statue, standing in a green space 
beside the central traffic intersection in the centre of Brcko (see Figure 4.16). This 
monument, erected in 1996, marks the 'victory' of Serb forces in the town. In the 
centre of an adjacent car-park stands a statue of Draza Mihailovic, erected in 1997 
and overlooking the boulevard that used to bear his name (see Figure 4.17). The 
'Serb Liberation of Brcko' monument and the statue of Draza Mihailovic have 
become popular focal points for the Serb community in Brcko. The 'Serb Liberation 
of Brcko Monument' serves many communal purposes, such acting as a back-drop 
for wedding photographs or the centre-piece of ceremonies to mark the Battle of 
Kosovo. The statue of Draza Mihailovic appears to have a more popularist 
attraction, serving as a rallying point for Serb youths following sporting victories. 
I witnessed such an occasion after Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) won 
the Basketball World Championships, an event which prompted a large group to 
assemble round the Draza statue to sing Serb folk songs and fire bullets into the air. 
Efforts to the remove these monuments by the OHR have been minimal, they were 
aware that such actions would "stir nationalist sentiments"20 • The recycling of 
historical myths has long been a connected with the formation and reproduction of 
19 Interview with OHR Official, Brcko 24th May 2003. 
20 Interview with OHR Official, Brcko 241h May 2003. 
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Figure 4.16 Serb Liberation of Brcko Monument. Brcko town centre 
(Source: Author's collection) 
Figure 4.17 Statue of Draza Mihailovic, Brcko town centre 
(Source: Author's collection) 
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nationalist identities, and this monument appears to be a clear example of these 
processes in action. This reflects Bell's (1999) suggestion that: 
[ ... ] landscape elements mem01ialise specific narratives of nationhood, reducing fluid 
histories into sanitized, concretized myths that anchor the projection of national identity onto 
physical territory. 
(Bell, 1999: 186) 
This paradoxical absence and existence of war memorialisation in Brcko 
echoes the problematic use of post-war justice in Yugoslavia as whole, as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the Hague has 
acted as a substitute for a broader 'truth commission' (as employed in South Africa 
following the end of the apartheid). Rather than establishing recognised truths and 
incorporating these into the landscape and traditions of Brcko, the ICTY has merely 
focussed the blame on two individuals (Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic) and pledged 
to take them to a location far from Brcko. The result is a fractured symbolic 
landscape where the history of the conflict has become relativised between the 
different communities. This was indicated in the research interviews: respondents 
would often respond to questions about Brcko's past with the comment "no one 
knows what happened in the conflict in Brcko". Through this logic, claims of ethnic 
cleansing in Brcko are allied to an 'anti-Serb' position rather than as statement of 
events. This position is being reproduced through international intervention, as all 
references to ethnic cleansing (and the conflict) have been removed from documents 
about the town, so as not to deter foreign investment and potential tourists. The only 
legitimised war damage within this body of literature is infrastructural: a destruction 
that can be easily rebuilt. 
The lack of memorialisation has only served to further fracture the histories 
of different communities within Brcko. The specific act of non-memorialisation of 
the conflict has acted as a divisive policy, as the broader debate concerning a 
renegotiated public sphere has been stifled by international intervention that, while 
professing otherwise, appears to favour the status quo. As the work of Bell (1999) 
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and Johnson ( 1994) suggests, the lack of a commonly recognised memorial marks 
the greater post-conflict issue of the absence of shared historical truths. The 
contradictory outcome of attempting to induce a collective 'forgetting' has been the 
continued fracture in historical interpretations of events in the town. It seems 
inadequate to continue to perceive the 'public memory' as a soft issue, one that does 
not relate to the 'hard' issues of economic and political life. The evidence from 
Brcko would suggest that it is just these imaginaries that continue to fracture 
symbolic landscape and reproduce the nationalist politics that the improvised state 
seeks to undermine. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Following the conflict in Bosnia, Brcko assumed a strategic sensitivity on 
account of its location at the linking point between the two halves of the RS and 
providing access for the Federation to Central Europe and the River Sava for trade. 
This chapter has examined how this sensitivity was resolved through the Final 
Award that created a new political entity within Bosnia to be known as Brcko 
District. The implementation of the Final Award saw an escalation in the powers of 
the international organisations in Brcko, in particular the OHR with the Supervisor 
at its head. The executive and legislative powers held by the Supervisor can be seen 
as a form of symbolic capital, a power to grant legitimacy to certain practices, while 
casting others as illegal or illegitimate. This process has resulted in the state being 
'improvised' in Brcko by international and local agencies, though ultimately 
legitimised by the OHR. 
This chapter has examined how the improvised state has created the political, 
economic and symbolic landscapes of Brcko District. In political terms, Brcko 
District has been heralded as unique in Bosnia as a successful 'multi-ethnic 
democracy'. This rhetoric masks, however, the ways in which the Supervisor and 
OHR have put these aspirations into practice. On the one hand, 'democracy' has 
been operationalised in vague procedural terms, where electoral competition has 
been replaced by 'transparent decision making' as the primary opportunity for 
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political participation. On the other, multi-ethnicity has been conceived in 
mathematical terms, involving recruiting people of the 'right' ethnic origin for posts 
within executive and legislative bodies. Such a quota-based approach, m 
perpetuating the notion of 'pure' ethnicities, removes the prospect of hybrid or 
multicultural identities. In terms of the economic landscape, reform has been 
interpreted as securing Brcko for private investment. While this approach has led to 
successes in fiscal discipline and economic management, the privatisation initiative 
has also strengthened the symbolic capital of the Supervisor in deeming certain 
activities as legal practice. The final section examined the role of the OHR and 
Supervisor in shaping the symbolic landscape of Brcko in an attempt to create a 
'neutral' space purged of nationalist referents. Rather than commemorating the 
conflict in Brcko, the strategy of the improvised state has been one of encouraging 
'forgetting'. In addition, surrogate memorials, such as 'Brcko District Day' only 
serve to reinforce the symbolic authority of the Supervisory regime and do nothing 
to encourage testimony or confront the trauma of conflict. 
The 'problem' of Brcko, and its 'solution' as a multi-ethnic special district, 
has provoked intensified international intervention. These practices of intervention 
have strengthened the sovereignty of an 'improvised state' over Brcko District. This 
is reflected by the power of the OHR District Supervisor to legitimise certain 
activities and discourses. As a key example, despite the lack of electoral 
competition, the 'transparent' processes of the District Government have been 
signalled by the OHR as evidence of emerging democracy. However, the notion of 
'transparency' is only democratic if someone is watching. This power of 
legitimisation has been justified by the OHR on the basis that there are the 
opportunities for Brcko citizenry to shape practices of the improvised state. 
According to the OSCE and OHR, key agents of the improvised state, these 
opportunities to 'hold the state to account' increase the need for an active 'civil 
society'. This is nothing new, civil society has long been seen as a mechanism 
through which the power of the state can be restricted or shaped. What is important 
for this thesis is that the assumption has been made in Brcko that civil society is 
represented by the presence of NGOs. Within this logic, the presence of NGOs as 
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autonomous from the state can be equated with the presence of civil society which, 
through the transparent practices of the District Government, equates to democracy. 
The following chapter examines this production ofNGOs in Brcko District. 
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Chapter 5 
Local Geopolitics: 
The emergence of 
NGOs in Brcko 
District 
The entire system of governance in Bosnia assumes a bridge between policy makers and 
society. This bridge needs to provide information. Civil society provides this bridge, this 
need assessment. 
(Interview with OHR Official, Sarajevo 281h May 2003) 
The previous chapter outlined how Brcko District has been created as a 
political, economic and symbolic entity following the Final Award, a process that 
has strengthened the agencies of the improvised state. This chapter will examine 
how this post-conflict 'solution' has shaped the discourses and practices ofNGOs in 
Brcko. The comment above, made by a senior OHR official in Sarajevo, suggests 
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that 'civil society' in post-conflict Bosnia should be acting as a conduit for 
information between the citizens and the state. These remarks reflect a common 
definition of civil society as a site of political mobilisation and civic participation, 
autonomous from the organisations of the state. This definition of civil society 
echoes the Supervisor's comments in the last chapter, when he suggested that NGOs 
should act as witnesses to the 'transparent' performances of democracy in the newly-
formed Brcko District. NGOs are thus cast as civil society organisations, 
independent from the improvised state and reflecting the beliefs and needs of the 
Brcko citizenry. 
This civil society role represents a fundamental departure from the original 
function of NGOs in Bosnia. NGOs first emerged in Bosnia as agents within the 
humanitarian relief effort during the conflict. This humanitarian role was the 
consequence of the scripting of the conflict as a 'humanitarian disaster' while also 
reflecting the prominence of NGOs in prevailing development discourses. The post-
conflict shift from conduits of humanitarian relief to civil society organisations 
assumed a dramatic change in the temporality and scale of NGO activity in Bosnia, 
from short-term internationally funded operations, to long-term locally funded or 
voluntary organisations. This change in the role ofNGOs represents a manifestation 
of the broader shift in post-conflict Bosnia as international agencies have switched 
their focus from humanitarian requirements to assisting in the democratic transition. 
This chapter examines how such geopolitical scripts of 'humanitarian 
emergency' and 'democratic transition' are experienced at the local scale. In doing 
so, it will assess the effects of such discourses as they are interpreted and deployed at 
the Brcko level. Through an examination of the NGO survey data in Brcko, the 
difficulties for the NGOs in shifting from delivering aid to representing civil society 
begin to emerge. In contrast to linear models of NGO development which chart an 
unproblematic progression from one role to the next, the experiences from Brcko 
suggest that their function during the conflict has continued to define their post-
conflict role. Consequently, NGOs in Brcko have been perceived by the Brcko 
citizenry as 'wealthy' and 'international' organisations which offer sound 
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employment oppmtunities. These contradictory representations suggest a paradox: as 
intemational agencies embrace NGOs as locally-embedded civil society actors, 
simultaneously such organisations are interpreted at the local level as 'new' and 
'extemal', dislocated from existing networks of political participation. 
5.2 The Role of NGOs in the Bosnian 'Humanitarian Emergency' 
The centrality ofNGOs in the intemational effort during the Bosnian conflict 
was neither inevitable nor innocent. This section will examine the three intersecting 
factors which led to the prominent position of NGOs in Bosnia. In the first instance, 
the geopolitical framing of the conflict as a 'humanitarian disaster' ensured that 
rather than a political or military response, assistance was materialised through relief 
and aid. As a second factor, broader shifts in intemational development policy and 
practice had seen the rise of NGOs as key partners to westem govemments and 
development agencies in the delivery of aid and the realisation of foreign policy. 
The third catalyst to NGO involvement was the relief effort itself, as security 
conditions on the ground led intergovemmental agencies to increasingly seek 
partners in the non-govemmental sector. 
5.2.1 Geopolitical Framing 
Noam Chomsky (1999), in his critical assessment of the 1999 NATO action 
in Kosovo, draws attention to the importance of geopolitical framing in shaping 
intemational interventions in local conflicts. Chomsky demonstrates how NATO 
govemments portrayed the actions of the Yugoslav govemment, under Slobodan 
Milosevic, on its Albanian population as 'minority oppression', in contrast to the 
endorsement of similar tactics by Turkey on its Kurdish minority (Chomsky, 1999). 
These pervasive representations justified opposing interventions. Yugoslavia was 
subject to NATO air strikes across its territory, hitting key infrastructure in an 
attempt to destabilise the Milosevic govemment. In contrast, the US has lauded 
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Turkey as an example of an Islamic democracy and made repeated calls for its 
membership to the EU. This example points to the importance of wider geopolitical 
contexts in shaping the interventions of powerful extemal actors as particular events 
are 'framed' in terms which support preconfigured policy scripts. 
The Bosnian war was geopolitically framed as an intractable and bewildering 
problem by the govemments of Westem Europe and the US. The deployment of 
Balkanistic readings of the conflict, blaming primordial 'ancient ethnic hatreds' for 
the outbreak of violence, led to two associated intemational responses. The first, 
detailed in Chapter 3, was to adopt a diplomatic effort which reproduced the 
nationalist logic that presumed a division of Bosnia into ethno-national regions. 
Drawing on Derrida (1994), Campbell (1998a) describes this alignment between 
territory and identity as "ontopological", as a connection was forged between the 
"ontological value of present-being to its situation, to the stable and present 
determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general" 
(Derrida, 1994: 82 in Campbell, 1998a: 80, emphasis in Campbell). It is this 
on topological thinking that led to the 'provinces' of the V ance Owen Peace Plan 
(1993), the 'territories' of the Owen Stoltenberg Plan (1993) and finally, perhaps in 
the purest example of partition, the 'entities' of the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995). 
In addition, the casting of the conflict as a consequence of ancient ethnic hatreds 
introduced a moral equivalency suggesting that all sides were equally to blame for 
the violence and, as such, a decisive military intervention would be impossible. 
Klaus Dodds ( 1998) notes the contrast between this strategy and the representation 
of the first Gulf War, where the conflict was framed in clear moral terms between 
the 'evil' dictator and the 'civilised' westem world (Dodds, 1998: 178). 
Ontolopological readings, coupled with the invocation of moral equivalency, acted 
to rule out intemational military intervention. Instead these geopolitical scripts cast 
Bosnia as a place of difference, ethnically divided and distant from European norms 
of civic citizenship. 
The second and associated intemational response was to portray the Bosnian 
conflict as a 'humanitarian disaster'. This depiction continued the suggestion of 
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moral equivalency, by depicting the violence as almost analogous with a natural 
disaster and hence did not offer a clear aggressor or victim. While continuing to 
mystify the causes of the conflict, this representative strategy focussed attention on 
the outcomes, that of widespread human suffering and material destruction. 
Attending to these humanitarian outcomes could mediate the worst ravages of the 
conflict, reducing political pressure to intervene in this long running cycle of 
violence at the heart of Europe. In contrast to the importance granted to difference in 
the first geopolitical script, the labelling of the conflict as a humanitarian disaster 
invoked an essential similarity between the peoples of Bosnia (as they were all 
victims) and the global citizenry, invoking a common humanity (see Kant, 1991). 
The script of humanitarianism was easy to commodify through media 
representations as the comprehensive coverage of the conflict brought Bosnia into 
the gaze of the global television watching public. These images often challenged the 
ingrained Balkanism of European and American foreign policies that sought to 
portray the conflict in terms of 'ancient ethnic hatreds'. Examples of such 
challenges can be seen in Maggie O'Kane's reports for The Guardian newspaper 
which were said to employ an "anti-geopolitical eye" in eschewing dominant 
political discourses and drawing Bosnia in to a "universe of moral responsibility" (6 
Tuathail, 1996b: 182). These reports challenged the "social production of distance 
and moral indifference around Bosnia" (6 Tuathail, 1996b: 182). By cutting through 
'distancing scripts', media representations of this kind focused on the similarities 
between those suffering and the audiences in Western Europe and North America. 
In doing so these reports reminded viewers and readers that those suffering were 
Europeans, inhabiting a land that until recently had been a holiday destination and 
had hosted successful international sports competitions, not least the Winter 
Olympics in Sarajevo in 1984. Rather than the moral distance created by Balkanistic 
geopolitical scripts of primordial ethnic war and the Balkan vortex, such media 
representations focussed on the proximity of Bosnia as a cosmopolitan European 
country. 
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The discourse of similarity was often deployed explicitly to foster public 
donations for humanitarian relief in Bosnia. The rock band U2 used these strategies 
in their fundraising song Miss Sarajevo, part of the War Child fund raising appeal of 
1995. The lyrics comprised a series of questions concerning life for those under 
siege in Sarajevo: 
Is there time for kohl and lipstick? 
A time for cutting hair? 
Is there a time for high street shopping, to find the right dress to wear? 
(U2, 1995) 
By drawing on explicit parallels between the listeners' Western consumer lifestyle 
and those living under persistent threat in Bosnia, U2 were attempting to raise public 
concern and stimulate donations. These reference points served to reinforce the 
cultural and social proximity of Bosnia and help foster a sentiment amongst the 
public of Western Europe and America. The branding of Bosnia as a 'humanitarian 
disaster', with associated charitable appeals, meant the frustration of the public could 
be directed towards providing emergency relief, as opposed to demanding a more 
effective political solution to the causes of the conflict itself. 
These geopolitical and media images of Bosnia echo previous contradictory 
representations of the Balkans. On the one side international diplomatic efforts cast 
Bosnia as a 'bewildering' distant place of ethnic difference. These scripts were 
embedded in the past, as the present conflict was perceived as product of the "Balkan 
ghosts" of historical enmity, conjuring the imagery of Robert Kaplan (1994). In 
contrast, media representations portrayed Bosnia as operating in the present, through 
invocations of the cosmopolitanism of Sarajevo, live feed television images to 
Mostar and as the host of an Olympic games. Though contrastingly casting Bosnia 
as different and similar, both these scripts assisted in the production of Bosnia as a 
'humanitarian disaster'. Military intervention was perceived as impossible, as the 
roots of the conflict were 'bewildering', while the invocation of proximity provoked 
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popular opinion that an intervention was required. This intervention took the form 
of a humanitarian effort, at the centre of which were NGOs. 
5.2.2 NGOs as Agents of Development 
The prominent role ofNGOs in the humanitarian effort in Bosnia reflects the 
centrality of such institutions within international development policy in the early 
1990s. Global development policies had long embraced NGOs as key institutions 
for stimulating development, in particular, as they were perceived to operate outside 
formal state structures. Throughout the 1980s, policy makers questioned whether the 
states of the developing world commanded the authority to effectively govern their 
territory and, if they could, whether those in control of state functions were 
concerned with addressing social inequalities within their state borders. 
International institutions became critical of what were perceived as 'profligate' or 
'inefficient' states, in particular as a result of the growing international debt crisis of 
the 1970s. The World Bank, headed by former US Secretary of Defence Robert 
McNamara, shifted towards a more neo-liberal ideology, rejecting Keynesian 
approaches of fiscal management and instead advocating development guided by 
Adam Smith's notion of the 'free hand of the market'. This approach is typified by 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, operating in the neo-liberal partnership of the 
'Washington Consensus'. As low income countries suffered crippling debts in the 
wake of oil price rises in the late 1970s, 'solutions' were offered in the form of SAPs 
that focussed on the reduction in the state's role in shaping economic affairs. The 
SAPs encouraged countries to abandon protectionism of infant industries and instead 
establish primary commodity exports, particularly agricultural goods, as the 
centrepiece of economic strategy (Pender, 2001: 3 99). As Mkandawire (1998) points 
out in reference to Africa, "the state was vilified for its weaknesses, its over-
extension, [and] its interference with the smooth functioning of the markets" 
(Mkandawire, 1998: 1). The SAP model therefore fostered the notion of aid 
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'conditionality', where financial assistance was linked to the adoption of a pmticular 
set of 'weak -state' policies recommended by the World Bank. 
In the 1980s, the conditionality of structural adjustment lending was confined 
to the economic sphere, with the World Bank consistently deferring to national 
sovereignty on broader political issues (Pender, 2001: 400). However, as structural 
adjustment lending attracted increasing criticism over the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the focus of aid conditionality began to broaden. SAPs were considered to have 
been a failure in terms of fostering economic development and, instead, poverty 
levels had risen and income disparities widened. The 1980s became known as the 
'Lost Decade' for development, as the Gross Domestic Product (GNP) figures for 
low-income countries stagnated or fell while external debt reached unserviceable 
levels (Camara Neto and Vernengo, 2002: 7). Even the World Bank's 'star 
performer' Mexico, which had been regarded as a model for neo-liberal economic 
management, defaulted on debt payments in 1994 and re-established a dependence 
on emergency loans (Pender, 2001: 401). In addition, the East Asian Tiger 
economies, countries that had explicitly avoided the approaches fostered by the 
Washington Consensus, had managed "the most successful development in history" 
over the 1980s (Stiglitz, 1998). However, rather than leading to withdrawal of 
World Bank/IMF involvement, the failure of SAPs to improve economic and social 
conditions led to the broadening of developmental objectives. The ideology of the 
free market approach was not rejected outright, but rather seen as part of a series of 
measures required to 'improve' development. The focus of international 
development agencies turned from macro-economic concerns, operating within and 
between states, to examining the form and quality of the institutions and processes of 
governance. 
This new development agenda was suitably entitled 'good governance' and 
was first outlined in the World Bank's (1989) report Sub-Saharan Africa: From 
Crisis to Sustainable Growth. This new agenda seemed to answer critics who had 
suggested that the World Bank and IMF policies had been focused on narrow 
economic issues at the expense of social and political problems. The attention of 
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these global development institutions shifted to the operation of power within the 
state, and in particular on aspects of 'accountability' and 'participation'. While 
seemingly vague, 'good governance' was variously defined to include some, or all, 
of the following aspirations: an efficient public service; an independent juridical 
system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of 
public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative 
legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a 
pluralist institutional structure, and a free press (Leftwich, 1995: 427). 
Subsequently, Jenkins (2002) suggests 'good governance' could be operationalised 
by restructuring state bureaucracies, reforming legal systems, supporting democratic 
decentralisation and creating accountability-enhancing civil society (Jenkins, 2002: 
485). 
This broad remit has clear implications for state sovereignty as this change 
of emphasis indicates disillusionment amongst policy makers with the 
developmental potential of the state (Howell, 2000). In place of a range of macro-
economic issues, the 'good governance' initiative brought a wide range of public and 
private functions into the gaze of organizations such as the World Bank and IMF. 
These development organizations incorporated the reform of domestic agencies into 
the conditionality of developmental aid. While critics have suggested that this 
reflects a politicization of aid, the World Bank viewed the new agenda as "correcting 
sub-optimally designed institutions which were ruining otherwise sound policy 
initiatives" (Jenkins, 2002: 487). Thus, the World Bank cast this 'corrective' 
approach as merely managerial as opposed to containing any political substance (if 
that is possible). By deploying managerialist rhetoric that suggested that the problem 
lay with how the policies were implemented rather than the political underpinnings 
of the policies themselves, continued structural adjustment policies could be 
legitimised despite statistics suggesting their failure at solving problems of social 
welfare. In addition, the inclusion of the adjective 'good' has enabled the raising of 
evaluative questions about 'proper' procedures, issues of transparency and the 
quality and process of decision-making (Doomobos, 2001: 101 ). There are clear 
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issues of power in the ability to label what governance is 'good' or 'bad', dependent 
as it is on seemingly subjective criteria established by the same global organisations 
that formulate interventions. Consequently, 'good governance' initiatives have been 
criticised for politicising aid conditionality while eroding the sovereignty of 
individual low-income states. In addition, Mercer (2003) suggests that 'good 
governance' is merely a "performance" which, while involving a range of new 
actors, masks a continued commitment to neo-liberal policies (Mercer, 2003: 743). 
The primary institutional change heralded by the critique of structural 
adjustment and the associated discourse of 'good governance' was the emergence of 
NGOs as the primary partners in development initiatives. 'Partnership' became a 
key part of the discourse of developmental intervention as non-state actors were 
enrolled in projects designed and funded by both state and non-state development 
organisations. Salamon (1994) describes the effects of this policy shift as an 
'association revolution', as neo-liberal development strategies facilitated the 
emergence of NGOs operating outside either the state or the market. Fisher ( 1997) 
suggests that NGOs were perceived by development organisations as 'magic bullets', 
for such was the faith that they would "mysteriously find their target" (Fisher, 1997: 
442). This conception of NGOs as a panacea is echoed by Stiles (2002), who notes 
that NGOs offered donors "a relatively safe and convenient means of avoiding both 
public and private sector dangers" (Stiles, 2002: 836). Hulme and Edwards (1995) 
outline two ways in which NGOs were vital to what they call the 'new policy 
agenda' of neo-liberalism coupled with discourses of 'good governance'. Firstly, 
while the market is perceived as the most effective route to economic growth and 
service provision, NGOs are considered vital for accessing those groups that the 
market fails (Hulme and Edwards: 1995, 5). Secondly, NGOs are seen as vehicles 
for democratization and the establishment of a sound 'civil society'. In this way, 
NGOs are perceived as a realm of 'autonomous' organisations that can improve 
participation in the process of governing while also articulating the demands of the 
citizenry. In short, they can hold the state to account. 
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In Bosnia, NGOs were perceived to be particularly important as the territory 
was branded a 'failed state' where domestic governmental institutions were unable 
(or unwilling) to protect and provide for its citizens (Kaplan, 1994; Dorff, 1999; 
Chopra, 2000) 1• This is, of course, only an extension of the logic behind discourses 
of 'good governance': here the processes of governance were (by certain indicators) 
considered sub-standard and external assistance was required to ensure 
improvement. The very notion of 'failed states' raises the question of what qualifies 
as statehood and how failure is measured (for a discussion of these Issues see 
Milliken and Krause, 2002). The rhetoric of 'failed states' represents a moment 
when all claims to sovereignty are lost, as external intervention is recast not as a 
necessary compromise of state sovereignty, but as a requirement for guaranteeing the 
safety and security of the (now 'stateless') citizenry. 
It is through the discourses of 'good governance' and the allied 'association 
revolution' that NGOs have become key actors in the toolkit of international 
developmental and humanitarian responses. As Bosnia was depicted as a 
'humanitarian disaster' international NGOs established field offices and deployed 
expatriate staff to assist in the distribution of relief and aid. The centrality of NGOs 
did not, however, solely emerge from the geopolitical framing of Bosnia and the 
discourses of global development agencies. The need for NGOs was also crucially 
shaped by the realisation of the humanitarian effort in Bosnia. 
5.2.3 The Need for Partnership 
The institutional make-up of the humanitarian effort in Bosnia was not 
simply a product of development discourses applied in practice, but it was also 
shaped by the security conditions on the ground. The UNHCR acted as the lead 
organisation, arriving in 1992 to coordinate the distribution of relief. This marked an 
Like most representations within the conflict, this is contested. Some groups (particularly Bosnian 
Serbs) would perceive the 'failed state' to be Yugoslavia not Bosnia, as the conflict was cast as 
emerging out of illegal Bosnijak secessionism. It is for this reason that some consider the conflict a 
civil war and others an act ofsta~e on state aggression. 
146 
Cbapter 5 Local Geopolitin 
"astonishing and unprecedented" transformation of the UNHCR, an agency that was 
more accustomed to helping individuals that are or may become refugees and had 
never attempted operational relief on the scale of Bosnia (Rieff, 2002: 132). 
Conventionally, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) had fulfilled 
the role of looking after non-combatants in war zones. However, an ICRC convoy 
carrying food and medical relief on May 18 1992 was attacked as it entered Sarajevo, 
despite the security guarantees obtained from the parties concerned (ICRC, 1992). 
Three ICRC staff members were wounded and one of them, Frederic Maurice, died 
the next day at a Sarajevo hospital. As a result, the ICRC postponed intervention 
until late 1993, and in the interstices the UNHCR stepped into the logistical vacuum 
left in the delivery of relief. 
The centrepiece of the relief operation in Bosnia, both in terms of substance 
and media portrayal, was the Sarajevo airlift. As early as April 1992 freedom of 
movement was restricted around Sarajevo, with Bosnia Serb forces surrounding the 
city from the hills above. Later that year the only entry or exit for the city's 
predominantly Bosnijak population was through a narrow tunnel dug under the UN-
controlled airport. The airport had been secured by the UN through Resolution 764, 
passed on July 13 111 1992, which called for the deployment of UNPROFOR troops 
"to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance" (UN, 1992). The importance of controlling the airport 
extended beyond the clear transportation benefits; occupying this territory also 
prevented Serb forces from entirely encircling Sarajevo. Over 1993 UNHCR 
shipped over 51 000 tonnes of supplies into Sarajevo though the airlift. This 
increased from January 1994 to July 1994 to over 96 600 tonnes, with the monthly 
food target alone comprising 6 600 tonnes (Chroman, 1995). 
The humanitarian effort was not limited to Sarajevo, though this remained 
the focus of the world's media over the following four years. The geography of 
humanitarian action in Bosnia pointed to a certain moral hierarchy, produced through 
an intersection of geopolitical representations and media coverage. The explicit 
American sympathies for the Bosnijak position in the conflict, as exemplified by the 
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US government's commitment to the 'lift and strike' policy during negotiations2, led 
to specific targeting of international aid to areas under Bosnijak control. Other areas 
of Bosnia fell out of the media and public consciousness as the four-year war 
progressed, and subsequently attracted little in the way of humanitarian relief. Brcko 
was one such place. As it had been the location of 'ethnic cleansing' it was not 
considered a priority for humanitarian intervention. A US army officer described 
how Brcko was considered "too dangerous" for large-scale humanitarian relief until 
a year after the signing of the Dayton Agreement (Cucolo, 1999). These comments 
act as a clear example of the entanglement of geopolitical discourses of 'danger' and 
'Serb control' during the conflict. Instead, humanitarian intervention in Brcko 
echoed that of other contested areas in Bosnia where the 'solution' of the UNHCR 
comprised assisting in the transfer of populations in order to reduce civilian 
causalities. 
On the ground in Bosnia, the inexperience of the UNHCR amplified the need 
for partnership organisations to assist in the humanitarian effort. In the wake of the 
'association revolution' (Salamon, 1994) within the delivery of developmental and 
emergency assistance, numerous NGOs stepped in to distribute aid in Bosnia and 
work alongside the UNHCR. By 1993, over 3 000 humanitarian personnel from 
over 250 organizations carried UNHCR identity cards (Young, 2001: 787). These 
NGOs varied widely in terms of size and funding: at one end of the scale there were 
international organisations such as Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Caritas (the 
Catholic humanitarian aid and relief organisation), Merhemet (a Muslim charitable 
association registered in Sweden), Mercy Corps and the International Crisis Group. 
These groups operated well-funded and large-scale relief operations, establishing 
offices across Bosnia and deploying expatriate staff to facilitate aid distribution. 
Many of these organisations begun working during the 1991-1992 war in Croatia and 
simply moved their operation into Bosnia as its need became greater. 
This relates to the lifting of the anns embargo and the striking of Serb positions around Sarajevo 
(see Silber and Little, 1995: 287 and Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
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On the other end of the scale, there were smaller organisations and 
collectives driving humanitarian relief overland, such as the 'Serious Road Trip'. 
Milos Stankovic (2001), a British Arn1y interpreter present in Sarajevo throughout a 
large part of the conflict described the relief effort as "a loosely coordinated 
patchwork of well meaning do-gooders who exposed themselves to horrible risks for 
no return other than the satisfaction of having delivered some aid" (Stankovic, 2001: 
64). These improvised aid missions highlight the geographic proximity of the 
conflict to Western Europe: only a day's drive from France while nearly commutable 
from Italy. At this time Bosnia was also the only country in the world where no one 
required a visa for entry or exit. Thus Bosnia's proximity to Western Europe, 
coupled with the absent bureaucratic requirements, lowered the logistical barriers to 
small NGOs entering the humanitarian effort. 
Over the course of the conflict, increasing numbers of NGOs were embroiled 
in the network of organisations delivering aid to Bosnia. The intersection of the 
geopolitical framing of Bosnia as a 'humanitarian disaster', the centrality of NGOs 
within development solutions and the inexperience of the UNHCR on the ground 
ensured that NGOs became key conduits for humanitarian relief. Though much of 
this work consisted of short-term projects, the signing of the Dayton Accords in 
1995 was coupled with a $5bn 'Priority Reconstruction Programme', which ensured 
that further donor funds were available for NGO work in Bosnia (Miller and Martin, 
2003: 145). Despite the continued funding opportunities, the context in which 
NGOs were operating shifted on account of the Dayton Agreement. Other areas of 
the world became priorities for the disaster relief NGOs as the geopolitical framing 
of Bosnia shifted to focus on more long-term peace-building and reconciliation 
objectives. This paradigm shift was described to me during the fieldwork as a move 
'from emergency to transition'3. 
5.3 From 'Emergency' to 'Transition' 
3 
Interview with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Officer, Sarajevo 29th May 2003. 
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Despite the signing of the Dayton Agreement and the associated cessation of 
military violence, the slow pace of international implementation of the Agreement 
ensured that delivery of humanitarian aid continued to be the predominant concern 
ofNGOs over 1996 and 1997. The Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) continued as a 
de facto border over these years and freedom of movement was still severely 
restricted. In the case of Brcko the Dayton rhetoric of a unified multi-ethnic 
democratic Bosnia appeared a long way off as NGOs such as the IRC established 
humanitarian relief centres in the devastated suburbs of Brodusa and Dizdarusa. 
Much of this work was necessary in the absence of a functioning state or market, as 
NGOs stepped in to assist in the provision of basic services, under the guidance of 
the improvised state. Indeed, in Brcko the provision of basic services became a 
point of leverage over intransigent local politicians as NGOs delayed intervention 
until security could be guaranteed. In a paper in Parameters, the US Army War 
College Quarterly, Lieutenant Colonel Tony Cucolo explained this process: 
Simply opening a dialogue would bring their town [Brcko] great benefits: nongovemmental 
organizations (NGOs) were looking for any sign of moderation from the Serbs before they 
would commit substantial aid [ ... ]one would think a reliable power grid and new windows 
and heating oil from aid organizations for their hospital might be good incentives for simply 
discussing face-to-face local peace initiatives. 
(Cucolo, 1999: 110) 
This comment not only highlights the post-war role of NGOs in assisting in 
the provision of utilities and basic services, but it also points to how NGOs became 
enrolled in the discourses and performances of the wider processes of peace-
building. NGOs began to be perceived not simply as conduits for resources, but also 
as active participants in the network of organisations that were attempting to 
implement the Dayton Agreement. As immediate post-war humanitarian concerns 
began to diminish for certain sections of the population, so NGOs shifted their 
priorities towards objectives of reconciliation and, with direct reference to the 
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discourse of Dayton, 'democratization'. One NGO worker described how this shift in 
priorities had effected donor funding, remarking "they used to fund doing things now 
they fund talking things"4 • 
A number of authors have attempted to model these shifting NGO priorities 
as organisations move from humanitarian objectives to more long-term priorities. 
These changes are reflected in Korten's (1990) 'three generations of voluntary 
development action'. In this model, Korten outlines three stages or 'generations' of 
NGO activity from relief work, to capacity building and then finally to the more 
abstract 'sustainable systems development' where NGOs seek to make changes in 
policies and institutions at local, national and international levels (Korten, 1990: 
118). Korten suggests that a linear path can be traced between NGOs moving from 
the first through to the third generations of voluntary activity (Korten, 1990: 113-
132). While this schema shares some features with the post-war geopolitical 
discourses in Brcko, Korten's invocation of a teleology divided into distinct 
consecutive phases does not provide an accurate representation of the practices of 
the NGOs in the town. Brcko's post-conflict society was one of dislocation, 
fragmentation and profound inequality, as certain groups managed to capture 
resources through both legal and illegal means whilst others remained destitute and 
in need of humanitarian assistance5• 
The difficultly in identifying distinct phases of NGO activity m Brcko 
supports Gill's (2000) observation that literature examining economic and social 
transformations suffers a problem of delineation, as he asks "where does the 
breakdown end and the transition to democracy begin?" (Gill, 2000: 8). As 
humanitarian relief in Bosnia has dwindled both in terms of volume and prevalence 
within the rhetoric of international intervention, a discourse of 'democratization' has 
emerged. The rhetoric of"emergency to transition" is suggestive of the wider move 
to connect Bosnia to other economic and social transformations taking place in 
Central and Eastern Europe, through such organisations as the Council of Europe 
4 Interview with Counterpart Official 'C', Brcko 41h October 2002. 
5 
The wide income disparity within post-conflict Brcko was discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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and the Stability Pact. The implications of this shift in the discourse and rhetoric of 
development interventions has been profound for the NGOs of Brcko. A 
representative of Counterpart, an American NGO working in Brcko, alluded to the 
shifts in temporality and velocity heralded by the change in donor priorities: 
l mean, also I think that there is a difference between humanitarian involvement and the 
longer tenn community organising and development, because humanitarianism is top down, 
it is about speed and efficiency. I mean, it is glotified shipping innit! 
(Counterpart Official 'A', Brcko, 151h May 2003) 
This comment points to the substantive change in NGO work in Brcko, from 
mitigating the worst consequences of conflict to attending to the longer-term issues 
of conflict resolution, community development and democratization. 
The shift from 'emergency to transition' has, however, involved more than a 
simple reallocation of NGO tasks from short-term relief distribution towards more 
long-term objectives. While during conflict their position as external actors capable 
of intervening dispassionately in the 'bewildering' (Major, 1999: 532) state of affairs 
was brought to the fore, in the post-war period NGOs were reinscribed as 
autonomous organisations close to the grassroots capable of stimulating associative 
life and acting to represent the disadvantaged or marginalised. In this way, a 
remarkable change has taken place as NGOs, once the frontline of international 
intervention in Bosnia, are taken to represent 'civil society'. This perceived 
transition in role also has a clear scalar component, as the benefit of NGOs shifts 
from their extra-local status, outside of the parochial 'ancient ethnic hatreds', to 
being explicitly embedded in local communities and thus able to represent particular 
interests. This re-branding of NGOs can only be understood in the context of wider 
debates surrounding 'transition', defined as the collection of institutional and 
societal reforms undertaken to reorganise states to function as market democracies. 
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5.3.1 Transitions to Democracy 
Over the last two decades 'transition' has become the most popular label for 
the set of processes involved in a state moving from authoritarian rule to liberal 
market democracy. In particular, following the end of the Cold War and the Fall of 
the Berlin Wall, academic, media and policy scripts have deemed the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe to be 'in transition'. Samuel Huntington (1991) branded 
these dramatic European events as a 'third wave of democratization', following two 
other phases of democratization from 1828-1926 and 1943-64 (Huntington, 1991 ). 
This 'third wave' led to triumphal declarations of "the End of History" (Fukuyama, 
1992) where liberalism, capitalism and democracy were thought to have scored a 
final victory over authoritarianism and communism. These claims have since 
subsided and, even been discredited, with Merrifield (2004) recently suggesting that 
"[a]nyone with half a brain knew that Fukuyama's teleology was an apologia for free 
market capitalism" (Merrifield, 2004: 325). Beyond this teleology, the 'end of 
history' approach also assumed that from the shell of authoritarianism fully 
functioning democracies spontaneously emerged. In contrast, the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR has 
been sporadic, contingent and perhaps most importantly, a long-term process. 
Recent work examining the events of the 'third wave of democratization' has 
built on these arguments, drawing attention to the ways in which democratic 
transition has been viewed in reductive terms, ignoring local and temporal 
differentiations (Bradshaw and Stenning, 2004: 24 7). These criticisms have been 
broadened to question the model of democracy that is envisaged within work 
examining democratic transition. It seems that just as democracy has solidified its 
"aura of legitimacy" (Held and Archibugi, 1995: 2), so critics have questioned the 
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unifying ideologies and procedures that underpin this form of social order. As 
Graham ( 1986) points out: 
[u]p to the eighteenth century everyone had a clear idea of what democracy was and hardly 
anyone was in favour of it. Now the position is reversed. Everyone is in favour of it but no-
one has a clear idea any longer what it is. 
(Graham, 1986 quoted in Arblaster, 1999: 34.) 
Bastian and Luckham (2003) agree, suggesting that despite the ubiquity of the term 
contemporary democracy is "Janus-faced", with the capacity to both "empower 
citizens, overcome exclusion and contribute to good governance" but often 
becoming "the tool of powerful economic interests, reinforcing social inequalities, 
penalizing minorities, awakening dormant conflicts, and failing in practice to 
broaden popular participation in government" (Bastian and Luckham, 2003: 1). For 
Bell and Staeheli (2001) this distinction can be thought of in terms of procedural 
and substantive democratization, arguing that democratic transition has privileged 
the procedural (that is, the institutions, rules and practices of governance) over 
substantive issues of democratic outcomes (such as equity and justice) (Bell and 
Staeheli, 2001: 178). This distinction opens questions as to the ability of 
'representative' democracy to deliver equitable outcomes, and in so doing whether 
such models of democracy have moved beyond eighteenth century conceptions of 
the tern1, described by Painter (1999) as "mob rule or tyranny of the crowd" (Painter, 
1999: 103; Williams, 1983: 93-98). 
The experience of post-conflict Bosnia illustrates the contested nature of 
discourses of democratization. In the initial post-conflict period democracy was 
conceived in procedural terms, with the holding of elections taken as a measure of 
success in the transition to democracy. A number of authors have suggested that this 
narrow conception of democracy and rapid time scale was a product of US domestic 
concerns, most notably the Clinton Administration's desire to be seen to be making 
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progress in Bosnia during a presidential campaign (Williams, 1996; Donais, 2000). 
While the 1996 elections predictably entrenched nationalist political rule over the 
Bosnian territory, international stakeholders, who pointed to the elections as tangible 
evidence of 'democratization', could still claim 'success' 6 • This discursive tactic 
reflects Bell and Staeheli's (2000) assertion that the procedures of democracy have 
been promoted at the expense of a more intangible substantive democratization. It 
seems, however, that the initial 'success' of the Bosnian 1996 elections has since 
been reassessed by Europe and the US, when examined in the context of 
reformulated geopolitical aims. For example, US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz used a trip to Srebrenica to suggest "the experience of Bosnia shows the 
danger of rushing to hold elections in post-war Iraq simply as a show of democracy 
taking root"7 (quoted in Shanker, 2003). Paddy Ashdown, the current Bosnian High 
Representative, is similarly reflective on the success of early elections in Bosnia: 
Promoting democracy in Bosnia Herzegovina was the highest priority in the aftermath of 
the Dayton Agreement. We measured the success of this by the number of elections we 
could organize. Seven years on, however, citizens [ ... ] have grown weary of voting [ ... ] 
The focus on elections, meanwhile, slowed our efforts to tackle organized crime and 
corruption. 
(Ashdown, 2003: 17) 
The results of the 1996 Bosnian elections did not, however, mark a 
rethinking of the international democratization strategy. The focus remained on 
procedural aspects, though more emphasis was placed on establishing the 'correct' 
6 For claims by international community of the 'success' of the 1996 elections see, for example, High 
Representative Carl Bildt's speech at Royal United Services Institute, October 1996 (available at 
www.ohr.int). 
7 This rhetoric is made all the more surprising as Wolfowitz argued prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
that "there is no history of ethnic strife in Iraq" and thus the country would not demand the same level 
of post-conflict intervention (quoted in Schmitt, 2003 ). 
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institutions and establishing the rule of law8 • These ambitions hold clear echoes of 
the World Bank's 'good governance' approach: the employment of 'managetialist' 
rhetoric to suggest that technical or bureaucratic failings are blocking economic or 
political reform. As evidence, the nationalist election results in Bosnia were a 
significant factor in the granting of "Bonn powers"9 to the OHR, thereby granting 
symbolic capital and strengthening their control over the Bosnian territory. Much of 
the explanation for the election results employed the same 'cultural racism' (Zizek, 
2000: 4-5) that had infused the Balkanistic interpretations of the conflict itself. The 
inability of the Bosnian citizenry to vote for moderate political parties, as opposed to 
monothematic nationalist groups, was put down to the 'immature' civil society in the 
country (Belloni, 2001 ). As a consequence, following the elections the creation and 
strengthening of civil society became an issue in Bosnia (Chandler, 2000: 144). As 
with the discourse of 'good governance', questions of weak or immature civil society 
were entirely subjective and defined only in terms established by the intervening 
governments and organizations. Another similarity was that the invocation of 'weak 
civil society' heralded new and more penetrative forms of intervention in Bosnia as 
"strengthening civil society" became a key aspect of the discourses of 
intergovernmental agencies and national governments (see OSCE, 2001). 
5.3.2 The Importance of Civil Society 
The renewed political and academic interest in 'civil society' in the 1990s 
can be traced to the fall of Communism across Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. 
The power of dissident and pro-democracy groups to shape the institutions of the 
state has been portrayed as a victory for 'civil society': the will of the people holding 
8 Car! Bildt, Paddy Ashdown 's predecessor as High Representative, made a number of speeches after 
the election result calling for stronger common Bosnian institutions and the need for more emphasis 
on the civilian, as opposed to military, aspects of the peace agreement (see, for example, Bildt, I 996). 
9 As discussed in Chapter 4, "Bonn powers" (named after the location of the Peace Implementation 
Conference on December I 01h 1997 at which they were granted) allow the High Representative to fire 
any elected official or pass any law if it is perceived to be in the interests of implementing the Dayton 
Agreement. 
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the state to account (Bernhard, 1996: 311; Crook, 2001). This image of civil society 
as a force of democracy is also prevalent in Bosnia, where a range of international 
agencies have created policies and programmes to encourage the creation, 
development or consolidation of civil society (see World Bank, 2004; OSCE, 2003; 
United Nations, 2003). Civil society has thus entered the discourses of international 
development agencies, keen to draw on its role of encouraging "genuine spaces of 
democratic politics" (Isaac, 1996: 293-294). This prioritising of non-state actors 
echoes the solutions encapsulated by 'good governance' initiatives, discussed earlier 
in the chapter. 
However, the popularity of the idea of civil society within the discourses of 
international agencies and the conviction with which civil society is discussed 
should not be confused with a universal understanding of the term. As Bratton 
(1994) suggests "few social and political concepts have travelled so far in their life 
and changed their meaning so much" (Bratton, 1994: 52). These shifts in the 
meaning of civil society are not surprising: historically, the term has formed a vital 
part of the vocabulary of political philosophers as they have considered how people 
can meet individual needs whilst also achieving collective ends. On account of this 
historical ubiquity, there are many origins of the term 'civil society', and these have 
been selectively drawn upon to justify and support the image of civil society as a set 
of non-state organisations in post-conflict Bosnia. 
The classical roots of civil society can be found in the work of Socrates, 
Aristotle and Plato, where the term described the use of rational argument to resolve 
conflict and achieve a common good. These early models of civil society reflect the 
uses of civil society as a mechanism for mediating between "[ ... ] selfish goals of 
individual actors and the need for some basic solidarity" (Hann, 1996: 4). The 
scholars of the Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith and David 
Hulme, developed these themes in the Eighteenth Century. These scholars 
conceived civil society as not only a social or political consideration but also an 
economic practice, involving the civilised exchange of both ideas and goods. This 
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raised the question of the role of the state: if economic transactions could be 
conducted with civility the intervention of the state was seen, particularly by Adam 
Smith, as unnecessary. 
In the Nineteenth Century, Hegel was more circumspect in reducing the role 
of the state in managing economic and social affairs. Hegel saw civil society as a 
consequence of the capitalist mode of production which constituted a location of 
competing class relations, each with little interest in the common good. 
Consequently, the state was vital in mediating the "egotistical tendencies" of certain 
elements of civil society (Padgett, 1996: 4 ). This moral role of the state was later 
contested by Marx, who felt that the private dimension of civil society overpowered 
the public aspect which, in a capitalist society, resulted in an overemphasis on the 
rights of the individual to pursue self-interest (Arato and Cohen, 1995: 142). Despite 
their differences, these models introduce the notion of civil society as external to the 
state, potentially holding the state to account. In addition to a philosophical 
aspiration or a theatre of economic exchange, Marx and Hegel conceived civil 
society as a focal point of democratic practice. This role was emphasised by Alexis 
de Tocqueville in De la Democratie en Amerique (Democracy in America) (1835). 
In this work, de Tocqueville argued that the guarantee of individual liberties was to 
be found in what he called 'democratic expedients' which included local self-
government, the separation of the church and the state, a free press, indirect 
elections, an independent judiciary and, above all, 'associationallife' (Kaldor, 2003: 
19). 
These theoretical underpinnings were evident in the rhetoric of international 
agencies following the 1996 elections in Bosnia in their portrayals of civil society as 
a democratic prerequisite, separate from the state. The rhetoric of pluralist 
democracy, coupled with the ideal of the separation of civil society from the state, 
has continued within the policy scripts of international agencies in Bosnia. For 
example, the OSCE's 10 (2003) Civil Society Policy in Bosnia begins with the 
10 The OSCE is drawn upon to represent international policy in Bosnia on account of its geographical 
reach within the country over the post-war period: it has been the international agency with the most 
field offices within Bosnia (Interview with OSCE Head of Mission, Brcko 1711' October 2002). 
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statement: "[t]he term 'Civil Society' describes the space which lies between the 
government on one hand and families and individuals on the other" (OSCE, 2003: 
1 ). Civil society is thus represented as a space of liberty, a democratic expedient in 
de Tocquevillian terms, capable of holding the state to account and negotiating 
individual and collective needs. This representative strategy allows NGOs to be 
equated with 'civil society' on account of their perceived autonomy, coupled with 
their supposed ability to "pluralize the institutional arena and bring more democratic 
actors into the political sphere" (Mercer, 2002: 10). The OHR demonstrates a 
similar conflation of 'NGOs' and 'civil society' in their published development 
policy, where they use the two terms interchangeably (see OHR, 2000b). The OSCE 
(200 1) seem to agree, suggesting that NGOs are an "essential part" of civil society: 
[t]he presence of a strong civil society is crucial to promote democracy as a mechanism for 
stimulating public pressure and forcing state institutions into becoming more responsible and 
accountable. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a fundamental role in the 
development and consolidation of democratic stability and pluralism. Their work to protect 
human rights, advocate legislative changes and voice the basic needs of the population makes 
NGOs an essential part of civil society. 
(OSCE, 2001: 3) 
The perception of NGOs as a fundamental part of 'civil society' has led to the 
suggestion that their mere presence in post-conflict Bosnia is evidence of 
democratization (Tvedt, 2002: 364). This line of thinking reflects quantitative 
ratings of democratization, where the number of NGOs correlates with the level, or 
'depth', of democracy (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997: 77; Fisher, 1998; Mercer, 2002: 
1 0). This approach is reflected in the work of organisations such as Civic us or the 
Open Society Institute as they attempt to construct "indices of democracy" largely 
based upon numerical analyses of NGO presence (Anheier, 2004 ). In this way, the 
improvised state in Brcko no longer views NGOs as agents of aid delivery, but rather 
as representatives of democratic participation. 
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The conflation of NGOs with civil society has led Mcllwaine (1999) to 
suggest that the tetm has been "hollowed out" as it has become just another term in 
the lexicon of development agencies (Mcllwaine, 1999: 515). Kaldor ( 1999) agrees, 
suggesting that this neo-liberal interpretation conceives civil society "not as struggle, 
but as service delivery" (Kaldor, 1999: 22). Hann ( 1996) is more critical suggesting 
that the "reduction [of civil society] by governments and aid agencies to the world of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represents an impoverished view of social 
life" (Hann, 1996: 22). Perhaps the most contested aspect of this view of social life 
is that it suggests that society is divided cleanly between the state one 'side' and civil 
society on the other. 
The discussion in the previous chapter began the process of contesting this 
clean division by heralding the state in Brcko as 'improvised' between various 
agencies and processes. The relationship between the improvised state and NGOs 
appears far more blurred in Bosnia than the certainty of the discourses of the OHR 
and OSCE would suggest. The work of Antonio Gramsci is useful in understanding 
the practices of these improvised state organs as they attempt to shape civil society. 
Gramsci conceived civil society as an arena in which states and other powerful 
actors intervene to influence the political agendas of organised groups with the 
intention of defusing opposition (Hearn, 2001: 43). This represents a dramatic shift 
from the neoliberal definition of civil society as 'autonomous' from the state. This 
notion is developed by MacDonald ( 1994) when he notes how Gramsci criticised 
liberal attempts to draw a clear distinction between state and civil society and insists 
that the two spheres are integrally connected: 
[s]tate power is maintained not only through the formal organisations of 'political society' 
(government, political parties, the military), but also by building hegemony through many of 
the institutions of civil society such as the church and the media. The attempt of neo-
conservatives and liberal-pluralist to distinguish between the state and civil society is 
therefore misguided. 
(MacDonald, 1994: 272). 
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This critique has recently been explored empirically through the work of Yael 
Navaro-Yashin (2002), who examines the social reproduction of the state in 
contemporary Turkey. In the context of a persistent critique of the division between 
the state and civil society, Navaro-Yashin suggests that those who celebrate a new 
associational pluralism 'outside' the state in Turkey may have confused a changing 
discourse or technique of state power with an autonomous rise of civil society 
(Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 132). In this way, Navaro-Yashin suggests that there is no 
'autonomisation' to be observed, but rather a changing enmeshed relationship 
(Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 132). These practices also reflect the symbolic capital of the 
state, capable of legitimising certain non-state activity (as 'civil society' or NGOs) 
whilst legislating against others (branding it 'illegal' or 'uncivil'). 
This seems an appropriate starting point for examining the NGOs in Brcko. 
The notion of an 'enmeshed' relationship conveys the blurred lines between (or 
among) the agencies of the improvised state and the NGOs, as the boundaries seem 
permeable, often to the point of non-existence. The shift from 'emergency to 
transition' has seen NGOs, previously agents of humanitarian relief, recast as 
organisations of civil society. This is a remarkable transformation: NGOs are no 
longer rapid distributors of aid, but rather able to encourage civic participation. 
NGOs in this context are understood as autonomous from the state, as "observing 
Assembly meetings", "public hearings" and "lobbying councillors"'' have become a 
primary form of political participation (particularly in the absence of an election). 
The following examination of the NGO survey begins to question this autonomy and 
highlights the more enmeshed or blurred relationship these organisations exhibit 
with the improvised state. 
5.4 The organisations in Brcko District: the NGO Survey 
KY: I think question eleven is stupid. 
11 Interview with Ambassador Clarke, the Brcko Supervisor 24th March 2003 
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AJ: Why? 
12 
KV: No one will want to talk to you about problems ... 
This particularly fmstrating exchange occurred as my field assistant Dragana 
and I walked across the park in the centre of Brcko having completed the first survey 
with a Youth NGO called 'Vermont'. On the evidence of that first survey she was 
right, and it also confirmed a latent fear that the NGOs in Brcko were 'over-
surveyed'. Indeed, the representative at Vermont had been involved with conducting 
the survey for the Omladinska Informativna Agencija only two months earlier. 
Surveys had also been carried out by the UNDP when they established a Brcko Local 
Action Programme (BLAP) in 2001 and also by the International Rescue 
Committee-funded NGO Resource Centre in 2000. The Project Manager of the 
NGO Resource centre had warned me at the outset of the fieldwork "they won't want 
to talk about problems[ ... ] because they will think you could offer some money"13 • 
The regularity of these NGO surveys acted as an immediate indicator of the 
importance to the improvised state of measuring the quantity of 'civil society 
organisations' as an indication of the quality of associative life 14 • This frequency led 
to responses for my survey being read off a computer screen, and when it came to 
question eleven ('what problems have you experienced working in Brcko District?') 
a debate was provoked as to what would be perceived as the 'right answer'. Finally 
the Vermont representative settled on 'not enough money', the same answer would 
be repeated in the majority of responses to question eleven. This speaks to issues of 
positionality as my role of international researcher was connected to that of a donor 
and, as such, to the same issues that the NGO Resource Centre experienced with 
12 
Taken from a conversation with my research assistant Dragana, 4th October 2002. A copy of the 
survey (in English) can be found in the thesis Appendix. 
13 Interview with the former Programme Manager of the NGO Resource Centre, Brcko, 3'd May 
2003. 
14 This was given as the reason behind the survey by the Omladinska Informativna Agencija (email 
correspondence on 9th October 2002) and during an interview with the UNDP Programme manger, 
18th February 2003. 
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their survey. In the case of the UNDP survey, they have acted as both surveyor and 
donor in Brcko, funding specific projects under the umbrella of the BLAP 
programme. It was perhaps no surprise then that individual NGOs felt the need to 
cast their organisation in a good light. 
However, my NGO survey had important functions beyond reiterating the 
desire for NGOs to avoid self-criticism. I employed four selection criteria to limit 
the organisations surveyed: legal registration 15 (though two active organisations that 
were attempting to register were included); social welfare objectives; non-profit and 
non-political (in the sense of non-party political) objectives. These criteria served to 
exclude certain organisations, such as the Mjesne Zajednice (MZs or Local 
Communities), an absence that is discussed in Chapter 6. Despite these exclusions, 
the survey provided a 'snapshot' of the dynamic NGO sector in Brcko, presenting 
data on the number of organisations and the areas in which they were working. The 
completed surveys also gave details of the partner organisations in both the public 
and private sector. However, the survey's main outcome was that it gave an insight 
into the blurred, shifting and contested boundaries that divide NGOs from other 
organisations and agencies. Whether as a consequence of proximity to international 
organisations, donors, the government organs, political parties or the private sector, 
the fragile autonomy ofNGOs in Brcko District was often portrayed. To understand 
this fragility requires an outline of the sector itself. 
Eighteen organisations were surveyed over October and November 2002. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly all of these organisations were registered, or had arrived, 
since 1992. Between 1992 and the declaration of the Final Award in 1999, five 
NGOs registered to work in Brcko. I should repeat the caveat that this does not 
mean there were only five organisations working in the area. The number during 
this period is low due to a number of factors. Firstly, international humanitarian 
organisations (such as International Rescue Committee, the ICRC, Mercy Corps 
International and World Vision) registered to work in Sarajevo, if at all, and only 
15 
Here I am referring to registration external to Brcko District. Over the course of the fieldwork all 
of the NGOs were attempting to register at the District level, a process that is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
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'localised' their branches later in the reconstruction effort. Indeed, many of these 
humanitarian organisations may have been registered and then subsequently left 
Brcko (as is the case with the International Rescue Committee) and therefore they 
are not represented in this 'snapshot' NGO survey. Secondly, many local 
organisations waited to formally register until the announcement of the arbitration 
process, and thus the future of the District was more assured. Thirdly, the 
announcement of the Final Award heralded new donor funds, thus facilitating the 
emergence of new NGOs in the area (an issue discussed below). On account of these 
factors, 1999 saw a peak in the number of registrations with eight organisations 
registering to work in Brcko over the course of the year. Between 2000 and 2003, a 
further eight organisations either registered or were in the latter stages of the 
registration process. A chronological assessment of the organisations will add some 
dynamism to the motivations behind, and the outcomes of, the emergence of NGOs 
in Brcko District. 
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5.4.1 NGOs Registered 1992-1998 
Organisation Date of Place of Organisation Aims Map 5.1 
registration registration (taken from the survey) Reference Point 
(see overleaf) 
Serb Sisters' 1/8/92 Bijeljina "Goals of humanitarian purpose 1 
Association based on Christian mercy of 
Serbian Church." 
Scouts' Union 11/4/95 Bijeljina "Improve the standard of life for 2 
youth." 
Paraplegics' 15/3/97 Bijeljina "To raise awareness in local 3 
Association community about needs of those 
people who are handicapped." 
Bosnljak Women's 17/7/97 Tuzla "Help women: education, material 4 
Association support. health support." 
Refugees and 1/1/98 Bijeljina "Our only goal is to resolve 5 
Displaced Persons problems of the refugee 
Association population." 
Figure 5.1 Brcko NGOs registered between 1992 and 1998 
As the table shows, five organisations registered to work in Brcko between 
1992 and 1998. The earliest registration date for an NGO is 151 August 1992 (at the 
court in Bijeljina) by the Serb Sisters' Association. The ethno-national affiliation of 
this organisation is not surprising considering how Brcko was 'ethnically cleansed' 
by Serb forces over the spring and summer of that year leaving an exclusively Serb 
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Map 5.1 Brcko town centre showing the distribution of registered NGOs 
(Source: Adapted from Cirkovic, 1999) 
population in the town. The building in which they met was a Serb cultural 
stronghold 16 in the centre of town, with seemingly the only permanent member 
ofstaff a secretary who sat in an upstairs room in front a six-foot Serbian flag. ln the 
16 
There are two reasons why this seemed to be the case, above and beyond those listed in the text. 
The first is that it was in this theatre that my research assistant recited her Serbian epic poetry (which 
is referred to in Chapter 4). The second is that the large cafe that occupies the ground floor gives its 
printed receipts in Cyrillic script, an act of a strongly Serb sympathetic business. 
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survey, the organization listed their central aims as "cherishing the traditions of the 
Serbian race" and "making sure that old traditional customs and handicrafts are not 
forgotten" while following the "humanitarian tradition of Christian mercy of the 
Serbian Church" 17 • The activities of the Serb Sisters' Association were listed as 
"visiting the old and infirm" and "organising trips to convents" 18. When I finally 
managed to attend a meeting, the pictures on the walls of their office were an 
interesting juxtaposition of Serb cultural imagery (such as St. Sava and St. Cyril) 
alongside pictures of meetings with past and present District Supervisors. While I 
expected these two positions to work in antagonism (Serb nationalism and the 
Dayton oriented OHR), their animosity was reserved only for the District 
Government with whom they have "very little contact" because "they are not very 
interested in the work ofNGOs" 19 • They also said that they felt that "they had been 
ignored by international donors because of their name", on account of the fact that 
"organisations that are not multi-ethnic are not appreciated in Brcko District"20 • 
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects to emerge from the Serb Sisters' 
survey was their answer to the question "what linkages do you have with other 
NGOs and associations?" The first organisation they listed was the Bosnijak 
Women's Association, another one of the five organisations that registered between 
1992 and 1995. Perhaps conditioned by perpetual discourses of ethnic animosity and 
subsequent clashes of entrenched nationalism, this was a link I had not expected to 
be considered most important, indeed, I thought there would be animosity between 
the two organisations. However, in discussion with the BW A this close tie was 
reiterated. The Bosnijak Women's Association seemed to have little in common 
with the Serb Sisters' Association. They met in a small nursery school in the heavily 
reconstructed Brodusa district of Brcko and began their work "helping soldiers in the 
Federation side during the war"21 • More recently they have worked to "provide 
17 
Survey of the Serb Sisters' Association, Brcko 23'd October 2002. 
18 
Survey of the Serb Sisters' Association, Brcko 23'd October 2002. 
19 
Discussion with a representative from the Serb Sisters' Association, Brcko 23'd October 2002. 
20 
Survey of the Serb Sisters' Association, Brcko 23'd October 2002. 
21 
Interview with a representative ofthe Bosnijak Women's Association, Brcko 21'1 February 2003. 
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equipment for schools" and "move towards a more project based approach"22 • 
Interestingly, the geography of these two organisations reflects the ethno-national 
division of the District following the conflict: the Serb Sisters' in the centre of Brcko 
in a building adorned with Serb flags and Orthodox iconography, the Bosnijak 
Women's Association up a gravel track on the periphery of town in what was the 
Zone of Separation. Following discussions with both the Serb Sisters' Association 
and the Bosnijak Women's Association, coupled with witnessing the organisations at 
an NGO registration meeting, the reason for their mutual support became clear. It 
seemed that both the Serb Sisters' Association and the Bosnijak Women's 
Association are both resistant to the notion of multi-ethnic identity, as espoused by 
other women's groups such as the Brcko Women's Round Table. The Serb Sisters' 
and the Bosnijak Women seek to support each other in their mutual desire for mono-
ethnicity, a situation that reflected Susan Woodward's contention that there has been 
"plenty of cooperation among leaders of the three national communities [in Bosnia] 
to keep the game going" (Woodward, 2001: 12). A perhaps more pernicious 
example of this collusion of nationalist positions is often discussed in relation to 
Tudjman and Milosevic meeting at Karadjordjevo23 to agree upon the division of 
Yugoslavia (Silber and Little, 1995: 131). 
Another organisation that registered before 1999 was the Paraplegics' 
Association24 • This NGO ran a small print shop off the main street in Brcko and 
sought to finance their organisation through the profits. Their central organisational 
aim was "trying to get society to help paraplegics"25 through a combination of direct 
action (material assistance to the mobility impaired and their families) as well as 
attempting to change government legislation to improve access for those with 
disabilities. This combination of lobbying activities coupled with (attempted) 
financial sustainability seemed to suggest that the Paraplegics' Association reflected 
the discourses of civil society as espoused by organisations such as the OHR or the 
22 
Interview with a representative of the Bosnijak Women's Association, Brcko 21" February 2003 
23 
Tito's favourite hunting villa 125km outside Belgrade (Silber and Little, 1995: 133) 
24 
The Paraplegics' Association registered on 15th March 1997 in Bijeljina. 
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OSCE (200 1, above). On this evidence I was, perhaps nai"vely, expecting to meet an 
organisation that was satisfied with its position within the network of Brcko 
institutions. However, when I went back to the organisation to collect the survey I 
had an impromptu interview with the manager who appeared extremely agitated by 
the lack of support from the Distlict Govemment. The manager showed me into his 
small office off the printing room. The electricity in Brcko had failed, and as it was 
an icy December moming we warmed up by drinking sweet Turkish coffee from 
chipped mugs. He was outraged by the injustice of the District Govemment, 
criticising the high taxes for NGOs, the bills and their level of wages saying, "the 
cleaner gets paid more than the Mayor of Venice!"26 As the final demonstration of 
govemment disinterest he remarked that they "had a Basketball toumament and the 
govemment would not even come to that!"27 The president felt that these policies 
were because they [the Govemment] "want a Westem system and fund us only from 
time to time, not on a regular basis"28 • When I asked if they had a permanent 
representative with the government the president replied: 
No, but that is fine, because we don't want to be political - we would rather work with the OHR 
as they are not political men. We are in good cooperation with the OHR, and its reduction in 
size will be a problem. 
(Interview with the Paraplegics' Association, 91h December 2002) 
These comments represent another example of the casting of 'politics' as the 
actions of the District Govemment, whilst the OHR was perceived as apolitical. 
Within the interview with the Paraplegics' Association this divide was also 
constituted as competing ideologies of 'nationalism' (the District Govemment/ 
'politics') versus 'multi-ethnicity' (OHR/ 'apolitical'). This binary seemed to have 
25 
Survey of the Paraplegics' Association, 3'd October 2002. 
26 
Interview with the President of the Paraplegics' Association, 91h December 2002. 
27 
Interview with the President of the Paraplegics' Association, 91h December 2002. 
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a number of effects, as NGOs sought to avoid connections to the State (District 
Government) in favour of forging links with international organisations. In this 
way, the geopolitical position of international organisations (such as the 01-IR or 
OSCE) is masked by discursive 'neutrality'. 
The fourth organisation to register before 1999 was surveyed by mistake. My 
research assistant and I were looking for the Serb Sisters' Association in the area 
above the theatre in the centre of town; they had not arrived for another weekly 
meeting. We wandered through to the secretary (with the Serbian flag) in the 
adjacent room. In the large office sat a group of five men, smoking heavily and 
drinking Jelen Pivo29 They had been there the first time we had visited, though we 
had thought nothing of it- they were certainly not the Serb Sisters' Association and 
groups of men sitting around drinking and smoking were not rare in Brcko. 
However, on this visit the secretary asked why we did not want to survey them. One 
of the men looked round and agreed: "Yes, why don't you survey us? We are an 
NG0"30. So we gave them a survey, which was returned later thoroughly completed. 
They were the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons and their main aim 
was "the carrying out of Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement"31 • Annex 7 relates to 
displaced persons and refugees stating that "[a ]ll refugees and displaced persons 
have the right freely to return to their homes of origin" (OHR, 2000a: 51). They 
stated that they have "office problems" and they are currently meeting in the kafani 
penzionera (pensioners' cafe). They were also keen to state their autonomy, making 
it clear that they "do not look for donations"32 • 
The final organisation to register before 1998 was the Scouts Union, 
registering on 11th April 1995 in Bijeljina. Their responses in the survey were brief, 
citing that they sought to "improve the standard of life for youth" though their work 
28 Interview with the President of the Paraplegics' Association, 9th December 2002. 
29 
Literally translated 'Deer Beer', a lager brewed outside Belgrade. 
30 
From field journal 28th September 2002. 
31 
Survey of the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Brcko 4th October 2002. 
32 
Survey of the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Brcko 4th October 2002. 
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was hampered by "financial problems"33 • These rather abstract responses gave little 
impression of the working of this organisation, though their survey did act as an 
introduction to another international coordination initiative (in addition to the OHR 
NGO coordination meetings). The leader of the Scouts Union, Vlado Mihajlovic, 
was also the chair of the OSCE sponsored YCB. This perhaps explains why he 
suggested that the Scouts Union enjoyed cooperation with "all the organisations of 
Brcko District"34 • 
A unifying facet of all five organisations that registered before 1999 was a 
poor relationship with the District Government, variously suggesting that "the 
government has a negative view of associations"35, "[we have] no cooperation with 
the government"36 or "the government of Brcko District are not very interested in the 
work of NG0s"37 • Views concerning international organisations were more 
positive, suggesting that "the EU wants to help us"38 , "we have good communication 
with the OHR and OSCE through projects and seminars"39 and "the OHR appreciates 
our work"40 • The international organisations would perhaps respond that this points 
to their progressive attitude towards NGOs, or a more cynical critique may be that 
NGOs do not wish to 'bite the hand that feeds'. While either may be in part true, I 
would suggest there is a more historically embedded reason for these polarised 
v1ews. Four out of the five organisations are continuations (or, in some cases 
'reinventions') of associations that had existed prior to the conflict in Brcko. The 
only exception is the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons. These four 
have experienced a paradigm shift in relations with the government. As Pusic 
(1975) points out, the Yugoslav government had formerly provided funds for these 
organisations as part of the constitutional reform of 1974 (Pusic, 1975: 138). This 
33 
Survey of the Scouts Union Brcko 15th October 2002. 
34 
Survey of the Scouts Union, Brcko 15th October 2002. 
35 
Survey of the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Brcko 4th October 2002. 
36 
Survey of the Paraplegics' Association, Brcko 3'd October 2002. 
37 
Survey of the Serb Sisters' Association, Brcko 23'd October 2002. 
38 
Survey of the Paraplegics' Association, Brcko 3'd October 2002. 
39 
Intetview with a representative of the Bosnijak Women's Association, Brcko 21st February 2003. 
40 Survey of the Serb Sisters' Association, Brcko 23rd October 2002. 
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initiative was part of expanding worker self-management and devolution of 
centralised power. Certain government competencies, such as taxation and analysing 
infrastructural need, were devolved to Mjesne Zajednice ('Local Communities') 
though social and cultural welfare issues were encouraged through specific 
associations and including the, already established, Scouts (or 'Young Pioneers' as 
they were known). 
Brcko District Government has, however, been designed on a "western 
system", as the Paraplegics' Association termed it. This approach has heralded a 
new era of the neo-liberal 'small government' approach, reflected in the discourse of 
privatisation and advocated by advisors such as the District Management Team, 
where little finance is left within the District Government for these 'low priority' or 
'soft' social cultural welfare organisations. As such, the District Government is 
perceived by these associations to be 'failing' in its responsibilities, when in fact it is 
'succeeding', only the criteria of success have changed. The consequence of this 
altered institutional commitment from the District Government to the associations is, 
as these five organisations varyingly attest, the reconfiguration of institutional 
relations where intergovernmental organisations (such as the OHR, OSCE or EU) 
are perceived as providing vital funding and support. In this way, local networks of 
support and regulation are sidelined by these re-emergent NGOs (or reconfigured 
associations), in preference for transnational organisations who appear to be more 
supportive of their objectives. While autonomy from the state is lauded as a quality 
of civil society, these NGOs seem to be forming closer ties with the improvised state, 
while losing trust in the capabilities of the District Government. This process has 
assisted in reifying the notion of NGOs as 'foreign organisations' operating in 
Brcko. The consequences of this labelling will be explored through an examination 
ofNGOs that emerged following the declaration of the Final Award. 
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5.4.2 NGOs Registered 1999~2003 
Organisation Date of Place of Organisation Aims Map 5.1 
registration registration (taken from the survey) Reference 
Point 
Firefly Youth 12/3/99 Bijeljina "Reconciliation between different ethnic 6 
Project groups through various activities." 
Proni 29/5/99 Bijeljina "Promote cooperation and communication 7 
between people of all backgrounds and to 
foster people to take their own initiative." 
Lace Roma 1/6/99 Bijeljina "Help the homeless. Try and improve utilities 8 
like water, roads, lighting, and telephones." 
Vermont Youth 9/6/99 Bijeljina "Improvement of young people's situation, 9 
Association protection and promotion of rights of 
children and youth." 
Centre for 26/6/99 Bijeljina "Creating conditions for respecting people's 10 
Information and rights in accordance with international 
Legal Help conventions." 
Serbian Youth 8/7/99 Bijeljina "Development of cultural and spiritual 11 
Association identity." 
BUM (Brcanska 1/8/99 Orasje "Improving the conditions for youth in 12 
Udruga Mladlh) Brcko." 
Women's Round 31/12/99 Bijeljina "Strengthening peace and trust amongst 13 
Table people, strengthening the economic position 
of women in society and the protection of 
women." 
EKO (Ekolosko 13/4/00 Bijeljina "Organising courses on ecological issues 14 
Udruzenje Mladih) and preserving man's [sic] environment in 
order to raise awareness of its significance" 
EKI Micro Credit 117/00 Bijeljina "Providing micro credit to farmers and small 15 
businesses in Brcko District." 
St. Sava's Youth 21/10/02 Brcko "Cherishing national, cultural and spiritual 16 
Association identity." 
Anti-Terrorist In Process Brcko "Reduce terrorism in every way." 17 
Organisation 'Baza' 
Youth Association In Process Brcko "Education of young people in Brcko DC in 18 
Grcica area of drugs, aids, prostitution, criminal, 
domestic violence." 
Figure 5.2 Brcko NGOs registered between 1999 and 2003 
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Similar to the organisations registered from 1992 to 1998, those that 
registered from 1999 to 2003 seemed to be struggling to play to role of 'civil 
society'. Following the signing of the Final Award there was an increase in donor 
funding to Brcko. Not only was the future of the District now more certain, but also 
the multi-ethnic outcome was approved of by many donors (ICG, 2003: i). 
American donor organisations such as USAID or USDA favoured Brcko on account 
of the American District Supervisor retaining close control over District Government 
decision-making (ICG, 2003: 28). In addition, the close administration of economic 
reform by groups such as Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) and PADC041 acted 
to allay the fears of donors over potential corruption. As evidence of this changing 
donor climate, in September 2000 the UNDP announced a two-year Brcko Local 
Action Programme (BLAP) with a budget of just under $1.9 million dollars, which 
included a $278 000 fund earmarked for 'community development' to which NGOs 
could apply (UNDP, 2001: 31). Brcko was chosen as a site for such a regional 
development programme (there are only four such sites in Bosnia42) on account of its 
"multi -ethnic" character and the reconstruction necessary following the conflict43 • In 
another example of the shifting donor climate in Brcko, the German government 
development agency GTZ ( Gesellschaft for Technische Zusammenarbeit) began 
investigating potential funding strategies in Brcko for youth NGOs in January 2001. 
This initiative led to the establishment of the Local Youth Council (Lokal 
Omladinski Vlada) and, in conjunction with the District Government and an 
international youth NGO, the building of a youth centre in Brcko. 
By drawing on two case-study NGOs that registered in this period the effects 
of the shift from 'emergency' to 'transition' begin to come to light. Firefly Youth 
Project and Proni were the first two organisations to register following the Final 
Award, though these organisations had both been working in Brcko before 
41 Like DAI, PADCO (Planning and Development Collaborative International) is a Washington based 
development consultancy firm. They took over the USAID contract for the District Management 
Group in 2002. 
42 The other UNDP Area Based Development (ABO) projects in Bosnia are located in Posavina, 
Srebrenica, and the central Bosnian canton (UNDP, 2004). 
43 Interview with UNDP BLAP Programme Manager, Brcko 181h February 2003. 
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completing their formal registration. These organisations were both working in the 
field of youth reconciliation and though they had not worked within the humanitarian 
relief effo11 during the conflict, they felt the effects of public attitudes towards 
NGOs. In particular, they felt that NGOs were perceived by the Brcko public as 
'international' and providing good employment opportunities. In addition they felt 
that the title 'NGO' served to recast political engagement away from working with 
the District Government and towards the international agencies within the 
improvised state. 
Firefly Youth Project is an inter-ethnic reconciliation NGO that worked out 
of an office in central Brcko as well conducting outreach workshops in the suburbs 
of Brodusa, Dizdarusa and schools in central Brcko. Firefly was established by a 
student from Edinburgh University who had worked in Mladi Most ('Youth Bridge') 
a similar NGO in Mostar. When she explained how she chose Brcko as the location 
for an NGO she alluded to the nexus between media attention and humanitarian 
action, an issue discussed earlier in the chapter. She felt that the spotlight had been 
placed on certain 'talismanic' areas of Bosnia in the media, which had consequently 
attracted the greatest NGO attention: 
Where I was working in Mostar before there were hundreds of organisations working with 
young people - so it actually started to feel irrelevant - there wasn't any point to doing 
anything more in Mostar. But in Brcko, even if you did something and it didn't work out, at 
least you would be doing something that no one else was doing so you wouldn't be in 
competition with other groups. 
(Representative from Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 151h September 2002) 
While international donors and NGOs ignored Brcko in the immediate post-war 
period, the Firefly representative remarked on the shift in attention following the 
declaration of 'District Status' following the Final Award. In acknowledging that 
this funding had provided opportunities for greater NGO action, she also speculated 
on possible negative aspects to this new donor environment: 
175 
Chapter 5 L . oml Geopolitits 
Back in the good old days when Brcko was ignored there was this thing early on that there 
were only a few organisations working here and no one had very much money people did 
club together a lot more - like Proni and Firefly - and all these groups shared resources and 
made a real effort to work together. [ ... ] I think there has been too much money pumped into 
Brcko indiscriminately as a result of it becoming a District. Having said that people I know 
say Brcko is really amazing because it is a place that has become multiethnic following the 
conflict at an institutional level, at every level. 
(Representative from Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 151h September 2002) 
From 1997 to 2003, Firefly has run projects in theatre skills, art, English 
language, photography, Roma education and magazine production. It has also 
organised summer camps on the Croatian coast for children from Brcko and 
coordinated a summer arts festival in Brcko town. In the survey, Firefly 
representatives said that they did not have formal contacts with any other NGOs, and 
that they only had contact with the District Government "if we need permission for 
something, we don't ask for money"44 • They did not find the OHR, or other 
international organisations, very useful to their work because they felt that "no one 
listens any more [ ... ] quick changeover of staff [in the OHR] means that you are 
constantly introducing yourself'45 • These responses point to a new chronological 
understanding ofNGO work in Brcko. For the Firefly representatives the declaration 
of the Final Award, and its associated improved funding opportunities, had disrupted 
a previously charismatic working environment. The increased funding opportunities 
had reportedly bureaucratised the skills required to carry out work and had led to a 
struggle between individuals and organisations to gain funding and legitimacy. 
As detailed in Chapter 2, I had worked as a UK coordinator for Firefly 1999-
2000 and my job had been to help implement the first year of a three-year Diana 
Princess of Wales Memorial Trust Fund (DPWMTF) grant. When the grant 
proposal had been written, the arbitration process in Brcko had yet to be resolved, 
44 Survey of Firefly Youth Project, Brcko I 6th September 2002. 
45 Survey of Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 161h September 2002. 
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though a central aspect of the rationale for the funding was the 'unique' facet of 
Brcko as 'a contested area of Bosnia' 46 . The grant was directed towards localising 
the organisation, leaving a smaller, but self-sustainable, operation carrying out 
activities and workshops for young people from all ethnic backgrounds. This grant 
period, lasting from September 1999 to September 2002, was concluding at the start 
of the fieldwork in Brcko. The organisation continued to rely on money sent from 
the UK for its core costs (the rent of the building and the wages for the two full-time 
members of staff), though it had managed to gain some revenue through charging for 
English language lessons. According to the Project Manager, one of the central 
difficulties in localising the organisation lay with the attitudes of potential 
'volunteers' who demanded high wages for working for an 'international' NGO. 
She felt that this was a problem that had been inherited from the role of international 
organisations: 
There is a problem and the Intemational Organisations [lOs ], it is their fault. When they 
came [to Brcko] they offered so much to young people, free trips, seminars, people in NGOs 
and IOs they gave them money for projects and they taught them how to steal money. The 
truth is that so many projects [pause] you know when you get money for projects then you 
always give receipts for the money, it is sad but it happens a lot and it happened in Firefly. 
And they had good wages. And now, when there is not so much money, there is not so much 
donors, young people don't want to work for small money. They don't want to work for free 
and that is not an option. Or they don't want to work at all. But if they want to work the first 
question they will ask is "how much money will I get?" Not first question "how can I help?". 
(Programme Manager Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 2ih March 2003) 
These experiences were echoed by Proni, the second organisation to register 
m 1999. Like Firefly, Proni specialised in youth reconciliation work, though the 
organisation was much larger with offices across the Former Yugoslavia. I had 
experience of this NGO outside the research process, through both my work with 
46 Comments taken from the 'background' section of the Firefly Grant proposal to the DPWMTF, 
written in early 1999. 
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Firefly (with whom Proni collaborates, in patiicular through the Local Youth 
Council) and as Proni provided language tuition over the course of the fieldwork. 
The organisation arrived in Brcko in late 1998 (though registered formerly in May 
1999) and drawing on expertise gained from working in Croatia and Yugoslavia 
(now Serbia and Montenegro) it established its first field centres in Bosnia in Gornji 
Rahic and Brcko town (see Map 5.1). By splitting their activities between two 
offices on either side of the inter-entity boundary line, Proni was one of the first 
organisations to be carrying out cross-border work in Brcko following the conflict47 • 
However, in 2001 the two Proni offices merged and the organisation opened a new 
joint youth centre in Brcko town. This move reflected the improved freedom of 
movement in Brcko District that followed the declaration of the Final Award, as 
Bosnijak and Croat staff and benefactors were considered safe to travel into central 
Brcko to attend the NGO. At the time of the survey Proni had core funding from the 
Swedish Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)48 , and this paid for seven 
fulltime members of staff, three vehicles, and a large office and youth centre in 
central Brcko. Their main aim was listed as "to encourage personal development 
through social education"49 , and this was achieved through accredited higher 
education courses, exchange visits abroad, the running of a youth centre in Brcko 
(with plans to open others in villages across the District) and mine and drug 
awareness projects50• 
Proni shared Firefly's objective of localising their operation m Brcko. 
Registering the organisation in Bijeljina comprised the first part of this strategy, as 
the control over the management of the project gradually shifted from Sweden to 
staff in Brcko. Despite this process, which was ongoing at the time of the fieldwork, 
the organisation was still overseen by frequent visits from the Belgrade-based 
47 A number of organisations claimed to be the 'first NGO to carry out cross border reconciliation 
work in Brcko' over the course of the fieldwork. Through an examination of Proni evaluation reports 
and personal testimonies it seems that this organisation has a strong claim to the title (see Hugo, 
2001). 
48 They also applied for individual project funding to other donors, for example their mine awareness 
project was funded by the Japanese Embassy in Sarajevo. 
49 Survey with Proni, Brcko 191h November 2003. 
50 Survey with Proni, Brcko 191h November 2003. 
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Regional Coordinator who had the responsibility to supervise all the Proni projects 
in Bosnia and half of Serbia and Montenegro. [t was during an interview with the 
Regional Coordinator, sunounded by scouting tents in an upstairs room of the Proni 
youth centre, that she discussed the problems that a well-funded international NGO 
faced when attempting to 'localise' and be accepted by local NGOs: 
AJ: What has it been like working in Brcko as an international organisation alongside local 
organisations? 
ML: That is such a big problem. Well, I should say, I perceived it as such a big problem and 
people said it to me all the time. But the interesting thing is that now the organisation is 
registered locally, we have a local project manager and when you are here you will very 
rarely see any international presence [ ... ] there are not so many internationals coming to the 
project and, other than me, working. But still Isadora [the local project coordinator] was 
getting really strong rejection and then when we asked people it was because 'Oh, you have 
got money, all the rest of us are struggling'. So all along it was about having money, and 
people really resented the fact that the organisation had money. 
(extract from interview with Proni Regional Coordinator, Brcko ih May 2003) 
The experiences of Proni and Firefly point to the difficulties faced by NGOs 
m Brcko as their role during the conflict has acted as a barrier to effective 
'localisation'. Rather than acting as foci for civic participation, as the discourses of 
civil society may indicate, the NGOs could not become embedded in local networks 
as they were conceived as 'new', 'international' and 'wealthy'. These characteristics 
served to impede these NGOs' ability to recruit volunteers, which according to the 
UNDP a key facet of developing associationallife: 
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volunteering plays a significant pat1 in the welfare and progress of industrialised countries 
and is the basis of much of the activity of non-govemmental organisations ... By focussing on 
voluntary behaviour, the intemational community has an opportunity to reinforce the means 
and capacities of people from all parts of society to engage in civic activities to benefit their 
nations, their communities and themselves. 
(UNDP, 1999: 2-3) 
This volunteerism was not evident in Brcko. Working in an NGO in Brcko 
was viewed as one of the best employment opportunities outside the government. 
While academic and policy texts are often keen to show how NGOs are staffed by 
voluntary workers, the case in Brcko was one of struggles between skilled 
individuals to gain employment in these organisations. Rather than a voluntarism 
outlook, lucrative employment was often seen as a defining feature of NGOs in 
Brcko: 
[i]f l say to someone I am working in an NGO, if I say only that...I didn't say it was an 
intemational NGO, they just say 'Ooh you have good salary' How do you know that? And 
they say "well, everyone who is in that kind of organisation have good salaries". Well 
maybe I don't "no, no, no, you can eam as much as you want". So that is the opinion of all 
people: that people who are in NGOs want to earn money, not to help people. 
(Counterpart Official 'B', Brcko, 22nd May 2003) 
The head of the OSCE mission in Brcko supported this view, suggesting that 
"the NGO sector has been founded by external means[ ... ] so for local people it has 
been a new phenomenon and it has been greeted with a lot of suspicion"5 1• This 
novelty was reflected in the comments from the Proni Regional Coordinator, as she 
51 Interview with OSCE Head of Mission, Brcko 17th October 2002. 
180 
Chapter 5 Local Geopolitics 
felt that the term 'NGO' was not helping the organisations to forge connections with 
other organisations and the District Govemment: 
We were really interested in doing some work that was kind of 'let's just get the message out 
there as to what the role of an NGO is'. Because I got the feeling that it is a word that has been 
adopted, an English word that has been adopted, in the same way as we use 'social education', 
which means either: you don't have to tu m up, because when it is translated into local language 
it has the impression that it is infonnal so that if you don't tum up it doesn't matter, or else it 
means it is completely against the principals of leaming, so I was like we need to find new 
words to actually describe what we are doing. And I was saying to her this 'NGO' has been 
adopted as a title but 'non governmental organisation' is not a concept that exists and maybe 
we should have been looking back to the communist system and the words that were used 
under the Communist system because at least they have some recognition in the minds of 
people. 
(Proni Regional Coordinator, Brcko ih May 2003) 
According to a Proni project officer, this novelty of NGOs was limiting their 
political engagement. He remarked that the term 'NGO' sounded "strange, like anti-
govemment organisation"52 • He suspected that this influences the govemment's 
attitude towards NGOs: "they [the govemment] think it [NGOs] is something against 
the country, against the govemment"53 • On account of this 'anti-govemmental' 
emphasis, 'politics' was recast by the NGO workers interviewed as the activities of 
the govemment (as opposed to political parties) and thus 'being political' was 
defined as working in conjunction with the govemment. This echoes the attitude of 
the Paraplegics' Association, when they discussed the competing ideologies of 
'nationalism' (the District Govemment/ 'politics') versus 'multi-ethnicity' (OHR/ 
'apolitical'). This point was further illustrated during the dissemination event in 
Brcko, after a suggestion that part of being an NGO was being non-political. One 
NGO member said that he knew an NGO in Croatia that helped with election 
52 Interview with Proni Project Officer, Brcko 22"d April 2003. 
53 
Interview with Proni Project Officer, Brcko 22"d April 2003. 
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monitoring, remarking "how much more political can you get?!"54 Interestingly, the 
notion that NGOs should set themselves at a distance from the functioning of the 
District Government in order to retain a non-political status acts in direct 
contradiction to the desire of the Supervisor who, in casting democracy as 
transparency of the agencies of government, perceived that effective NGOs should 
be monitoring the decision making processes. 
The experiences of Firefly and Proni undetmine Korten's (1990) 'three 
generations of NGO activity', a model that in its failure to take into account public 
or institutional memory does not represent the experiences of the NGOs in Brcko. 
The notion of NGOs as "wealthy and external" is a sharp contrast to policy 
prescriptions casting them as agents of civil society. It is difficult to think of a place 
for lucrative employment opportunities within the assertion that NGOs are acting as 
voluntary spaces of civic participation and political engagement. Instead, this 
process of transformation highlights how the term 'NGO' has 'travelled' (Said, 
1983: 226) from its position within the discourses of intergovernmental 
organisations to its use in post-conflict Brcko. While theorists and policy makers 
have sought to link NGOs to civil society, the origins of NGOs in Brcko appear to 
provoke different connotations. Rather than suggesting an autonomous sphere of 
citizen activity, keen to represent the marginalised and voice basic needs, the term 
NGO evokes an image of wealth and international connection. The evidence from 
the case studies of Firefly and Proni demonstrate how the NGOs in Brcko have 
struggled with this image of financial security as it has acted as a barrier to 
volunteerism while redefining what it was to 'be political'. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The effects of the geopolitical framing of Bosnia as a 'humanitarian disaster' 
continue to be felt on the local scale in post-conflict Brcko District. The 
humanitarian effort established NGOs in Bosnia as well-financed, internationally 
54 Comment from NGO worker at the Fieldwork Dissemination Event, Brcko 20th March 2003. 
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connected organisations. In the post-conflict period, these international artefacts 
have been re-branded by the District Supervisor as evidence of a fledgling civil 
society, a set of organisations which can hold the Brcko District Government to 
account through the transparent performances of democracy. This representative 
strategy has created a paradox: while NGOs are perceived as acting as civil society, 
embedded in local social networks and acting as loci of civic participation, their 
history and transnational connections ensure that they are perceived by Brcko 
citizens as wealthy and international. This paradox challenges the teleological 
narratives charting NGO evolution as suggested by Korten (1990). The situation in 
Brcko is more blurred and nuanced than these models as public and institutional 
memory continues to reproduce NGOs as international organisations. 
This paradox also draws attention to the contested nature of the division 
between the state and civil society. The NGOs surveyed in Brcko were not "holding 
the state to account", but rather saw the District Government as unhelpful and 
ineffective while attempting to forge closer links with the agencies of the improvised 
state. By moving away from conceiving of the state as an identifiable institution and 
exposing its improvised nature in Brcko, the state/civil society binary becomes 
blurred. The NGOs saw relationships with international organisations as assisting 
institutional survival through funding and other forms of assistance. It is these 
processes through which NGOs are valued, reproduced and rendered visible that will 
be examined in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Gentrifying civil 
society: 
The dual paradox of 
NGOs in Brcko 
District 
This chapter addresses a dual paradox within the NGO sector in post-conflict 
Brcko District. In the last chapter, the shifting role of NGOs in Bosnia was 
examined, as they moved from actors within an international humanitarian effort 
during the conflict, to representatives of 'civil society' in the post-conflict period. By 
drawing on material from the NGO survey, it was argued that this transition has 
resulted in NGOs being perceived by the Brcko public and the organisations 
themselves as wealthy and international, while donors and the OHR have cast NGOs 
as locally embedded and representing the Brcko grassroots as agents of civil society. 
This chapter will expand on this 'snapshot' by engaging with more qualitative and 
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ethnographic field material in an attempt to examine the causes of this first paradox. 
Using the work of Piene Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1989, 1990), I will argue that NGOs 
represent 'gentrified' civil society. Building on the common conception of civil 
society as a space between the family and the state or the state and the market, the 
metaphor of gentrification highlights the accumulation and circulation of particular 
forms of capital in the organisations of civil society. By viewing gentrification in 
these terms, the process is conceived less as merely economic, and more as a cultural 
process, governed by economic considerations with political consequences. This 
process of social gentrification thus ensures that ce11ain organisations are reproduced 
and made visible within economic and social reform following the conflict in Brcko, 
while other organisations are rendered 'invisible'. The second part of the dual 
paradox stems from this invisibility. While organisations such as the former 
Yugoslav Mjesne Zajednice (Local Communities) are acting as key outlets of civic 
participation and representation in practice, they do not conespond with the 
symbolic values of civil society as prescribed by the District Government and OHR. 
Consequently such 'ungentrified' organisations have been marginalised in terms of 
donor funding and have been ignored in formal processes ofNGO coordination. 
This assessment of the dual paradox of the NGO sector in Brcko allows a 
number of tentative conclusions to be drawn. The first involves the measures of 
success that are applied to NGOs in Brcko. The analysis in this thesis suggests that 
the valorization of NGOs is an activity carried out by the OHR in conjunction with 
other international actors, as they specify the particular exchange values of the 
reserves of cultural, social and economic capital held by the NGOs. The second 
conclusion is that any study of NGOs in post-conflict environments must look 
beyond the gentrified institutional architecture and examine what other organisations 
are active although written-out of formal policy scripts and processes of 
international intervention. This, in turn, leads to a third argument, that by adopting 
the conceptual tools of Piene Bourdieu, a flexible approach to the social production 
of NGOs can be developed, one that is attuned to the compromises, improvisations 
and adaptations that shape the role of civil society in post-conflict environments. 
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6.2 Gentrification as Capital Accumulation 
Within geographical literature, gentrification is most commonly used to 
explain the process of capital accumulation in particular locations within the urban 
landscape (Lees 2000; Redfem, 2003; Philips, 2004). In drawing on the metaphor of 
gentrification, this chapter retains a focus on capital accumulation, though examines 
this process in the context of the social landscape. Using Bourdieu's (1984) notion 
of social and cultural capital, this metaphor helps describe how NGOs represent 
'gentrified civil society', wealthy in tetms of social and cultural resources, while 
other associations that lack capital remain 'ungentrified'. 
For Bourdieu, the economic metaphor of capital highlights "the struggle (or 
competition) for scarce goods for which the universe is the site" (Bourdieu, 1987: 3). 
He continues: 
[The] [ ... ] fundamental social powers are, according to my empirical observations, firstly 
economic capital, in its various kinds; secondly cultural capital [ ... ], again in its various 
kinds and thirdly two forms of capital that are very strongly correlated, social capital, which 
consists of resources based on connections and group membership, and symbolic capital, 
which is the form the different forms of capital take once they are perceived and recognised 
as legitimate. 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 3-4 original emphasis) 
One ofBourdieu's key insights was that each form of capital could be converted into 
other forms (Painter, 2000: 244), though with varying degrees of difficulty 
(Calhoun, 1993: 69). Bourdieu conceived symbolic capital as the most influential as 
"it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a 
position to impose recognition" (Bourdieu, 1989: 23). Crucially, a key aspect of this 
power is control over other forms of capital, managing their conversion and 
exchange rates (Engler, 2003: 449). As discussed in Chapter 4, this type of capital 
has been referred to as 'statist capital', as it is the state that has the legitimacy to 
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confer value on certain activities, whilst devaluing others (Engler, 2003). By 
viewing social and political practices in terms of capital privileges neither structure 
nor agency: individuals can exercise their agency, but are still constrained (or 
enabled) by their reserves of social, cultural and economic capital (Bridge, 2001 ). 
This concept of a 'soft-structure' permeates the work of Bourdieu, as he 
attempts to construct a theory of practice that overcomes the theoretical oppositions 
between binaries such as subjectivism and objectivism; particularism and 
universalism, and agency and structure. Central to this objective are Bourdieu's 
notions of habitus and field. Bourdieu describes habitus as "a system of durable, 
transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, 
objectively unified practices" (Bourdieu, 1979: 11 ). For Painter (2000) this makes 
habitus a "mediating link between objective social structures and individual action 
and refers to the embodiment in individual actors of a system of norms, 
understandings and patterns of behaviour, which, while not wholly determining 
action [ ... ] do ensure that individuals are more disposed to act in some ways rather 
than others" (Painter, 2000: 242). What appears critical is that habitus functions 
below the level of consciousness and language, "beyond the reach of introspective 
scrutiny or control by will" (Bourdieu, 1984: 466). In this way, habitus has been 
understood as both "the social inscribed on the body of the individual" (Cresswell, 
2002: 381) and "the regulated source of improvisations" (Calhoun, 1993: 78). In 
addition, Engler (2003) points to the reflexivity of habitus as it is both "structured 
by, and structuring, each individual social position" (Engler, 2003: 450). 
In contrast to the embodied and tacit nature of habitus, Bourdieu's notion of 
field is a more grounded conceptual tool. Bourdieu sees the social world as divided 
into a series of fields, each of which constituted a site of a struggle over a particular 
form of capital (Harker, 1990: 97). As Painter (2000) points out, this concept 
mediates Bourdieu's other theoretical devices as individual actors bring to the field 
both the embodied disposition of the habitus and their stocks of accumulated capital 
(Painter, 2000: 245). As with habitus, Bourdieu was keen to demonstrate that each 
field was dynamic, as struggles are not only over forms of capital but also over the 
power to define the field itself (Postone et al., 1993: 6). The actions of individuals 
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within the field are guided by 'strategy', which again breaks with subjectivist and 
objectivist thinking in viewing decision making as neither conscious, nor calculated, 
nor mechnically determined (Mahar et al., 1990: 17). Instead, strategy is the intuitive 
product of "a practical sense of a particular social game" (Cresswell, 2002: 380). 
This rhetoric of 'feel for the game' has drawn similarities in some quatters between 
Bourdieu's notion of strategy and rational actor theory (RAT) (Painter, 2000: 245; 
Bridge, 2001: 209). Bourdieu, however, rejects RAT as part of a wider aversion to 
subjectivism (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 118). RAT is dismissed as an overly 
economistic approach to life, without an appreciation of how actors are disposed to 
make certain decisions to maximize capital while guided by the logic of the habitus. 
Rather than reducing the causes of gentrification to simply structure or 
agency, the deployment of Bourdieu 's concepts of capital, field and habitus invoke 
the complex patterns of power that interact to gentrify civil society. In particular, 
two interlinked fields can be identified in Brcko that act as arenas for struggles over 
capital. The first of these fields is the relationship between donors and NGOs. As a 
consequence of the funding situation in Brcko, a select group of gentrified 
organisations, wealthy in social and cultural capital terms, have emerged in the post-
conflict period as recognised representatives of civil society. This process is 
described in terms of 'autonomisation' and 'homogenisation'. While autonomy is 
often embraced as a positive characteristic of civil society, the field of donor funding 
autonomises the organisations from each other, while binding them in closer 
relationships with institutions of authority. Furthermore, through the system of 
funding the gentrified NGOs are homogenised into a uniform 'cultural community' 
exhibiting shared cultural and behavioural traits 1• 
The second field is formed by the regulation of civil society by agencies of 
the state. This process has compounded the role of donors by valourizing particular 
traits as representative of civil society and bureaucratising these through legislation. 
While this could be interpreted as the impact of structure on the agency of NGOs, 
the ethnographic material from Brcko describes how this process is mutually 
1 This conception of habitus is drawn from Podmore's (1998) insights concerning loft living in 
Montreal. 
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constituted between the state and the NGOs as they operate to enable gentrification 
of selected organisations exhibiting specific traits. The final section of the chapter 
explores those organisations of civil society that have not gentrified, either as they 
lack capital or because they are unclassifiable within the symbolic landscape of 
international intervention. Paradoxically, it is these agencies which continue to act 
as loci of civil participation, outside the gentrifying gaze of official discourses and 
practices of international intervention in post-conflict Brcko. 
6.3 Donors Demands 
The first of the two fields that will be considered in this chapter is that of the 
relationship between NGOs and donors. With the increased popularity of NGOs as 
agents of international development has come an associated academic literature 
examining the role of donors in shaping NGO agendas. Recent scholarship has 
examined the strategies through which donors "set the agenda" (Mawdsley et al., 
2002) or the situations in which the relationship between donors and NGOs can 
become "too close for comfort" (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). In this respect, 
questions of conditionality have been raised as donor priorities have been seen by 
some to take precedent over needs emerging from the NGOs themselves or their 
constituent communities (Boyce, 2002; Evans-Kent, 2002; Evans-Kent and Bleiker, 
2003). In addition to shaping the activities of NGOs, a number of authors have 
focused on the 'unintended outcomes' of donor relationships on patterns of 
governance. In particular, this work has suggested that funding relationships have 
spread bureaucratic state power in the developing world, as NGOs are enrolled as 
instruments of neo-liberal governmentality (Ferguson, 1992; Bryant, 2002). These 
claims have, however, attracted criticism as authors suggest that such perspectives 
divert attention from the complexity of development policy as institutional practice 
(Mosse, 2003:45). Mosse (2003) continues: 
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Policy goals and their project instruments never encode a unity of interests. They are the 
result of complex negotiations over meaning, and as such are very much part of the wider 
social life and politics of development organisations that need to be explored 
ethnographically. [ ... ] [T]here is a need to pay more attention to the development projects, 
organisations and professionals which frame and control policy ideas. 
(Mosse, 2003: 45) 
There have been ethnographic attempts to engage with the relationship 
between donors and NGOs. Through an illuminating case-study of donor projects in 
Indonesia, Tania Murray Li (1999) draws on the notion of 'compromise' to point to 
the necessity of exploring the ways in which meanings and outcomes are negotiated 
between donors and NGOs, while at the same time acknowledging that they operate 
within an uneven field of power (Murray Li, 1999: 297). How ell (2000) employs a 
similar approach in an examination of the role of donors in shaping NGOs in China. 
She suggests that instead of clear needs assessments it is issues of "charisma, 
command of the English language, social ease with westerners and class" which 
have all been important influences on donor choice of partner NGOs and individuals 
(Howell, 2000: 12). In the case of Brcko both notions of compromise and the 
influence of particular cultural traits can be explored through an examination of the 
circulation and struggle over social and cultural capital. 
By way of an overview, the funding strategies of the NGOs in Brcko were 
extremely diverse. As shown in Figure 6.1 (overleaf), of the eighteen NGOs 
surveyed, eleven were funded by international organisations, two were funded by 
agencies within Brcko and five were self- or un-funded. Of the eleven organisations 
funded by international agencies, four had received project funding from the EU, 
while the remaining seven had received money from the UNDP, the Swedish 
International Development Agency, the Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Trust 
Fund, Word Vision, the Japanese Embassy, Mercy Corps and the United States 
Department of Agriculture. In addition to the different donor organisations, the scale 
of funding commitments also varied, with one-off project funding for all four EU 
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grants and the grants from the Japanese Embassy and the UNDP. The five 
remaining organisations were all funding relationships of three-years or more, as 
they constituted local branches of international organisations or, as with the case of 
the Mercy Corps funded organisation, they were a field office that had recently 
' localised ' though retained financial links to their head office. The two locally 
funded organisations were both Serb youth organisations (St. Sava' s Youth 
Association and the Serbian Youth Association) and both received donations from 
the RS Ministry for Sport and Youth, which retained an office in the centre of 
Brcko. The organisations that were classified ' self- or un-funded ' functioned sole ly 
through voluntary staff or through undisclosed donations from their membership 
base. 
Locally 
Funded , 2 
Figure 6.1 Funding Sources of NGOs in Brcko District, October 2002 
(Source: NGO Survey) 
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This kind of quantitative overview, often found in intergovernmental reports 
(see UNDP, 2001), masks the competition for donor funding that permeates the 
NGO sector in Brcko. The use of neat categories to organise the varied financial 
positions of the Brcko NGOs sanitises and homogenises what is a messy and 
dynamic scenario. Rather than reproducing these categories, this chapter will 
examine the effect of structures of donor funding through the struggles initiated by 
NGOs over cultural and social capital. In doing so it is possible to sketch a habitus 
of donor funding, whereby NGOs are disposed to act in certain ways as they seek to 
invest capital in order to 'gentrify', and become visible and 'classifiable' to the 
agencies that govern Brcko District. At the same time, the demands of donors, while 
structuring NGO procedures, were flexible and reformulated by these experiences. 
In this way, the gentrification of NGOs is neither seen as 'fixed' nor a product of 
either structure or agency, but as an outcome of the prevailing habitus. 
One key area of variation that is often overlooked in quantitative studies is 
temporality, as brief 'snapshots' fix in time the existence of NGOs. In contrast, ten 
months of fieldwork allowed an examination of the role of project-cycles in 
governing the activities of the NGOs in Brcko. As remarked by Sampson ( 1996), it 
appears that the agreed unit into which of NGO activity is divided is 'the project' 
(Sampson, 1996: 122), though there is no uniformity as to its scale or duration. All 
the NGOs in Brcko, regardless of whether they benefited from 'core-cost' financing 
from international organisations or otherwise, were in a constant process of applying 
for project funding. The difference between core-funded and un-funded 
organisations would become apparent between periods of funding, where those 
organisations without a long-term funding partner would often appear to 'lie 
dormant' awaiting potential future funding opportunities. A representative of the 
Bosnijak Women's Association alluded to her frustration at the short-term nature of 
relations with donors: "donors do not want to work with us when the projects have 
finished" 2• The president of Vermont youth organisation, which had been funded by 
UNDP to carry out such varied projects as "drugs awareness education", "basketball 
2 Interview Bosnjak Women's Association, Brcko 21st February 2003. 
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tournaments" and "Brcko District Day entertainments"3, said that between project 
funding he ensured the survival of the organisation through donating income he 
earns through employment as a customs official on Brcko Bridge. This organisation 
managed to retain a physical presence between periods of project funding in a small 
office in the centre of town (see Figure 6.2). Other organisations did not have this 
luxury and the only evidence of their presence was the attendance of their 
member(s) at coordination meetings or the name of the organisation appearing on 
' official' lists and spreadsheets from the District Government and OHR. The 
perpetual need to apply for project finance seemed to lead to a permanent struggle 
between the NGOs to distinguish themselves as the most appropriate organisation to 
receive donor funding. This struggle for recognition can be best viewed through the 
circulation, exchange and investment of social and cultural capital. 
Figure 6.2 Vermont Youth Association, Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
3 Taken from the survey of Vermont Youth Association, Brcko 30'h Septemer 2002. 
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6.3.1 Social Capital and NGO Autonomisation 
Putnam ( 1993 ), drawing on the work of James Coleman ( 1965), defined 
'social capital' as the accumulated value of groups or individuals working together. 
In contrast, Fukuyama ( 1995) collapsed the concept of 'social capital' into a single 
notion of "trust" that could be converted into 'economic capital' in the form of 
increased profit (Fukuyama, 1995). Bourdieu 's definition differs, as he saw the 
value of social capital in terms of "social connections" (Calhoun, 1993: 70) or 
"group membership" (Bourdieu, 1987: 4). Rather than assuming that social capital 
is generated by communal trust and cooperation, this definition focuses on the 
individual and their ability to accumulate capital. An examination of the Brcko 
NGOs as 'fictive individuals' highlights the struggle to forge social connections and 
the importance placed on group membership when attempting to capture donor 
funding. There was a wealth of evidence over the course of the fieldwork of the 
value NGOs placed on contacts within donor organisations, international 
organisations or the District Government. It was a representative of 'Baza' Anti-
terrorist Association who first alluded to the existence of this apparent economy of 
social relations in Brcko: 
There is no point trying to get a meeting with a member of the District government if you 
haven't seen [the OHR Political Officer] first. [The Political Officer] will ring up and then 
you will get a meeting. 
(Representative of 'Baza' NGO, Brcko November 22nd, 2002) 
While the expenence of the 'Baza' representative turned out not to be 
unique, it was not a formal requirement to receive the backing of the OHR before 
meeting a member of the District Government. As demonstrated by the comments 
made by a representative from Proni Institute of Social Education, personal contacts 
with members of the District Government made it a more approachable organisation: 
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We have always had good cooperation with the District Government. Because the people 
who work in government are people who I knew before the war, for example, Mr Adzic, 
who is Minister for Education, he was my teacher before the war so I can just knock on his 
door and ask what we need. 
(Representative of Proni, Brcko 301h April 2003) 
Despite the wide variety of individual experiences in contacting the various 
local and international agencies in Brcko, there appeared to be evidence that certain 
individuals and organisations (the OHR in particular) constituted gatekeepers to 
social capital. The importance of the OHR was encapsulated by the 'material social 
capital' of letters of support on headed notepaper and signed by the Supervisor, 
which would be included in funding applications. An example of such a letter can 
be seen in Figure 6.3 overleaf, reproduced from the pages of the UNDP Interim 
Evaluation Report, signifying that even the largest organisations required the social 
capital of contacts within the OHR. 
The importance of social capital, or group membership, was more apparent 
in the case of nationalist funding. As mentioned above, both the Serbian Youth 
Association and the St. Sava's Youth Association had gained funding from the RS 
Ministry for Sport and Youth. In the case of St. Sava' s Youth Association this 
funding was received because they "had friends in the Ministry" that wanted to 
"help our people"\ and led to the holding of a Serb Orthodox cycle rally in the 
centre of Brcko (see Figure 6.4 on page 197). When I met the representative from 
the Serbian Youth Association, he said he had gained funding for the "process of 
registering in Brcko" (discussed later in the chapter) their "radio programmes" and 
their "visits to Serbian Monasteries"5 • The problem with this social capital was not 
in the conversion into economic capital, through links with the RS Ministry for Sport 
and Youth repeat funding was mentioned by both organisations as a formality. 
Instead, the difficulty was converting this social capital into other forms of social 
4 Interview with a representative from St. Sava's Youth Association, Brcko 3rd December 2002. 
5 Interview with Serbian Youth Association, Brcko IIth September 2002. 
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OHR 
High Representative 
Obiliteva bb, 76100 Brao 
Tel: ++317 49 205 666 
Fax: t+31749 20S 560 
January 25, 2002 
UNDP·BLAP has been a good international partner here In Brcko District 
relative to programs that have been launched under BI.AP-1. Through such 
initiatives as the rural credit program, community development initiatives, 
Junior Achievement, rural land surveys and technical asslstanoe to women's 
groups (just to name a few) UNDP-BLAP has made valuable contributions to 
the economic and social enhancement of this community. 
In addition, your organizatiOn's Interaction with the Brcko District 
government has been an Important complement to the aaslstanoe being 
provided by the international community with respect to local capacity building 
in the area of municipal response to development projects. 
In view of your pending consideration for approval to be chosen for a 
second phase of wor11 in Brcko District under BI.AP·II, we are very supportive 
of your application. 
On behalf of OHR-Norlh, I wish you and your colleagues auccesa In your 
efforts to secure ,_financial support for your efforts. 
Indeed, we look folward to continuing to work with you relative to 
8ddiiiDnll projectl that are. clearly, required to l~e the oonditloM of this 
COiri'IUiity and its citizens. 
:t6t 1~ 
Deputy ligh Repreaentative 
Supervleor of Brcko 
Figure 6.3 Letter of support for the UNDP SLAP 
(Source: UNDP, 2001) 
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Figure 6.4 St. Sava's Youth Association cycle rally. Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
capital, such as contacts with international donor agencies or the OHR. By adopting 
the prefix ' Serbian ' the Serbian Youth Association admitted that "certain foreign 
organisations don't want to deal with us or give us funds"6. This nationalist social 
capital appears mutually exclusive; by drawing on the lucrative nationalist contacts 
funding from international sources committed to strategies of multi-ethnicity in post-
conflict Bosnia was ruled out. This also demonstrates the ways in which those in 
control of symbolic capital (in this case the OHR improvising the state, see Chapter 
5) can influence the exchange values of different forms of capital, specifically by 
placing a premium on ' multi-ethnicity' . 
It is, however, important to note that for both ' international ' and ' nationalist ' 
social capital, the exchange values, bound as they are to the discursive priorities of 
those in authority, are not fixed in time and have shifted with political expedience 
and geopolitical circumstances. As an example, a representative of the Serb 
6 Survey of the Serbian Youth Association, Brcko 21 " October 2002. 
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Democratic Party (SDS), who had worked in the RS Ministry for Sport and Youth, 
discussed with some pride the fact that his political party had recently held a seminar 
funded by the US Embassy, "this was the first time the SDS has had cooperation 
with the Embassy"7 • This kind of collaboration would have been unthinkable in the 
past, particularly considering the mutual animosity between the US Government and 
the Radovan Karadzic-founded SDS. It seems that the discourse of multi-ethnicity 
has, on a Bosnia-wide scale, seemingly diminished in importance over the perceived 
move from post-conflict reconstruction to the realpolitik of transition and 
international withdrawal. This shift, or narrowing, of priorities was demonstrated in 
the interview with the Brcko Supervisor. When questioned about the issue of the RS 
directly funding NGOs in Brcko he responded "it is not in my mandate to worry 
about that [ ... ] as long as they are not breaking Brcko laws. You know, I think the 
NGOs should be free to scrounge money wherever they can"8. The concerns of the 
Supervisor, as enshrined in the Final Award, lay rather in the "government financial 
area - there has been a failure by the RS to pay its obligations to the District [ ... ] 
and they tried to privatise some companies in the District without consulting us 
first"9. This example demonstrates the valorization of economic discourses by the 
Supervisor and the Final Award, marking a shift from 'post-conflict' concerns of 
inter-ethnic reconciliation. In this way, the negative social capital of nationalist 
discourses has diminished as processes of 'proper neo-liberal economic governance' 
have taken precedent over concerns of reconciliation. 
The value, in terms of social capital, placed on contacts with donor 
organisations and members of authority was not reflected in relationships between 
the NGOs themselves. Rather than being valued, contacts between NGOs were often 
perceived as an institutional threat. Those organisations with little permanent 
funding would sometimes suggest that the internationally financed organisations 
were merely "keeping an office alive" 10 while, in turn, those organisations with long-
7 Interview with a representative ofthe SDS, Brcko 14th April2003. 
8 Interview with Brcko Supervisor, Ambassador Henry Clarke, April 24th 2003. 
9 Interview with Brcko Supervisor, Ambassador Henry Clarke, April 24th 2003. 
10 This phrase was used by the representative of GrCica Youth Association in an interview 22"d 
November 2002 and was described in similar terms by a representative of Vermont Youth 
Association, Brcko 22"d Febmary 2003. 
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term funding would accuse the smaller NGOs of "existing only on paper"'' or being 
allied to "nationalist politics'm. It is interesting to chart how these views emerged 
over the course of the fieldwork period in Brcko District. In the initial survey the 
NGOs were keen to discuss the processes and fruits of their active collaboration with 
other NGOs, perhaps a signal of the capital attached to portraying your organisation 
as a 'team player'. As I witnessed the work of the NGOs over the course of the 
fieldwork, coupled with the dynamic of repeat interviewing, the representatives from 
the NGOs were more critical, viewing collaboration as a 'waste of time' or 
'impossible'. For a representative from Firefly Youth Project this came down to 
issues of competition: 
There is loads of competition between NGOs for the funding because people really feel like 
they are in competition, but if you talk about the collaborating with each other and get 
double the funding instead of competing with each other people are really suspicious about 
that. 
(Representative from Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 15th September 2002) 
Competition between the organisations was often expressed in the interviews 
through a complaint that there were 'too many' NGOs in Brcko, as suggested by the 
president of Vermont: 
In Brcko there are many organisations, but they don't have very much work and then those 
organisations will die[ ... ] when there are three or four organisations left that will be good. 
(President of Vermont Youth Association, Brcko 25th February 2003) 
Rather than collaboration, the prevalence of competition for funding seemed 
to engender secrecy amongst the NGOs themselves as to future funding 
11 This phrase was used in an interview with a representative from Firefly Youth Project on 15th 
September 2002. 
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opportunities or proposals that they were currently compiling. The issue of future 
funding was one area of the interviews that was regularly greeted with a hushed 'no 
comment' by informants, as this information was seemingly embargoed until the 
outcome was known or perhaps until the closing date for proposal applications had 
passed. The Brcko Centre for Information and Legal Help ( Centar za Informativnu 
Pravnu i Pomoc or CIPP) was candid about this in saying that they did not want to 
discuss the proposal they were submitting to the UNHCR as this could 
"jeopardise" 13 their chances of success. A representative of the agricultural NGO 
Counterpart saw this secrecy as an element of inter-NGO jealousy: 
Organisations are jealous, especially organisations that are working in similar jobs. They are 
jealously keeping their files and documents and studies in their office. If somebody is doing 
a study, what about it doesn't matter, but after finishing that study that organisation will 
jealously keep that study in their folders and not share it. If someone is asking for that 
document or study that person within the branch office will have the feeling that a person is 
begging them for that informations and the person will have the feeling that that information 
is secret and no-body else can see it apart from the person in that organisation. [ ... ] It is a 
competition to see who will be better. If you are better you can find funds better or faster. 
(Counterpart Official 'B', Brcko 22nd May 2003) 
In addition to retaining institutional 'secrets', certain NGOs viewed other 
organisations as 'too political' to warrant collaboration. The NGOs felt that 
proximity to political organisations could endanger donor funding. Particular 
scepticism was shown towards the 'Youth Coordination Body' (YCB), an initiative 
of the OSCE to improve communication between youth NGOs and political parties 
in Brcko, established in 2001. In terms of NGOs the objective, according to the 
Head of Brcko OSCE, was to make them "more visible" in Brcko, as "the Mayor 
12 This was an accusation made on many occasions during the interviews, for example by the 
representative of 'Baza' Anti-terrorist Association , November 22"d 2002; by Counterpatt Official 
'B', 22"d May, 2002 and by with a representative from Firefly Youth Project on 15th September 2002. 
13 Survey of Centre for Legal Infommtion and Help, Brcko 22"d October 2002. 
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perceives them as reactive, rather than active" 14• The formation of the coordination 
body was also in line with prevailing thoughts amongst OSCE and OHR that NGO 
coordination required guidance. As one OHR official remarked: 
The coordination between international organisations and NGOs is not bad provided it is 
d1iven by the International Organisations. NGO/NGO coordination is absolutely non-
existent. And even an International Organisation can't drive that. You can't get two NGOs 
in and say 'Hey look, you are doing this road and you are doing this b1idge why don't you 
get together'. 'I'll tell you why we don't get together because the two of us are both going 
for the same donor'. 
(Representative from OHR Brcko, 2nd June 2003) 
The approach of the YCB towards coordination, including both political 
parties and NGOs in one committee, proved contentious. On the one hand, the 
political parties were positive about the initiative, with the SDS suggesting it would 
be "useful in the future as an institution of democracy" 15 ; the POP (Partija 
Demokratskog Progresa) echoed this stance and declared it as "useful" 16, while the 
SDP representative considered it "nice ... we understand each other, we support each 
other" 17 • On the other hand, NGOs seemed more sceptical about the combination of 
political parties and NGOs. Some organisations had been part of the YCB at its 
inception, but had since stopped attending the meetings. A representative from 
'Baza' Anti-terrorist organisation explained: 
14 As mentyioned in Chapter 2, taken from an interview with the Head of Brcko OSCE, October 17th 
2002. 
15 Interview with a representative from SDS, Brcko 14th April 2003. 
16 Interview with a representative from PDP, Brcko 14th April2003. 
17 Interview with a representative from SDP, Brcko 16th April 2003. 
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At the beginning there were six organisations (SDP Youth, Baza, SDS Youth, SDA Youth, 
Economic School and Brcaska Udruienja Mladih). At that time we were just young people 
and we forgot the politics, but now it is something else. The Serb Radical Party joined and it 
turned nationalist. 
(Representative from 'Baza', Brcko 22nd November 2002) 
The concern over the combination of party politics and youth NGOs was repeated on 
many occasions. One American NGO worker, volunteering in Brcko, saw the 
combination as "dangerous": 
I think it is really quite dangerous actually. I think it is really quite a mistake. By including 
political parties, we are not talking about political parties that I am familiar with at home, we 
are talking about some nasty bastards. I don't want to hold people responsible, but the 
organisations themselves are responsible for [ ... ] obstructing returns and all that kind of 
stuff. To put them all in one boat encourages the political parties to take over. 
(Interview with Counterpart Official 'A', Brcko 15th May 2003) 
This wanness of the YCB was shared by certain international donor 
organisations. A representative from the German Development agency GTZ 
( Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit) felt that the YCB was "a problem 
because it involves political parties" 18 • Her organisation was reticent to work 
alongside the YCB, preferring instead to set up their own coordination initiative the 
Local Youth Government (LOV or Lokal Omladinski Vlada). She explained that this 
initiative was required to "normalise the atmosphere" between the NGOs: 
18 Interview with a representative from GTZ, Brcko June 4th 2003. 
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It was very tense, there was a problem in the atmosphere between the organisations. As a 
result we held series of workshops to try and improve things. One of the results of the 
workshops was the establishment of a local youth eo unci I. 
(Representative from GTZ, June 41h 2003) 
It seems from the polarised responses from the political parties and the 
NGOs that membership of the YCB had costs and benefits for each group in terms 
of social capital. For the political parties such membership allowed them to be seen 
to work with NGOs, raising their profile with both their electorate and with 
organisations such as the OSCE and the OHR. There appeared to be a clear gain in 
social capital in associating with internationally recognised 'civil society actors'. 
For the NGOs, however, there was a potential risk. For some, being tainted as 
'political' could have repercussions in terms of gaining future funding, for others the 
social capital of meeting with political parties could lead to financial support from 
the political parties themselves. How the NGOs played this trade-off between 
competing social capitals was mediated by their individual strategy for institutional 
survival. 
By presenting the social connections of Brcko NGOs in terms of social 
capital the shifting value placed on different relationships comes to light. In contrast 
to Putnam's (1993) conception of 'social capital' as cooperation between individuals 
or groups, the struggle to gain funding in Brcko has encouraged competition and 
suspicion between the NGOs. While civil society is defined within cet1ain policy 
scripts as an 'autonomous' group of organisations, the autonomy in this case is not 
from agencies of authority but conversely between each individual NGO. The 
process of accumulating social capital binds the NGOs in closer ties to donors and 
the agencies of the improvised state. The attempts to gain funding and ensure 
institutional survival serve to individualise the NGOs as they operate in competition 
for scarce symbolic resources. These exchanges and accumulations begin to 
illustrate the gentrification of civil society in post conflict Brcko, as NGOs become 
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containers for various kinds of social capital. This process is explored in greater 
detail through related exchange and accumulation of cultural capital. 
6.3.2 Cultural Capital and 1\lGO Homogenisation 
On a series of occasions in Brcko I heard the remark that an organisation, 
perhaps a political party or small private company, was behaving 'as if they were an 
NGO'. This comment suggests that there were a series of specific behavioural and 
cultural traits that were associated with NGOs in Brcko. When I questioned further 
what was meant by "behaving as if an NGO" the usual response was not that the 
organisation was committed to social welfare or was acting in a non-profit capacity, 
but rather that it was wealthy or had close links with international organisations. 
While these imaginaries may be dismissed as unrepresentative or anecdotal, they are 
indicators of the way in which NGOs have emerged in post-conflict Brcko as a 
cultural community. Just as the social contacts of the NGOs have been mediated 
through the exchange of social capital, the embodied traits and behaviour have been 
shaped through the accumulation and circulation of cultural capital. This economic 
metaphor illustrates how the struggle for certain traits works to reproduce the NGO 
sector in Brcko. This section will examine how the practices of NGO funding serve 
to mediate this struggle. 
Bourdieu ( 1986) describes cultural capital as "the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or 
less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" 
(Bourdieu, 1986: 248), though he also offered the more concise definition of 
"informational capital" (Bourdieu, 1987: 4). From these descriptions cultural capital 
has been variously interpreted as "education credentials" (Calhoun, 1993: 70); 
"culturally valued taste" (Mahar et al, 1990: 13), or "the knowledge and skills 
acquired in early socialisation or through education" (Painter, 2000: 243). 
Consequently, it has been used as a theoretical tool to explain the role of education 
in reproducing social divisions (Painter, 2000: 240). As Hark er ( 1990) points out, 
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this work examines the importance of cultural capital accumulation in reproducing 
patterns of power and dominance: 
Just as our dominant economic institutions are structured to favour those who already 
possess economic capital, so our educational institutions are structured to favour those who 
already possess cultural capital in the form of habitus of the dominant cultural fraction. 
(Harker, 1990: 87) 
As a result, those with the appropriate cultural capital are reinforced with success 
(Harker, 1990: 87). These processes of social reproduction can be identified within 
the NGO sector in Brcko District, as funding regimes 'reward' organisations with 
particular cultural capital at the expense of others. This serves to reinforce the 
metaphor of gentrification, as NGOs emerge as a cultural community distinct from 
other organisations of civil society. 
The funding of NGOs in Brcko was organised around the central unit of the 
'proposal'. There was wide variation in the form, function and content of the 
proposals, though they all corresponded with an activity that would take place over a 
bounded period of time, referred to as 'a project' (see discussion above). Every 
NGO contacted during the fieldwork, regardless of their funding status, size or 
institutional objectives, organised their work into this proposal-project structure. So 
the USDA-funded agricultural NGO Counterpart organised its re-forestation 
initiatives through distinct seedling distributions; the Serbian Youth Organisation 
initiated projects involving trips to monasteries or sports competitions; the 'Baza' 
Anti-terrorist organisation was planning a project consisting of a roundtable on "the 
causes of terrorism in Brcko" 19• While occasionally the proposal process was 
socialised through meetings or workshops, in most cases it operated through written 
documents and remote contact such as emails and telephone conversations. 
Consequently, the funding system involved the NGOs exhibiting the 'correct' 
cultural and behavioural traits for effective communication with donors, in addition 
to the technical knowledge of how to complete a proposal in a way that would be 
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attractive to a funding body. These interlinked traits define the cultural capital of 
NGOs, and they are examined below in three sections: ability with the English 
language, knowledge of donor discourses, and skills to negotiate the bureaucratic 
demands of proposal writing. 
The first skill that appeared to be valued by the proposal process was 
knowledge of the English language. A representative from Firefly Youth Project 
explained the primacy of English: 
I never met any donor who took any proposal in our language. Everything should be 
completed in English or French or Spanish or I don't know but English mainly. In last couple 
of years we did not write any proposals in our language. I mean, it was specified it should be 
in English. I mean, even if they have their offices here - a local person doesn't decide about 
donation so his boss must read it and I don't think he will translate it instead of us. I never 
met a donor who does that [laughs]. 
(Representative from Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 27th March 2003) 
The proposal writing process, however, did not simply demand knowledge of 
English but an expertise in the particular technical style demanded by funding 
agencies and government donors. Regardless of the level of skill of spoken English, 
Bosnian NGO members were categorised as 'non-native speakers' by the rigorous 
demands of proposal writing. A USAID representative in Sarajevo explained her 
"frustration" at poorly written English: 
Someone should do a PhD on language construction and civil society development. It is 
inappropriate to use the active voice here, OK, so everything is "the youth policy group was 
formed", by who! OK. "A meeting was held where something was decided", well what was 
decided? So those of us who speak English as a first language and been taught that you don't 
write or think or speak in the passive unless you intentionally want to soften something or 
don't know are very frustrated. 
(Representative ofUSAID, Sarajevo 29th May 2003) 
19 Taken from survey of 'Baza' Anti-terrorist NGO, Brcko 14th October 2002 
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This native-speaker/local binary was confirmed by an American volunteer to a 
USDA funded NGO in Brcko. He stated that the headquarters in Washington had 
become "very concemed" with the quality of the reports written by Brcko staff. On 
his arrival in Brcko corresponding with Washington became one of his core duties: 
[ ... ]I have ended up writing the reports. Especially when you are working for a government 
donor, it is unacceptable to have bad English and that is the reality of the situation. It is the 
same way that I have trouble learning Bosnian. English is a very forgiving language in 
spoken English, like you can mess around with all kinds of rules and no-one gives a damn. 
But in terms of written English you immediately notice mistakes. Like if you drop an article 
- in spoken English no-one cares but in a document you notice it immediately. 
(Counterpart Official 'A', Brcko 15th May 2003) 
The irony behind these comments is that out of four Bosnian members of staff in this 
NGO, three were recruited on account of their skills at English. Indeed, the head of 
office had previously been a translator at the S-For McGovem Base, while another 
staff member had worked in a similar capacity for the IPTF in Brcko. This level of 
skill had been sufficient for regular communication through email and telephone 
conversation with the head office in Washington, and for OHR coordination 
meetings, as they have always been held in English. However, it had not proved 
adequate for the 'official' channels of funding proposals and project reports. 
Through this binary of 'native-speaker' I 'local staff member' the level of language 
skill requisite for donor funding appears to have become unattainable to Bosnian 
staff members. While knowledge of English was vital for rapport with international 
organisations, OHR coordination meetings and day-to-day communication with 
donors or headquarters, when communication was deemed official, a 'native' 
English speaker seemed to be required. While there were distinct advantages in 
terms of cultural capital of an individual speaking English, this binary ensured that 
there was still greater capital in an NGO retaining links with, or employing, 
'international' or 'non-local' staff. 
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These benefits had not escaped the attention of individual donors as they had 
attempted to enact policies to counter this binary. In particular, international donors 
had begun to value local NGOs over international organisations. This strategy 
demonstrates the symbolic capital possessed by donor organisations20 as they invest 
'being local' as a trait with particular cultural capital. This strategy fostered a 
discourse of 'localisation' of NGOs that sought to develop "sustainable locally-run, 
voluntary organisations"21 , a policy explained to me, perhaps ironically, by an Italian 
employee of UNDP in Sarajevo. The discourse of localisation was reflected in the 
UNDP Brcko Local Action Programme (BLAP), where preference was given to 
funding local NGOs, as part of a broader aim to "capacity-build the Brcko NGOs"22 . 
Interestingly, despite this local focus in the UNDP and EU schemes, both their 
funding procedures demanded proposals were written in English. Thus despite the 
premium being placed on local NGOs, the application demands re-inscribed the 
requirement for 'native' English speakers. 
It seems from these examples that despite the donor discourse of localisation, 
'being local' was still trumped in cultural capital terms by being able to speak 
English. In order to maximise their cultural capital, many of the NGOs in Brcko 
exhibited a compromise between this premium on 'locality' and the donor 
requirement for competent English speakers. Through such a compromise, hybrid 
NGOs emerged which were both international and local and they deployed these 
identities in order to maximise their capital. For example, Firefly Youth Project 
received three-year funding from the Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Trust Fund 
directed towards creating a sustainable local NGO. At the completion of this 
funding cycle (in 2002) the organisation changed its name to Omladinski Projekt 
'Svitac' (a direct translation of Firefly Youth Project) and began the process of 
registering in Brcko. Despite this new local organisation, Firefly Youth Project still 
exists in the UK and continues to draft money to Svitac in order to meet its running 
20 The definition of symbolic capital as "the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient 
recognition to be in a position to impose recognition" (Bourdieu, 1989: 23) was discussed in Chapter 
5. 
21 Interview with UNDP Official, Sarajevo, 29th May 2003. 
22 Interview with Projects Officer at UNDP Brcko, 15th April 2003. 
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costs, while also supporting the organisation through assistance with proposal 
writing. The international contacts retained by Svitac also enable continuing visits by 
UK volunteers. These were ostensibly to implement short-term projects (such as 
music lessons or art projects) though the programme manager acknowledged an 
additional benefit that "they can go to all the OHR meetings for us"23 • It seems that 
in the case of Firefly/ Svitac this was simulated self-sustainability, where 
'localisation' was deployed to attract donor funding, though for logistical purposes 
international links were retained. In another instance, Counterpart had created an 
entirely new organisation through which it planned to 'localise'. In 2000, as part of 
an "exit strategy"2\ the Washington-based head office of Counterpart suggested that 
they establish a voluntary, locally-run organisation. This request led to the 
formation of Eko, an environmental NGO which registered locally, had an entirely 
local staff-team (comprised of the Counterpart staff), and could apply for funding 
from which Counterpart was restricted as it was funded by the USDA. Eko was 
donated office space by Counterpart and the programme manager shared her time 
between the two organisations, though this arrangement led to confusion as 
explained by a Counterpart official: 
The central problem for Eko has been this identity issue: is it Counterpart? Is it the future 
existence of Counterpart? ls it a separate NGO? Or is it an amoeba where the two are kind of 
joined but will then break off? It has never really been able to solve that crisis of identity. 
(Counterpart Official 'A', Brcko 15th May 2003) 
Though Eko successfully gained funding from the IRC and received a donation of 
equipment from S-For civil affairs, these were not enough to ensure sustainability. 
The fragility of this hybridity was illustrated when Eko 's president left her job with 
Counterpart and Eko disintegrated. Despite this failing, both the Svitac and Eko 
examples demonstrate the way in which labels such as 'international' and 'local' are 
reformulated and deployed by NGOs in order to maximise their cultural capital. 
23 Interview with a representative from Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 27th March 2003 
24 Interview with a Counterpart Official 'A', Brcko 15th May 2003 
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These experiences of 'localisation' reflect how the funding system required 
more than simply a knowledge of the English language, but also an awareness of the 
priorities and discourses of development agencies. Many of the NGOs felt that they 
could not "keep up" with changing donor agendas and found the shifting priorities 
"bewildering"25 • A representative of Firefly Youth Project/Svitac explained that 
when it came to writing proposals they "didn't know what donors wanted to hear"26 : 
But what our organisation actually needs is a person to help us with fund raising. Someone 
to sit with us and write one good project proposal - we need someone with experience in 
fundraising to find something for one year or three years, because honestly two of us won't 
be able to do it. Because we know what one project proposal has - we know we wrote a 
couple of proposals but we don't have experience with donors [ ... ] You know very well 
when you write project proposals you must make it like a report - when you report you know 
what that person wants to hear. We do not have that experience. 
(Representative from Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 271h March 2003) 
The notion of "one good proposal" suggests that cultural capital can be held in 
material form, in the same way that symbolic capital was materialised through letters 
of support from figures in authority. This comment also points to the way in which 
NGOs in Brcko often divorced needs assessment from the technical process of 
writing a donor proposal. Contact with donors was framed in terms "they wanted to 
hear" as opposed to reflecting the ideologies or activities of the NGOs. As with 
language skills, the importance of being able to understand and reproduce donor 
discourses influenced the recruitment policies of the NGOs in Brcko. Staff with 
experience of international organisations were perceived as preferential to those with 
specialist technical knowledge (such as agricultural knowledge in an agricultural 
NGO). As a result, individual cultural capital was not accumulated through formal 
25 These comments were made by the Bosnijak Women's Association, 2 I 51 February 2003, and the 
Paraplegics' Association, 91h December 2002, though the sentiment was shared by a number of 
NGOs. 
26 In!erview with ll. representative from Firefly Youth Project, Brcko 27th March 2003. 
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education or qualifications, but rather through knowledge of English and experience 
of working with NGOs and international organisations within Brcko. 
This valuation of cultural capital had two consequences for the NGO sector. 
The first is that it reproduced the notion that NGOs were 'international', as the skills 
required to work or volunteer related to knowledge of donor discourses as opposed 
to skills learnt at school or college in Brcko. In a second consequence, this 
interpretation of value has led to a small group of individuals exploiting their capital 
and moving between different short-term contracts within international organisations 
(such as the OSCE, OHR and UNDP) and the larger NGOs. For example, the entire 
UNDP BLAP staff team, excluding the Australian programme manager, were 
previously employed in NGOs (two from Firefly Youth Project, one from Vermont). 
The emergence of this group of 'development professionals', with English skills and 
expertise with donor organisations, has not only blurred the institutional boundaries 
between NGOs and international organisations but also homogenised the discourses 
of the NGOs in Brcko. As the NGOs and donors attended the same workshops, 
UNDP training sessions, or OHR Coordination meetings the rhetoric of the 
organisations has begun to coalesce around a series of key phrases, such as 
'roundtable', 'multi-ethnic reconciliation', 'capacity building', and 'economic 
development' 27 . The BLAP Programme Manager celebrated this emerging NGO 
discourse as an indication of the success of their training programmes: 
At first, when the project [UNDP BLAP] first opened in August 2000, we kept getting 
applications for 'non-developmental flashes': like a new soccer field, a new building or 
metal soccer poles and not wooden ones [laughs]. These have moved to 'access bridges', 
'roads' or 'conflict resolution towards training for community leaders'. 
(Programme Manager UNDP BLAP, Brcko 181h February 2003) 
The Regional Coordinator of Proni, however, did not share this positive assessment 
of the move away from 'non-developmental flashes'. She felt that the constant 
27 These four phrases are chosen as they appeared in numerous NGO surveys. 
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training of NGOs in writing donor proposals and following appropriate donor 
procedure was stifling creativity and leading to repetitive projects: 
[ ... ]people have been put through the same courses, with the same people, with the same 
methodology every time. You know that thing of just visioning? You sit down and think it is 
actually possible. Dream something and know it is actually attainable. Because what happens 
is that people say 'up the road they have an interne! cafe so we will have an interne! cafe' so 
down the road wi 11 then have an intern et cafe. Instead of thinking here is a need in society 
and we have these resources, what can we put together to meet that need? But that kind of 
creative thinking and planning is just not here. 
(Regional Coordinator Proni, Brcko ih May 2004) 
This comment suggests that rather than inspiring innovation or focussing on needs 
assessment, the discourse of donors was valuing the ability to reproduce 
development rhetoric, a 'trick' that could be learnt through recruiting individuals 
possessing the cultural capital of working within NGOs and international 
organisations. 
In addition to the requirement for language skills and knowledge of donor 
discourses, a final aspect of cultural capital that shaped the NGO sector was the 
ability to negotiate the more mundane bureaucratic requirements of the proposal 
writing process. These related to having the time to complete the often-lengthy 
period of correspondence with potential donors and access to computers and office 
facilities. The importance of these factors was confirmed by the NGO survey where 
the Brcko NGOs perceived "access to office facilities" as the second biggest 
problem, after more general issues of scarce funding. Many of the NGOs had to 
borrow space from other organisations and agencies, for example the Bosnijak 
Women's Association met in a nursery school in Brodusa and the GrCica Youth 
Association met in a roadside cafe on the outskirts of Brcko. According to both 
organisations these improvised spaces were sufficient for meetings, though they did 
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not provide the office support necessary for finding and contacting donors28 . These 
concerns and complaints led to an interesting feedback loop where office equipment 
(necessary to negotiate the bureaucratic demands of donor funding) became a key 
feature ofNGO funding applications in Brcko. This was reflected in the exasperated 
comments of the Head of OSCE Brcko when he said "I am always telling NGOs 
'don't just ask for another copy machine! "'29 This over-bureaucratisation has led to 
offices themselves holding material cultural capital as they have become a key 
feature of 'being an NGO'. 
A second facet of the bureaucratic funding system relates to the length of 
time it took to receive confirmation that a project could be financed. This was 
particularly evident in the case of the agricultural NGO Counterpart, which was 
engaging in reforestation and food security projects in Brcko District. Though 
benefiting from permanent funding from USDA, each project implemented by 
Counterpart Brcko had to be approved by their head office and by the American 
NGO Mercy USA, who were partners in the consortium and had a field office in 
Tuzla. In addition to the language difficulties discussed above, gaining approval for 
a project involved a bureaucratic process that could last over six months. According 
to one Counterpart official this had the consequence that projects became "more 
conservative" as no-one wanted to "end up wasting time on something that is going 
to end up not getting approved"30• This official added, "you couldn't ask [the 
backstopping officer in Washington] a question as if it dropped off the bottom of her 
Outlook screen she would never answer it"31 . Another member of Counterpart 
connected the lack of innovation in the projects to job security in admitting, "our 
projects didn't have much creativity[ ... ] we were scared we might lose our jobs"32 . 
In order to ensure funding, and to expedite the bureaucratic process, the projects of 
Counterpart became smaller in scale and repetitive. This led one Mercy USA 
28 lnfonnation taken from an interview with a representative of Grcica Youth Association, Brcko 22"d 
November 2002 and a representative ofBosnijak Women's Association, Brcko 21 ''February 2003. 
29 Interview with the Head of Brcko OSCE, Brcko 17th October 2002. 
30 Interview with Counterpart Official 'A', Brcko 15th May 2003. 
31 Interview with Counterpart Official 'A', Brcko 18th September 2004. 
32 Interview with Counterpart Official 'B', Brcko 22"d May 2003. 
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official to question their projects suggesting, "they weren't really reforestation -
maybe gardening"33 . 
The struggle over cultural capital continues to reinforce the process of social 
gentrification. As particular organisations accumulate the cultural capital necessary 
to gain donor funding they become recognised as NGOs. But this accumulation 
process also has a series of effects. The donor system has valued particular cultural 
traits that, while open to compromise and improvisation, have gone on to shape the 
attributes and activities of the NGOs. In the case of English language skills, this has 
continued the trend observed with social capital in binding NGOs ever closer with 
international organisations, while also leading to compromise of 'hybrid 
localisation'. The value placed on replication of particular donor discourses and 
phrases has also served to disconnect needs assessments from individual 
communities and drained proposals of creativity. Finally, the bureaucratic 
requirements of the donor system have led to NGOs placing cultural value in 
running an office. Such bureaucratic demands serve to restrict the transformative 
qualities of NGOs, once heralded as an attribute of civil society. The funding 
system, by reproducing only those organisations which exhibit stores of social and 
cultural capital, has privileged individualistic and conservative organisations which 
seek to reproduce the status quo rather than acting as loci of dissent or radicalism. 
To examine this political effect of social gentrification in greater detail the 
articulation between civil society and the state in Brcko requires close examination. 
6.4 The State and NGO Regulation 
The binary between state and civil society has been a feature of discourses of 
international intervention in Bosnia (see Chapter 5). Recent academic scholarship 
has challenged this binary in two contrasting ways. The first has been to retain the 
underlying epistemology of the binary, though challenging the scale on which it is 
conceived. This scholarship has focussed attention on scenarios where the state 
appears to be weakening, either as a consequence of increasingly globalised forms of 
33 Interview with official from Mercy USA, Brcko, 151h September 2004. 
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governance or where the institutions of the state have 'failed'. Consequently, the 
term 'global civil society' has been introduced to suggest that civil society can "only 
be understood in the context of the global, in contrast to earlier centuries when civil 
society only had meaning in relation to the territorial state" (Kaldor, 2003: 142). 
This approach represents a call for a rethinking of democratic participation to the 
global scale, in much the same way as Held's Cosmopolitan Democracy (1995) or 
Archibugi's Cosmopolitics (2003). In doing so, the central binary is reconfigured to 
place global civil society as a counterpoint to the 'global' state as played out through 
institutions of such as the Multinational Corporations, the World Bank, or the United 
Nations. Within such accounts, the role of civil society as a distinct site of 
democratic action remains, though rather than organising against the state, it is 
against "remote forces out of their reach" (Roy, 1995: 2005). 
In contrast, the second challenge to the binary between the state and civil 
society has been to cast doubt over the validity of the state and civil society as 
separate entities. Rather than viewing the state as separate entity, removed from 
society, the state has been conceived as a "set of processes" (Trouillot, 2001: 127), a 
"relation" (Harvey, 1976) or "an idea" (Abrams, 1988: 76). Drawing on Foucault's 
(1991) conception of 'govemmentality', Trouillot (2001) suggests that the state's 
materiality resides much less in its institutions than in the "reworking of processes 
and relations of power so as to create new spaces for the deployment of power" 
(Trouillot, 2001: 127). By unsettling the notion of the state and socialising it as a 
practice as opposed to monolithic institutions, its distinction with civil society 
becomes more blurred and problematic. Navaro-Yashin (2002) suggests that rather 
than proposing the autonomization of civil society from the state, it would be more 
appropriate to refer to a "changing enmeshed relationship" (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 
132). In particular, such work has drawn attention to the way in which civil society 
is enrolled into the practices, techniques and technologies of state power. Civil 
society is therefore seen as an illusion, a trick executed by the state to conjure 
notions of autonomy or emancipation, when the reality is a collection of 
performances that reproduce state power. 
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The evidence of civil society gentrification supports this latter interpretation 
of a blurred binary between civil society and the state. As seen in the case of 
struggles for donor funding, the process of gentrification binds the organisations in 
closer ties to agencies of authority whilst simultaneously encouragmg 
individualisation as the gentrified NGOs compete for limited resources. These 
processes serve to constrict the ability of gentrified NGOs to act as a "transmission 
belt" (Mohan, 2002: 127) between the citizenry and the state and, as such, they are 
more suggestive of the "enmeshed relationship" referred to by Navaro-Yashin 
(2002). The 'enmeshed' nature of the state and civil society is concealed through 
the reproduction of suggestions of autonomy by focussing on its 'non-governmental' 
nature. Even the title 'non-governmental organisation' implies that the founding 
criterion of such organisations is separateness from the state. The example of 
state/civil society relations in Brcko points to how processes of regulation have 
continued to both gentrify civil society into a visible and capital-rich group of 
organisations while reproducing this trick of autonomy. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, numerous local and international actors and 
agencies improvise the state in Brcko, though the final ability to classify and 
legitimise is reserved for the OHR as it holds reserves of symbolic capital. One of 
the ways through which this symbolic capital was 'bureaucratised' (Bourdieu, 1994: 
11) was the legal procedure for classifying what counts as 'civil society'. Within the 
Brcko context this process of classification is reflected in the Law of Associations 
and Foundations, drawn up by the OHR's legal department in Sarajevo and 
published in the Brcko District official legal gazette in December 2002. The central 
feature of this new law was the demand for all NGOs to register locally in Brcko 
District. This process dominated the interviews with the NGOs over the period of 
the fieldwork. Prior to the passing of the new Law of Associations and Foundations 
the NGOs were expected to register in one of four places, dependent upon the 
organisation's ethno-national affiliation. The three main ethnic groups registered in 
three nearby towns, with Bosnijak NGOs registering in Tuzla, Serb NGOs in 
Bijeljina, Croat NGOs in Orasje, while international organisations often registered in 
Sarajevo. This situation divided the regulation and taxation of NGOs between the 
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Federation and the RS, a situation that was deemed unsustainable following the 
Final Award and subsequent creation of Brcko District. The new Law of 
Associations and Foundations was designed to harmonise the taxation and regulation 
of the NGOs, while also ending the continued division of the District's organisations 
down entity lines. For the District Government, the process of re-registration would 
automatically compile a definitive list of organisations operating in Brcko, which the 
NGO liaison officer at the government said would be "helpful for offering project 
funding to NGOs in the future"34• The Brcko Mayor echoed this sentiment stating 
that he wanted to start funding NGOs "who offered good proposals"35 • 
The incentives offered by the District Government were effective in 
mobilising all the NGOs of Brcko to prioritise re-registration. The enthusiastic 
reaction of the NGOs seemed to diminish when faced by the bureaucratic and 
expensive process of re-registration. The process was variously described as "very 
complicated"36, "chaos, chaos [with head in hands]'m, "expensive"38 and "a mess"39• 
A representative of Firefly Youth Project/Svitac (FR) explained the bureaucratic 
demands of re-registration: 
FR: The thing is that we find out that we have to follow the process of renting space and 
everything like we are another organisation, like we are a business. 
AJ: Like a business? 
FR: Yes. Because we have to, before that we have to go to court to give our constitution and 
state the people who will be part of our assembly, management board and steering board. 
We then have to find space [and] to sign contract with landlord, we have to stamp that 
contract in the Municipality and then with that contract we have to go to tax inspection to 
give them the contract and they will stamp it. 
34 lnterview with NGO Liaison Officer, Brcko District Government, 22"d May 2003. 
35 lnterview with the Brcko District Mayor, Brcko 81h May 2003. 
36 lnterview with a representative from St. Sava's Youth Association, Brcko 3'd December 2002. 
37 Interview with a representative of Paraplegics Association, Brcko 9th December 2002. 
38 lnterview with a representative from the Serbian Youth Association, Brcko 11th September 2002. 
39 Interview with the UNDP BLAP Programme Manager, Brcko 181h February 2003. 
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AJ: Do these stamps cost money? 
FR: The stamp in municipality costs 30KM and I don't know how much at the tax inspection 
[will be] but when they put the stamp on it then we can go to the court. But I don't know 
how it will be at the Court. I heard 500KM and then there are some other taxes and then we 
have to publish it in the Sluibeni Glasnik [legal gazette] and that also costs money about 
6Km a word. So I don't know. [ ... ] I mean the process is completely like we are opening a 
shop. 
(Excerpt from an Interview with a representative from Firefly Youth Project, 
Brcko 27th March 2003) 
As this exchange suggests, the registration process was governed by 
uncertainty and guesswork. There appeared to be a lack of any clear information as 
to the cost of the process, as a number of different agencies all demanded a range of 
seemingly arbitrary taxes and payments. The Programme Manager of the UNDP 
BLAP felt that this confusion was a consequence of the timing of the legislation: 
I don't think the government passed the legislation ever thinking they would have to 
implement it, they thought that there would be elections first. 
(Interview with UNDP BLAP Programme Manager, Brcko 18th February 
2003) 
As a result of the legislation and its chaotic implementation certain 
organisations found it impossible to register in Brcko. As with the donor demands 
discussed above, these barriers can be interpreted in terms of the accumulation of 
different varieties of capital. The high registration fee and taxes ensure that only 
those organisations with the requisite funds could become a legally legitimate NGO, 
again underlining the importance of economic capital. A number of organisations 
found that social capital could often be deployed in lieu of economic capital. Both 
Firefly Youth project and Eko used contacts in the government to gain assistance 
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from the EU-funded Brcko Development Agency (Razvojna Agencija Brcko 
Distrikta ). This initiative, established to assist businesses in the process of 
registration and so attract foreign direct investment, helped the NGOs compile the 
necessary documentation for registration. While this saved legal costs in drawing up 
a constitution, the court fees remained the same. In another example of 
organisations deploying social capital in lieu of economic capital, the St Sava's 
Youth Association and the Serbian Youth Association had their registration fees 
paid by the RS Ministry for Sport and Youth. This appears to be a case of nationalist 
social capital being converted into economic capital to ensure legal legitimacy for 
the two youth associations. For the RS Ministry the economic expense could be 
justified in terms of the accumulated cultural capital of being seen to work alongside 
and support youth NGOs in Brcko District. Other NGOs such as the Baza 
Association and the Grcica Youth Association, which did not hold these capital 
reserves, were struggling to register. These organisations pointed out that they could 
not afford the expense of registration and they did not have the contacts in the OHR, 
the District Government or political parties that could assist them. These examples 
would seem to suggest that the improvised state, in this case operating through 
OHR-designed laws and implemented by the ill-prepared District Government, have 
used legislation to legitimise certain organisations at the expense of others. The 
legitimised capital-rich organisations can thus be seen as 'gentrified', as they are 
rendered visible to processes of governance and deemed suitable representatives of 
civil society. 
This explanation, however, underestimates NGO agency. By lending 
primacy to the policy environment in Brcko, such an account supports a 'supply-
side' interpretation of gentrification, where the state is perceived to guide the 
process through targeted legislation. In practice, the NGOs themselves were active 
in shaping the policy to suit their own institutional survival. As competing 
organisations could not fulfil the criteria of registration, the policy became an 
instrument of gentrification for the NGOs. This dynamic was illustrated at a meeting 
called by the OHR on February 181h 2003. This event was organised as a response to 
the widespread criticism by the NGOs of the new Law of Associations and 
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Foundations. Despite being arranged by the OHR and hosted at the OSCE Political 
Resource Centre, the OHR Political Officer who chaired the meeting was keen to 
portray it as a "grassroots initiative"40 • It is ironic that the OHR could organise a 
"grassroots initiative" against a law that their legal department drew up, though it 
neatly illustrates the symbolic capital of OHR in its ability to monitor both the 
production and consumption of government legislation in Brcko. The meeting was 
well attended by the NGOs as they packed in to a small seminar room on a very cold 
winter evening. Based on my experience from the interviews I was expecting the 
organisations to be highly critical of the OHR and the District Government (who 
sent no representation) and to call for a lowering of the registration fee. 
In practice, the course of the meeting did not follow these straightforward 
expectations. Following an introduction from the OHR Political Officer 
summansmg the complaints she had heard concerning registration, each NGO 
representative stood up and described their experiences of attempting to register in 
Brcko. All the contributions followed a similar pattern: introduction; thanks to the 
OHR for calling the meeting; complaints about the injustices of the registration fees 
and bureaucracy. The OHR representative attempted to steer the meeting towards a 
measurable outcome asking the organisations "what are you able to undertake 
together?" "We should write a letter to the Mayor" suggested the representative from 
the Scouts' Union, to much agreement. "We should ask for an annulment of the 
registration fees - why should we pay again?" enquired a Proni representative. 
Though the universal benefit of reducing registration fees would seem to be beyond 
question, the notion of a reduction sparked arguments. The Women's Roundtable 
representative began to warn against lowering registration fees: 
4° Comment by OHR Political Officer in an NGO Registration Meeting, Brcko 18th February 2003. 
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If the cost of registration is dropped all sorts of associations would want to register. Then 
some organisations that were multi ethnic would divide and register on their own ... NGOs 
shouldn't have a political stance. 
(Comment by a representative of Women's Roundtable, NGO Registration 
Meeting 181h February 2003) 
These remarks were clearly targeted at the Women's Roundtable 'rivals' the Serb 
Sister's Association and the Bosnijak Women's Association, while containing a 
veiled threat to the OHR that the Women's Roundtable could split if registration 
were free. This sentiment highlights how the NGOs were attempting to use the 
registration fee to reproduce a series of cultural traits attached to being an NGO, one 
of which was multi-ethnicity. The representative from the Women's Roundtable 
was suggesting that to gentrify, that is to become recognised as an NGO, should 
involve surrendering the social capital of nationalist affiliation (which had been so 
lucrative in the case of St. Sava' s Youth Association and the Serbian Youth 
Association). There seems to be an innate exclusivity behind this sentiment: either 
benefit from legal legitimacy or continue to benefit from nationalist political 
patronage. In a similar way, the representative of the Scouts' Union suggested that 
only 'local' organisations should benefit from a reduction in the registration fee, as 
international organisations "could afford it"41 • Again, the registration fee was being 
utilised as a tactic by the NGOs to ensure that gentrified NGOs were a community of 
'local' organisations, as opposed to including those that benefit already from 
international links. While these two examples suggest an underlying economic 
motivation for support of the registration fee, there were also comments concerning 
the cultural make-up of prospective NGOs. The Regional Coordinator of Proni 
related her experience of attending a follow-up meeting at the Political Resource 
Centre and being told by a series of organisations that when the registration fee had 
41 Comment made by a representative of the Scouts' Union, NGO Registration Meeting 18th February 
2003. 
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been reduced in Serbia "the next thing that happens is that you have people setting 
d 1 b . ,42 up gay an es Ian groups . 
The example of the Law of Associations and Foundations demonstrates the 
bureaucratisation of the symbolic capital held by the agencies of the state. Brcko 
District's improvised state, operating in this instance though the District 
Government and OHR, attempted to confer legitimacy only on those organisations 
with reserves of economic capital by setting high demands for NGO registration. 
This technique appears to render these civil society organisations distinct from the 
state, labelling them as 'non-governmental organisations' and granting them 
individual legal personality. However, the NGOs economic motivation to register 
(the desire to gain Government funding for specific projects) connected the NGOs to 
the state institutions in Brcko; while in symbolic terms, registration was producing 
visible and classifiable NGOs, leading to their enrolment into the governmental 
structures of Brcko District. This would suggest that rather than acting as a locus of 
dissent or civic participation, the NGOs were striving economically and 
symbolically to correspond with the demands of a blurred and nebulous state in 
Brcko Dist1ict. 
These processes also reinforce the gentrification of civil society. The 
demands for economic capital within the new legislation made donor funding a 
prerequisite to NGO registration. This reinforced the struggles for social and 
cultural capital discussed earlier in the chapter. In addition, the process of 
registration was reformulated by the NGOs themselves to suit their image of a 
gentrified civil society, purged of particular cultural traits. Rather than acting as a 
space of dissent or a check on state power, the gentrified NGOs were seemingly 
complicit with the agencies of the improvised state. The legislation was designed to 
render the NGOs visible, both to instruments of taxation and, potentially, to 
government funding. While this could be interpreted as demonstrating the rigid 
structure of state control over NGOs, in practice the situation seems more nuanced 
as the legislation was greeted by the NGOs with selective resistance and acceptance. 
The NGOs seemed disposed to act in certain ways as a consequence of their 
42 Interview with the Regional Coordinator Proni, Brcko 7th May 2004 
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accumulated capital coupled as valued by the surrounding institutional context. This 
example of NGO registration highlights how the stmcture and agency of civil 
society gentrification can be better understood as a shared habitus, produced and 
reproduced by enmeshed state agencies and NGOs. 
The metaphor of gentrification highlights the transfmmation of ce1tain civil 
society actors, wealthy in capital terms, into NGOs. This process is structured by 
the survival instincts of these 'fictive individuals' as they strive to secure funding 
and legitimacy within the shifting discourses and practices of post-conflict Brcko. 
To identify certain organisations as gentrified involves the simultaneous recognition 
that certain organisations and individuals have either resisted this process or did not 
possess the requisite capital to gentrify. The final section of the chapter examines 
these 'ungentrified' spaces of civil society. 
6.5 Organisational Absences 
We waited by the verge of the road to Tuzla in Brodusa in the bitter cold. Sane/a seemed 
unsure of where we were to meet the representative from the Roma Association, a group I 
had previously been told "did not exist" and were "impossible to get hold of"43 . We had 
managed to call the President of the association on a mobile phone and he had told us to 
come at a specified time and wait in the centre of Brodusa. After twenty minutes we called 
again and had no response. We were beginning to give up hope when a large battered blue 
lorry rumbled to a halt next to us and a man opened the door and said "Fahrudin sam, 
hajde44 ". He was a giant of a man with hands like satellite dishes covered with tattoos. We 
drove through Brodusa, past many lorries dropping off supplies for the permanent 
reconstruction work that is taking place in this part of town that was once the frontline of the 
conflict. [See Figure 6.5 overleaf] After ten minutes the asphalt ended and the road tuned 
into a quagmire. It was very misty as the lorry stopped where the minefields stretched out 
marking the end of town. We headed for a house which, like many others, had only its 
ground floor rebuilt. Fahrudin beckoned us in, it was definitely a 'shoes off' situation. We 
were ushered through a bare front room (apart from a Vel)' colourjitl carpet) and, after 
going through a curtain, up some concrete steps. We were in a 'living room' upstairs, where 
43 These comments had been made in an interview with a representative from Firefly Youth Project, 
15th September 2002. 
44 
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Figure 6.5 Brodusa, Brcko 
(Source: Author's collection) 
there were no windows and it was extremely cold. Sitting in the room already were two other 
men, as it turned out the vice-president and treasurer of the Roma Association. The meeting 
was really interesting, though the usual problems with Sane/a's translating. But they 
certainly weren 't that chatty. They seemed resigned to the lack of help from the government, 
as they weren 't getting any money. It struck me that they didn't want to 'play the game' like 
other organisations. They didn 't talk in discourses or buzzwords, they just wanted better 
sanitation and humanitarian conditions for the Roma. In their discussion of the conditions, 
and from what I had seen on the journey in the lorry, nothing had moved fonvard, it seems 
that Dayton has overlooked them and they haven 't been able to go through the usual 
channels. Half way through the interview an old lady entered the room (I think she was 
Fahrudin 's mother) and sat on a carpet-covered sofa next to the window. She kept looking 
across and smiling while gesturing as if to rub her arms saying "zima, zima ,.45 She said 
she had twelve children and what they really needed was a disco, and then laughed doing a 
funny dance with her arms. It was a real contrast to the three men. They explained that they 
couldn't even gain support from the network of Bosnian Roma Associations in Tuzla and 
Sarajevo because they are perceived as rich because they come from Brcko District. But 
45 Translated as ' winter, winter', a common expression in Brcko indicating the cold. 
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Brcko District Government isn't helping them out. So it seems that both the 'informal' and 
the formal' networks are failing them. It struck me that they are t1ying to improve the 
conditions of their grQYJ2, and not simply trying to advance the standing of their 
organisation. This is difficult ground in this 'ethnicised' post-conflict situation because the 
temptation is to start talking of Serb Groups fl)ling to work fm· 'their' people and the same 
with Bosnijaks and Croats [ ... ] 
(Extract from field journal 27th February 2003 original emphasis) 
This account describes a trip to the Roma Association in Brodusa on the 
outskirts of Brcko. As this narrative suggests, the Roma Association had been 
difficult to find, it did not send any representative to OHR coordination meetings 
and it took no part in the negotiations to reduce the registration fee, though it had 
registered in 1999 in Bijeljina. By not taking part in these activities it had been 
rendered 'invisible' within Brcko District, or as the representative from Firefly 
Youth Project had suggested it "did not exist'A6. The language of the meeting with 
the Roma Association differed markedly from other interviews, there was no 
mention of applying for donor funding, of speaking English, of printing business 
cards or establishing an office. The organisation did not appear to be in a struggle 
with other organisations over such objects of social or cultural capital, and as such it 
did not seem interested in displaying the traits that constituted 'being an NGO' in 
Brcko. This move to resist struggles over capital seemed to disconnect the Roma 
Association from other NGOs, from the organisations of the state and even, as they 
suggested in the meeting, from other Roma Associations. Rather than gentrifying 
and binding itself closer to organisations of authority and power, the Roma group 
appeared to be an autonomous and ungentrified organisation speaking from the 
margm. 
In a corresponding way, there seemed to be no pressure from state 
organisations such as the OHR or District Government to gentrify the Roma 
Association. The Roma did not seem to fit the symbolic landscape of prescribed 
46 These comments had been made in an interview with a representative from Firefly Youth Project, 
15°' September 2002. 
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solutions within Brcko, constructed as they were from the notion of ethnic conflict 
between Bosnijaks, Serbs and Croats. While there was little room within such a 
response for plural or multiple identities, there was even less for minority groups 
which existed outside this construct of three-way ethnic enmity. There were 
tentative efforts by international donor organisations to assist the Roma people 
through the Roma Association, for example in 2002 the UNDP ran a project to 
encourage Roma education through the provision of school supplies and money for 
each child attending school. Unlike many such partnerships, these activities were 
not focussed on 'capacity building' the Roma Association, through training in how 
to apply for funding or dealing with agencies of authority. Such training was 
considered unnecessary as the Roma Association were not considered "like an 
NG0"47 , but rather an unclassifiable organisation outside the symbolic 
understanding of post-conflict Brcko. This is an example of a civil society actor that 
has not gentrified into an NGO under the gaze of international intervention. 
The Roma Association was not the only example of such ungentrified civil 
society in Brcko District. Another group of organisations that were acting as focal 
point for community participation were the Mjesne Zajednice (MZs). As discussed 
in Chapter 4, these territorially constituted organisations emerged from the 1974 
Yugoslav Constitution and were the lowest strata oflocal government and conceived 
as a form of direct popular association (Pusic, 1975:137). They were small-scale 
organizations, with eighty-two covering present-day Brcko District (Rosenbaum, 
2001). Though the 1974 constitution did not grant MZs revenue-raising powers, in 
practice this became necessary as the Yugoslav Federation began to weaken. 
According to Allcock (2000) each Yugolsav municipality became a federal 
arrangement of MZs (Alcock, 2000: 92). Beyond these brief surveys of Yugoslav 
constitutional arrangements it is difficult to find details of how MZs operated on a 
day-to-day basis. Anecdotal evidence suggests that their membership was nearly 
exclusively male and beyond their governmental function they operated much like a 
social club. A friend from Mostar, who said that her friends jokingly use the term 
47 Interview with a UNDP Project Officer, Brcko 151h April 2003. 
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'Mjesne Zajednice' as a derogatory phrase for something pertaining to an old person, 
supported this impression. 
Whatever the form of MZs over the 1980s and 1990s, their role changed after 
the conflict. Following the Final Award in Brcko District the MZs were formally 
disbanded as, according to an OHR Political Officer, "the authority of Brcko District 
Government cannot be sub-divided, and so the Mjesne Zajednice cannot have any 
governmental function"48 • This differs from the RS and Federation where the MZs 
have retained a government role, collecting taxes and indicating areas of community 
need. Since their formal dissolution their role in Brcko has been more difficult to 
define, as they have continued to informally function as loci of community 
organization, particularly in the field of returns. Though traditionally territorially 
defined, following the displacement of Brcko's population during the conflict whole 
MZs relocated to function as 'MZs in exile'. In an interview a Bosnijak displaced 
person (DP) explained the way in which the MZ from Klanac (see Map 5.1) 
relocated to the village of Rahic following the violent displacement of the urban 
population to rural areas of the District: 
DP: These old MZs never stopped working, for example MZ Klanac leadership was the 
same but in Rahic. They had their office there, they had people who would come and join 
and have fun, well not fun, but have meetings or whatever. They organised events. 
AJ: So people displaced from Klanac all over the district would go to the office in Rahic? 
DP: Yes, and they organised reconstruction. The Serbs in Klanac in town formed their own 
MZ and have stayed. 
(Excerpt from an interview with a Bosnijak DP, Brcko, 22nd April2003) 
As this exchange suggests, the MZs became conduits for information 
between state agencies (such as the OHR and the Brcko District Government) and 
returnee groups. While NGOs were apparently misunderstood and perceived as 
48 Discussion with the OHR Political officer, Brcko, 13th September 2004. 
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'intemational', MZs were reportedly "much easier to understand[ ... ] because it was 
like that before the war and people can see MZs are fighting for them[ ... ] there are 
people every day going to MZs with requests for something or another"49 . It seems 
that the continuity of MZs, from pre- to post-conflict granted them a variety of 
symbolic capital, manifest as legitimacy and trust, which the gentrified NGOs could 
not accumulate, regardless of funding, capacity building or institutional support. 
Often NGOs drew on this symbolic capital to advance their work; the Italian 
agricultural NGO Cric, which was based in a rural part of the District, described 
MZs as "vital partners"50 when working with rural communities. 
Despite these successes, there were many concems amongst the intemational 
agencies about the political role played by MZs, as alluded to by a former OHR 
official: 
The most important role of MZs since the war has been the dissemination of information. It 
is about dissemination of information both upwards and down. And the problem is that since 
the MZs themselves will end up themselves being politically aligned, the information that is 
being passed will always go through a filter at the MZ leadership stage. 
(Interview with former OHR Official, Brcko 2nd June 2003) 
While certain MZs in Brcko District were described as "too political" to be regarded 
as 'civil society' actors, others were embraced as partners within community 
development projects. The problem that was often communicated in the interviews 
was the difficulty knowing which of these kinds ofMZ you could be dealing with, as 
explained by an OHR Political Officer: 
49 Interview with a Bosnijak DP, Brcko, 22"d April 2003. 
50 Interview with Agricultural NGO Cric, Donja Skakava, 181h March 2003. 
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[ ... ] they are a bit of a Jekyll and Hyde [ ... ] They [MZs] really are the most committed form 
at present, taking care of the residents within that area. They have, in that sense, very 
legitimate concerns. But there are examples, such as Klanac, which are totally dominated by 
political parties, by party politics. I think the problem lies, in fact, when it comes to [pause] 
coming from a position where they had very strong links with the government when they 
had all these competences at the local level and they had an understanding with the 
government on how things are done and what to expect. The same kind of scenario has 
embedded itself, as it does in most relationships, that the politics take over and becomes an 
issue of you having the power and you putting your man into government. And this is 
something that we wanted to break. 
(Interview with an OHR Political Officer, Brcko 241h May 2003) 
These perceived dangers of MZs as potentially 'Hyde' -like political 
organisations was also reflected in the language of the USAID funded District 
Management Team report on municipal assistance for Brcko District compiled m 
2001: 
By not fully appreciating the potential obstacle that the MZs could have been, and still may 
be, to the process of governance consolidation, a false sense of security regarding the 
stability of the institutions that have been established has perhaps been created. In this 
regard, efforts should be initiated to create ethnically integrated, community-based units of 
the District Government which can serve as a part of the Brcko governance structure. In all 
probability, at least some of the leadership of the MZs can and need to be integrated into 
such an effort. One alternative that might be initiated by the District Government is the 
establishment of 10 to 15 geographically based (if necessary, they could be gerrymandered 
in such a manner as to insure ethnic diversity) elected or appointed neighborhood councils. 
Such councils, while remaining subordinate to the District Government, could be delegated 
authority to allocate modest financial resources to facilitate community improvements and 
possibly given some degree of authority in the areas of planning and zoning. 
(Rosenbaum, 2001) 
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These candid remarks point to the level of international engineering which 
was considered necessary to depoliticise and regulate the activities of MZs. This 
strategy was evident m the UNDP BLAP's attempt to create 'Community 
Development Groups' as rival non-political local community associations, in a 
similar vein to the 'neighbourhood councils' suggested by Rosenbaum (2001) above. 
The Programme Manager of UNDP BLAP explained enthusiastically "the MZs were 
not representative, so we approached the communities and told them about 
representation"51 • According a UNDP Project Officer the process of 'improving 
representation' involved ensuring that the Community Development Groups 
included "representatives of youth, farming associations and women"52 . There have, 
however, been doubts in certain quarters as to the viability of 'creating' new systems 
of communal organization, as articulated by a former OHR Official: 
The MZs are much more experienced with dealing with the international community than 
the international community is with dealing with MZs. So, they will, I have been here a long 
time and they will quite openly, openly as far as I am concerned, they will recruit members 
of the other ethnicity in order to make them more attractive to donors and NGOs, they know 
that absolutely. One of the MZs I deal with is I 00% Serb, but they did have one mixed 
marriage and I think there was a Muslim that lived on the border of the MZ. And the MZ 
leader was hilarious in including their name so that they got Muslim, a Croat and a Serb! 
The cynical manipulation of the International Community is quite amusing to watch. 
(Interview with former OHR Official, Brcko 2nd June 2003) 
This MZ-led representation was reflected in the formation the UNDP 'Community 
Development Groups' in eleven localities in Brcko District. The evaluation report 
of UNDP BLAP described the selection and setting up of these development groups 
as "particularly challenging for a number of reasons including local mistrust towards 
outsiders and a sense of dependency and entitlement due to previous humanitarian 
assistance for which nothing was asked in return" (UNDP, 2001: 23). In light of 
these potential difficulties I asked the UNDP Programme Manager how they had 
51 Interview with UNDP BLAP Programme Manager, 18th Febmary 2003. 
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approached the target communities and she laughed and exclaimed "oh, mainly 
through the MZs!"53 In supporting the sentiment of the former OHR Official, this 
comment reveals an 'MZ pragmatism' which permeated other areas of the UNDP 
Programme. In the glossy Community Development Strategies produced for each of 
the eleven localities the quantitative data is divided in terms of MZs and the groups 
define themselves as 'Local Community Development Groups', suggesting almost a 
sub-set 'development group' of the Mjesne Zajednice. It seems that that though 
lengths were taken by the UNDP to avoid the discourse of MZs, tainted as they were 
with uncertainty and political associations, they remained a key tool for organising 
community participation. 
The process of rendering the MZs 'representative' and 'readable' as 
Community Development Groups appeared more for the benefit of agencies of 
authority than for local people. In a move related to the classification of MZs, the 
OHR was drawing up a Law of Local Communities over the course of the fieldwork 
period. Like the Law of Associations, the intended outcome of this legislation was 
the legal registration of all the MZs, coupled with a formal rejection of their 
governmental function. An OHR Political Officer described this process: 
The Law on Local Communities establishes a reality that government competences have 
been taken away from local communities and so now in order to reassert their power they 
need to depend on something other than simply institutional cooperation with the 
government. They need to build up as grassroots pressure which is the only way of holding 
the government accountable. 
(Interview with an OHR Political Officer, Brcko 241h May 2003) 
This comment portrays how the new Law of Local Communities was being designed 
to place institutional distance between the government and the MZs. This rhetoric is 
reminiscent of the discourses of institutional autonomy, rendering civil society as 
distinct from the state. The familiarity between MZs and the District Government 
52 Interview with UNDP Project Officer, Brcko 15th April 2003. 
53 Interview with UNDP BLAP Programme Manager, 18th February 2003. 
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was, according to the OHR, a barrier to the celebrated democratic attribute of 
"transparency": 
The way that authorities view MZs and include them is because the relationship is much 
more defined with the MZs than it is with the NGOs. Their patience with them is just a 
testimony that they are aware what is going on, who this MZ belongs to politically and their 
political infighting. And if these political bodies exercise influence on the government over 
the allocation of resources then we are in a very non-transparent system 
(Comment made by OHR Political Officer, Brcko 241h April 2003) 
This comment demonstrates the broad desire amongst the agencies of the 
state to convert MZs to NGOs so as to render the organisations 'more transparent', 
just as the District Supervisor had seen the role of NGOs as viewing the transparent 
democratic performance of the District Government (see Chapter 4). The UNDP 
Programme Manager explained that they would have a small fund that they could 
apply to for the funding of projects54 • The Proni Regional Coordinator described a 
programme they were organising to train MZ leaders in drawing up logical 
frameworks for funding proposals55 • Such strategies coalesce to represent a broad 
tactic of gentrifying the MZs into NGOs, to expose them to the same struggles for 
capital and attempt to render them 'autonomous' from government intervention. 
Such an objective operates with a narrow interpretation of governmental action, as 
the evidence from this chapter suggests that the gentrification of MZs into NGOs 
would not 'autonomise' the organisations but rather qualitatively alter their 
enrolment into the operation of state power. In contrast to the MZs as recognised 
governmental agents, the production of 'NGOs' allows the illusion of autonomy, to 
reproduce the notion of a separate state and civil society. 
As in the case of the Roma Association, the MZs are not in the symbolic 
gaze of international intervention as it has been enacted in Brcko District. They are 
not classifiable, neither new nor old, neither 'the state' nor 'civil society' but hybrids 
54 Discussed in an interview with the UNDP BLAP Programme Manager, Brcko 181h February 2003. 
55 Discussed in an interview with the Proni Regional Coordinator, Brcko 7th May 2003. 
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of the two, and as such they have been rendered invisible within official accounts. 
While international discourses of 'localisation' have gained popularity, the MZs 
appear to represent organizations that are too local, as they do not possess the social 
or cultural capital to transform into NGOs. In contrast, gentlified NGOs can easily 
be classed as civil society, because they operate within an understood language and 
classificatory system contained within international discourses and practices of 
intervention. In cultural capital terms the past political connections of MZs in 
conjunction with their 'local' status trumps the meager value placed on acting as a 
locus of civic participation and organization. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The metaphor of gentrification has been used to desclibe the way in which 
social space has been transformed through the investment of social, cultural and 
economic capital. This metaphor helps explain the dual paradox of NGOs in Brcko. 
The first part of this paradox emerged in the previous chapter from the identification 
ofNGOs by the agencies of the state (led by the OHR) as 'civil society', embodying 
locally embedded grassroots organisations providing a window on the performance 
of democracy in Brcko. Conversely, however, in the post-conflict period NGOs 
have come to be seen in Brcko as 'international' and 'wealthy'. The reproduction of 
this paradox can be explained in terms of the struggle by NGOs to accumulate social 
and cultural capital under the gaze of donor organisations and the state. By 
deploying the conceptual tools of Pierre Bourdieu, this struggle is seen as neither a 
product of rigid structures nor the individual agency of the organisations involved. 
Instead, there is a prevailing habitus of shared dispositions, shaped by the NGOs, 
donor organisations and the agencies of the state. The process of gentrification has 
drained the NGOs of a number of traits that are commonly held to define civil 
society. Gentrification has removed NGOs from local or grassroots structures as they 
are bound closer with donor and state agencies. Rather than encouraging collective 
undertakings, the process of gentrification leads to more competition and 
individualisation between the organisations. In addition, instead of acting as a locus 
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of dissent or a check on state power, the gentrified NGOs are enrolled as a symbolic 
resource granting legitimacy to state practices. 
The second part of the dual paradox emerges from the ungentrified spaces of 
civil society. While organisations such as the Roma Association and the Mjesne 
Zajednice have become key sites of civic participation they have been marginalised 
in terms of donor funding and have been ignored in formal processes of NGO 
coordination. These organisations do not fit the symbolic landscape of international 
intervention, as they blur and problematise the sanitised discourses of ethnic conflict 
(in the case of the Roma Association) and understandings of state and non-state 
actors (in the case of the Mjesne Zajednice). The exclusion of such organisations 
from official discourses points to an underlying symbolic violence, as NGOs become 
'understood' as the only official representatives of civil society. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: 
Examining spaces of 
democracy 
The bridge was about two hundred and fifty paces long and about ten paces wide save the 
middle where it widened out into two completely equal terraces placed symmetrically on 
either side of the roadway and making it twice its normal width. This was the part of the 
bridge known as the kapija. [ ... ]The kapija was the most important part of the bridge, even 
as the bridge was the most important part of the town, or as a Turkish traveller, to whom the 
people ofVisegrad had been very hospitable, wrote in his account of his travels: 'their kapija 
is the heart of the bridge, which is the heart of the town which must remain in everyone's 
heart'. [ ... ] At every time of year the kapija was a real boon for great and small. Then every 
citizen could, at any time go out to the kapija and sit on the sofa, or hang about it on business 
or in conversation. [ ... ] Someone affirmed long ago (it is true that he was a foreigner and 
spoke in jest) that this kapija had an influence on the fate of the town and even on the 
character of its citizens. 
(Andric, 2000: 14-20) 
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In The Bridge on the Drina (2000) Ivo Andric uses the construction of a 
stone bridge in Visegrad, eastem Bosnia, as a central point in his vivid depiction of 
the ebbs and flows of regional history. As this extract describes, at the centre of the 
bridge is a kapija, a communal area where local townspeople would gather to 
deliberate on politics, religion and the affairs of the town. In AndriC's account, the 
kapija acts as a symbol of the possibilities for the negotiation of individual and 
collective interests and therefore recalls a particular ideal of civil society associated 
with classical literature (see Arato and Cohen, 1995: 7-8). The ephemeral moments 
of interaction and exchange on the kapija suggest informal associations organised 
around trust and tradition. It was these moments of civic association that this 
ethnographic research has attempted to capture, through an examination of the 
production of civil society in post-conflict Brcko District, Bosnia. 
This final chapter presents the two key arguments of the thesis, followed by a 
discussion of the relevance of this ethnographic research to the theories and practices 
of political geography. The first argument centres upon the practices of 
democratization in Brcko District. Despite the rhetoric of Brcko District's unique 
status within Bosnia, the intemational interventions in the area have depended upon 
the same reductive conceptions of multi-ethnicity and democracy rehearsed in the 
Dayton Agreement. Rather than encouraging more fluid conceptions of territory and 
identity, the intemational intervention in Brcko has echoed discourses of 'neutrality' 
and democratic 'transparency'. The second argument concems the production of 
civil society in Brcko District. The conflation of NGOs with civil society in Brcko 
has led to a process of 'social gentrification', where particular individuals and 
organisations strive to gain funding and legitimacy. This process, whereby 
intemational organisations recognise and reward local organisations capable of 
projecting a particular 'professional' image, marginalises institutions unwiiiing or 
unable to conform to bourgeois norms. This thesis draws attention to the Mjesne 
Zajednice, community associations which demonstrate the values of civil society but 
lack the social and cultural capital that would valorize them in the eyes of the 
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improvised state in Brcko District. The final section of the conclusion reflects on the 
impm1ance of these findings to contemporary political geography. 
7.2 The Democratization of Brcko District 
The international response to the Bosnian conflict was characterised by two 
interlinked discourses: Balkanism, which presented the conflict as a consequence of 
'ancient ethnic hatreds', and ontopology, where ethno-national identities were linked 
to specific territories (Todorova, 1997; Campbell, 1998a drawing on Derrida, 1994). 
The result was the Dayton Peace Agreement which divided Bosnia into two 
'entities': the Muslim Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. Many 
international observers were quick to point to the success of this strategy, claiming 
that it had ended the cycles of military violence, whilst also creating a "unified 
multi-ethnic Bosnian state" (Holbrooke, 1999). The experiences of post-conflict 
Bosnia have not reflected this celebratory rhetoric (Campbell, 1999; Hayden, 2002), 
as the existence of the two entities has prevented the functioning of state institutions, 
and allowed nationalist political leaders to continue to trade on fear of conquest by 
other 'ethnic groups' (Belloni, 2001). The continuing strength of nationalist political 
parties, coupled with high levels of international intervention years after the end of 
the conflict, would appear to cast doubt on the viability of ontopology as a 
peacemaking strategy. 
Brcko offered an alternative to the idea that ethno-national identities should 
be reflected in the establishment of ethnically distinct territories. The absence of this 
territory from the Dayton Peace Agreement provided an opportunity to enact a multi-
ethnic solution, in contrast to the polarisation of the two entities. In 1999, the 'Final 
Award' established the former Brcko Municipality as a 'special district' of Bosnia, 
separate from the two entities and committed to multi-ethnic government, schools, 
judiciary and police. This solution involved a dramatic increase in the scale of 
international intervention, as the Office of the High Representative assigned a 
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District Supervisor to administer the creation of the 'special district' and the 
establishment of 'multi-ethnic democracy'. 
Though there have been successes m Brcko in relation to the return of 
refugees and economic performance, this has been matched by increased 
international supervision and intervention. My research suggests that the emphasis 
on 'multi-ethnicity' in the Final Award has not generated vocabularies of multi-
ethnic identity within the organisations responsible for governing the District in the 
post-conflict period. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that international organisations 
charged with the task of governing post-conflict Brcko have replaced notions of 
multi-ethnicity with policies of ethnic neutrality. Rather than promoting genuinely 
plural institutions and opportunities for increased interaction between ethnic groups, 
ethnic neutrality simply implies that Bosnijaks, Croats and Serbs should be treated 
the same. This technique echoes the moral equivalency of international responses 
during the conflict itself, where no side could be blamed for the "bewildering" 
conflict (Major, 1999). As a consequence of the creation of Brcko District, 
international agencies such as the OHR gained such comprehensive legislative and 
executive power that they can be best described as an 'improvised state', stepping in 
to perform state practices whenever they deem necessary. This improvised state has 
used such powers to confer democratic legitimacy, reducing the conception of multi-
ethnic democracy to the use of ethnic quota systems to appoint government officials, 
to ensure that the Government and Assembly exhibit the 'correct' ethnic balance. 
Drawing on innovative approaches within political geography and cultural 
studies (Cresswell 1996; Edkins, 2003; Butler, 2004), my thesis also examined the 
politics of the changing landscape of post-conflict Brcko. The reduction of multi-
ethnicity to neutrality was reflected in the interventions of the improvised state into 
the symbolic environment of Brcko, through practices such as renaming the streets 
and issuing new house numbers. Rather than attempting to address issues of trauma 
and reconciliation, these interventions have encouraged the Brcko society to 'forget'. 
The only sanctioned commemoration is that of 'Brcko District Day', an occasion 
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which serves to revitalise the improvised state through the celebration of its founding 
moment. 
Alongside reductive conceptions of multi-ethnicity, international 
intervention in Brcko has conceived democracy in narrow terms as 'transparency'. 
The Supervisor cited the ability of citizens to monitor the performances of the OHR-
appointed District Government as evidence of the 'democratization' of the District. 
This conception of democracy has a series of effects. In the attempt to confer 
legitimacy on the practices of the District Government and Assembly, this discursive 
strategy draws attention away from the decision-making power of the OHR. In 
addition, this conception of democracy, lacking any form of electoral competition, 
sets a requirement for individuals and organisations to monitor the activities of the 
government. In the discourses of the OSCE and OHR, this monitoring role should be 
played by the organisations of 'civil society'. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this ethnographic examination 
of the democratization of Brcko District. First, intervention in Brcko has not 
involved a substantive rethinking of concepts of multi-ethnicity or democracy in 
Bosnia. Individuals in Brcko have been essentialised by international agencies, 
defined by their 'ethnicity'. As Campbell (1998a) points out in relation to wider 
interventions in Bosnia, this practice serves to exclude or erase the possibility of 
multi-cultural or hybrid identities. In this optic, international intervention into the 
territory of Brcko was conceived in terms of competing ontopological visions, rather 
than constructing more fluid or plural conceptions of territory. 
Second, this ethnographic focus draws attention to the importance of 
examining the processes through which the state is performed, as opposed to more 
conventional material interpretations. Such a reconceptualisation serves to challenge 
claims that characterise the Bosnian state as 'weak' or 'failed'. The central Bosnian 
government may be weak, but state practices in Brcko certainly appeared strong. 
This was an 'improvised state', where the responsibilities and competences were 
fulfilled by an ever-changing array of international and local agencies. The final act 
of legitimacy was performed by the OHR, as it held the symbolic capital necessary to 
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Impose recognition on ce11ain activities, while branding others as illegal or 
illegitimate (Bourdieu, 1989). 
7.3 The Production of Civil Society 
Since the early 1990s, scholars and practitioners have increasingly positioned 
ideas of 'civil society' at the centre of notions of successful development (Crook, 
2001; Doornbos, 2001). In a European context, the role of dissident movements in 
challenging authoritarianism in Central and Eastern Europe leant particular credence 
to the notion that, by strengthening civil society, organisations could encourage 
liberal democratic change more broadly. Over the following years, the rise of civil 
society has become indelibly linked to the transition from authoritarian regimes to 
liberal democracy. The actions of the dissident groups saw civil society cast as a 
virtuous set of organisations, capable of holding the state to account and providing 
new spaces of civic engagement. These activities have led to a distinct democratic 
discourse of civil society which has embraced civil society as autonomous from the 
state (Lewis, 2001; Mandel, 2002). 
The evidence from interviews and policy documents suggests that the 
international agencies operating in Brcko shared this normative view that civil 
society is necessarily distinct from the state. This definition has facilitated the 
branding of NGOs as examples of civil society organisations. However, this 
conflation of civil society and NGOs is a fraught representative strategy. The 
emergence of NGOs as agents of humanitarian relief during the Bosnian conflict 
influences their role in the post-conflict period. As a consequence of the abundant 
funding for aid and relief during the conflict large sections of the Brcko public link 
the term 'NGO' to organisations which are wealthy and international. This 
presented a paradox: while international agencies embraced NGOs as civil society 
organisations capable of stimulating civic participation, NGOs were viewed by the 
Brcko public (and often by the NGOs themselves) as disconnected from local 
struggles and linked to international networks of funding and regulation. 
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I have shown how these shifting perceptions of NGOs are linked to real 
changes in the role and function of local NGOs in Brcko District during the post-
conflict period. In the quest for funding, local NGOs are increasingly seeking to 
acquire particular forms of social and cultural capital. The metaphor of 
gentrification points to the ways in which NGOs compete to deploy donor discourses 
and demonstrate their grasp of English, computing skills and staff management. I 
have also shown how the struggle among local NGOs to acquire these forms of 
capital has provoked competition, suspicion and secrecy. The production of a series 
of secretive organisations struggling to retain valuable information is contrary to the 
role prescribed for civil society by the OHR as monitors of the transparent processes 
of the Brcko Government. In addition, the struggles for social and cultural capital 
have reduced the radicalism of NGO projects, as they prioritise their quest for 
funding over developing emancipatory political projects. Rather than offering 
dissent, the NGOs sought to tailor their projects and aspirations to suit the priorities 
of donor organisations. 
In chapter 6, I argued that these varied, and at times contradictory, processes 
of capital accumulation drew the NGOs into the gaze of the improvised state. This 
process of rendering NGOs visible to the state was most clearly illustrated through 
the introduction of the Law of Associations and Foundations in Brcko District. This 
strategy comprises one of the most explicit modalities of symbolic power: the use of 
legislation to legitimise certain activities and organisations. This law required all the 
NGOs to re-register in Brcko District, ensuring that they accorded with stringent 
financial and institutional requirements. Those organisations wealthy in terms of 
cultural and economic capital could register and label themselves an 'NGO', whilst 
those that could not register were excluded from funding opportunities and risked 
legal sanction. This process highlights the blurred and contested boundary between 
NGOs and the practices of the state in Brcko District. Moreover, these conclusions 
question the role of NGOs as autonomous centres of critique. Civil society 
organisations in Brcko were bound to the state through networks of regulation and 
funding and less visible processes of influence and legitimation. 
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This thesis has also identified limits to processes of gentrification. The 
Mjesne Zajednice (Local Communities or MZs) constitute an example of civil 
society that has remained ungentrified in post-conflict Brcko. Their connections to 
the state are explicit: prior to the conflict, they constituted the lowest strata of 
Yugoslav local government, with responsibilities for collecting taxation and 
communicating areas of social need to the central government. These official 
competences were removed in the post-conflict period, as the structures of the 
Dayton State failed to create a role for MZs. Unlike NGOs, MZs cannot be 
portrayed as distinct from the state. Indeed, the MZs are very difficult to define and 
categorise, and their association with Socialist Yugoslavia has seen them excluded 
from international funding or support. 
The MZs have assumed a number of social and political roles in Brcko 
District. In particular, they have acted as key agencies in pushing for the return of 
refugees, advocating on behalf of displaced persons to local government bodies. 
This is not to romanticise these associations, for a proportion of MZs have been 
captured by nationalist politics and others have attempted to block the return of 
refugees. However, their connections with the government and their morally 
inconsistent behaviour should not, a priori, discount them as civil society 
organisations. The MZs have accumulated trust within their communities, their 
membership transcends lines of 'ethnicity' and they act as important sites of 
deliberation and exchange. Consequently, it seems that the MZs most closely 
approximate AndriC's vision of the kapija as a space of communication and 
exchange. 
7.4 The Theory and Practice of Political Geography 
It is not my purpose here to suggest definitive conclusions from this study: 
the discussion of research positionality in Chapter 2 described the necessarily partial 
and situated nature of all research findings. Rather than claiming some kind of 
synthesis, the issues discussed within the case study of Brcko's democratization 
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intervene in five cunent areas of geographical research: the politics of NGOs; recent 
ethnographies of the state; the application of the theories of Piene Bourdieu; the use 
of ethnographic methodologies, and the practice of writing critical histories. Each of 
these themes will be addressed below. 
As the methodology adopted m this thesis suggests, to understand the 
processes of democratization in Brcko, or their absence, it is necessary to examine 
ethnographically the three-fold relationship between international agencies, locally 
based NGOs and the Bosnian State, as well as the manner in which this relationship 
is performed in practice - and represented in space. Such an approach evokes 
questions of politics, power and agency. Challenging an historical focus on NGOs 
as unproblematically virtuous, recent research has explored the diverse effects of 
NGO interventions in areas of the world dependent to advanced capitalism (Munay 
Li, 1999; Miller and Martin, 2003). Associated work has eschewed an historical 
focus on the external reports and large-scale projects to focus instead on the inner 
workings of power within these organisations (Howell, 2000; Mawdsley et al., 
2002). My distinctive contribution to this literature has been to examine the 
everyday operation of NGOs in Bosnia, drawing on interviews with key officials, 
participant observation and other observational strategies. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 6, this examination has highlighted the patterns of dependence and 
legitimacy binding NGOs with broader international organisations which have come 
to substitute the state. 
In exploring the aspirations and practices of the improvised state in Brcko, I 
have drawn on recent ethnographic work that re-theorises the state (see Trouillot, 
2002; Navaro-Yashin, 2002; Painter, 2003; Nordstrom, 2003). This literature looks 
beyond large-scale government structures and epochal events to explore the politics 
of everyday encounters between government and non-government officials. These 
practices were labelled the 'improvised state', a phrase which describes the ad hoc 
way in which state functions were canied out by a range of individuals and agencies. 
This argument contributes to debates concerning transnational governmentality by 
exposing the importance of new institutional forms distinct from government in 
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practices of contemporary governance (Gledhill, 1999; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; 
Flint, 2003). The concept of an improvised state also questions 'failed state' rhetoric, 
dependent as it is on normative assumptions of statehood. Rather than dismissing 
sites of post-conflict international intervention as 'failed states', there is a need for 
political geographers to take seriously the banal practices and spaces which serve to 
revitalise the improvised state and reproduce its symbolic power. 
The conflation of state power with the accumulation of symbolic capital was 
one way in which this thesis drew on the theorisations and methodologies of Pierre 
Bourdieu. There has been a limited use of Bourdieu's work within geographical 
literature, perhaps as a consequence of his sociological past and anthropological 
methodology (notable exceptions include Painter, 2000 and Cresswell, 2002). This 
thesis has demonstrated that Bourdieu' s conceptual framework of capital, field and 
habitus provides a valuable toolkit for political geographers as it illuminates the 
politics and struggles inherent in social practices. Employing these terms to describe 
the effects of international intervention in Brcko avoids reproducing binaries such as 
structure and agency which are enshrined in language itself (The Friday Morning 
Group, 1990: 196). Rather, the metaphor of gentrification was drawn upon to 
demonstrate the political effects of the accumulation of social and cultural capital 
within a shared habitus. 
In methodological terms, this thesis has employed an ethnographic mode of 
inquiry in order to take seriously 6 Tuathail's call for "grounded geographical 
knowledge over abstract geopolitical sloganizing" (6 Tuathail, 2003: 655). Recent 
scholarship has revealed the value of analysing OHR documents and regional 
newspaper reports in exposing the political dominance of nationalist discourse in 
Bosnia. I have combined analysis of this material with interviews and observation 
designed to explore how people interpret and receive ideas. This methodology was 
time-consuming and restricted the scope of the research to a small geographical area. 
However, it provided rich detail of the practices and meanings behind political 
action in Brcko District. It has also allowed the thesis to demonstrate the 'multiple 
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Brckos", overlaid on the same geographical space and represented though the 
polmised symbolic landscapes of commemoration and graffiti. 
These aspects of the landscape were also examined through a critical 
reconstruction of the history of post-conflict Bosnia. This approach points to the 
importance of situating present struggles for power and resources with reference to 
an historical understanding of regional politics. At the centre of this historical 
narrative is the importance of continuity. Academic narratives of Bosnia often select 
a single historical event through which to understand current regional politics, such 
as the violence ofWorld War II, the death ofTito, or Milosevic's speech in 1989 at 
the site of the Battle of Kosovo. The historical approach of this thesis has been to 
embrace historical continuity, as artefacts of previous political or social orders have 
been reconfigured in the present. The Mjesne Zajednice, established in the 1974 
Yugoslav constitution, constitute examples of such artefacts. As discussed above, 
the Mjesne Zajednice have emerged in post-conflict Brcko marked by a different 
political role but a similar social meaning. The importance of such organisations is 
too often lost within academic analysis, suggesting an unquestioned adherence to the 
OHR notion that Bosnia 'began' at the Dayton Agreement. 
This thesis has strived to evoke the complexity and contradictions inherent in 
contemporary Brcko District. Contrary to dominant narratives, Brcko is not a 
'special' district, distant or distinct from the political struggles that shape everyday 
life. Neither is Brcko a 'problem' that requires a solution. In questioning such 
imaginaries, this research has exposed the reductive thinking underpinning the 
presentation of Brcko as a 'multi-ethnic democracy'. This concern marks a 
continuing task for political geographers: to problematise discourses which stabilise 
the past into unquestioned narratives, to challenge interventions which reduce 
identities to singular characteristics, and to question the conflation of civil society 
with the actions ofNGOs. 
1 This concept echoes David Campbell's notion of 'MetaBosnia' or the multiple competing 'Bosnias' 
(See Camp bell, 1998a: x; Camp bell, 1998b ). 
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1. Name of Organisation: 
NGO Survey, IBrcko District 
September/October 2002 
Alex Jeffrey University of Durham 
12. Dale and location of registration: 
3. Address/phone/email in Brcko District: 
4. Organisational aims/objectives? 
5. What projects/activities/events does your organisation carry out or plan to carry 
out? 
6. What local and international linkages do you have with other NGOs and 
associations? 
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7. What links do you have with governmental organisations? 
8. Number of staff: 
a) paid 
b) voluntary 
9. What are your methods of fundraising? 
10. What are the long-term goals of the organisation? 
11. What problems have you experienced working in Brcko District? 
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